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Introduction
To accept the necessity for development, one must first accept one’s 
relative inferiority and inadequacy and the need to evolve and advance 
towards something else.1
Globalization is said to be the defining convention of the new millennium.2  For 
the Third World, however,3 development is the most important concept in the 
international system, for it is development that defines and locates the Third World 
within the international community.4   Whether praised or excoriated, defended or 
condemned, “development” shapes and dominates most thinking about Third World 
nations.5  Indeed, the peoples and nations of the world have come to be characterized in 
terms of their development or lack thereof.  Development has evolved into an essentially 
incontestable paradigm with such a powerful hold on our collective imaginations that it is 
almost impossible to think around it.
Since the advent of “development” in the early 1950s, Third World nations have 
demanded more meaningful assistance from monetarily richer countries and more control 
over their political and economic destinies.    Their demands have been largely rejected 
and/or ignored, and the assistance that has been made available has been accompanied by 
countless conditions. These conditions have often yielded disastrous results, including 
ever-mounting debt for numerous Third World governments and increasing deprivation 
for the very people the development project purports to assist.6  Even when measured in 
terms of its own stated goals and objectives, development has, for the most part, failed.7
As “experts” have promulgated widely varying and often contradictory theories and 
strategies, it has become increasingly apparent that they do not in fact know how to 
achieve the objectives that ostensibly define their expertise.8
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This article does not contend, however, that the experts need only devise the 
appropriate strategy, nor does it simply critique micro-development, civil participation, 
market-led development, sustainable development, gender and development or other 
current variations in an exceedingly long list of variations on the development theme.   
We do not assert that money is all that is needed,9 or that industrialized countries need 
only assume their responsibility to bring civilization to the desperate masses of the Third 
World.10  Rather, we challenge and interrogate the very concept of development.
Development is a set of practices and beliefs that are part of the Western political 
and cultural imagination, despite being presented as universal, natural and inevitable.  
The development paradigm comprises a pervasive and largely unquestioned set of 
interlocking ideological assumptions that must be exposed and then questioned.  It 
presumes a universal and superior way of ordering society, and that all societies are to 
advance toward the same goal.  Local and indigenous cultures, economies, self-concepts, 
and ways of existing are largely without value in this discourse (notwithstanding recent 
attempts at “local participation”), for the entire development project is premised on its 
subjects “developing” into something else – and that something else is the West.11  Thus, 
in the name of modernization, cultures have been destroyed, communities uprooted or 
eradicated, and whatever sovereignty emerging nations possessed has virtually 
disappeared.12
The concept of development privileges certain societies, cultures and institutions, 
while disparaging others; it is grounded in defining the “Other” as incompetent, inferior 
and in need of transformation.  That most “undeveloped” people are people of color only 
reinforces the Western view of the developing world as essentially dysfunctional, for it 
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comports with American views of brown and black people in the United States. For 
Europeans the development project continues the colonial civilizing mission.13 Taking up 
where colonialism and the “White man’s burden” left off, the development project 
provides the legal and moral justification for substantial interventions in the affairs of 
those who have been categorized as underdeveloped.14    It justifies and supports the 
economic and political status quo and the imbalance of international power, and it renders 
the underdeveloped powerless, for it is the developers who name subjects, problems and 
solutions.  The objective in the following pages is to construct and then deconstruct the 
concept of development, and to question whether development is so fundamentally 
flawed that it should be abandoned in favor of a post-development paradigm.  
   Part I constructs the theory of development, beginning with the discovery of 
global poverty after the Second World War.  It establishes how poverty is in some 
respects socially contingent, and how the notion of global poverty suddenly homogenized 
and problematized the lives of the majority of the world’s peoples.  With the impending 
Cold War and the disintegration of colonial empires as crucial backdrops, industrialized 
nations set out to eradicate poverty and bring the benefits of modernization to the 
impoverished masses of the newly de-colonizing world, and thus development as we now 
know it was born.  From its inception, development was informed and shaped by the 
meta-narrative of modernization, which is explored as the primary theoretical foundation 
for the undertakings that were to follow.15   Law and development is also analyzed as the 
legal manifestation of modernization theory and as an additional theoretical underpinning 
of development.
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Part II explores how development has been constructed in practice.  It begins with 
the international financial institutions that form the institutional edifice of the 
development project with particular emphasis on the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.  It then focuses on the succession of often-contradictory economic 
experiments and development theories that have emanated from these and other 
institutions.   Development theories have run the gamut as sustainable development, 
micro-development, women- centered development, endogenous development, 
appropriate development, ‘Basic Needs’, and both state and market-led development have 
all had their days in the sun.16  What began as economic growth to eradicate poverty 
evolved to include “enhancing participatory democratic processes”, “enlarging choices”, 
“affording the opportunity to develop to one’s fullest potential”, “participation in 
decisions affecting one’s life”, and affording the “means to carry out national 
development goals and promote economic growth, equity and national self-reliance”.17
One consistent theme, however, is that the development project has grown ever larger 
and more comprehensive. More disturbingly, international financial institutions now 
determine policy in many Third World countries – much in the way colonial powers once 
did.18  Yet, despite myriad inconsistencies and the well-documented pain and disasters 
that have resulted from their strategies, these institutions and the concept of development 
enjoy continuing and largely uncritical support within the international community.  
Part III turns to legal constructions of development and the seriatim attempts by 
Third World nations, over the past fifty years, to use international law in the pursuit of 
development.  These efforts began with the demand for Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, and then turned to broader demands for a New International 
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Economic Order. When these failed, Southern nations asserted a Right to Development, 
seeking to incorporate development into the burgeoning rights discourse.  Reparations are 
the most recent evolution in the campaign for economic justice, as some Third World 
nations now demand compensation for the exploitation and crippling consequences of 
slavery and colonialism.  To the extent that these initiatives sought to establish legal 
obligations for the West, they have been unsuccessful.  As this section demonstrates, 
international law has only reinforced and reproduced the economic and political 
inequities present in the international economic system.
Part IV turns to deconstructing the discourse of development, demonstrating that 
it is a method of conceptualizing the world that, in turn, shapes the world.19  Although 
portrayed as a neutral and universal concept, development is planned, directed and 
controlled by specific international and national institutions that act in ideological concert 
and reflect the views and interests of certain communities, societies and cultures.   This 
ideology creates and defines the “Other” while providing the legal and moral rationale for 
interventions that locate and cement the Third World on the lower rungs of the 
international system.   Development is the product of a particular perspective and that 
perspective problematizes and homogenizes the majority of humanity.  Deconstructing 
this discourse suggests that it is at least possible to imagine a post-development world 
and to perceive the people of the Third World in a fresh light.  
Given the failures of development, the power relations it engenders, and its 
generally negative and degrading view of non-Western peoples and cultures, Part V 
attempts the very difficult task of envisioning a different approach to thinking about the 
world.  No new meta-narrative or grandiose strategy to replace the development 
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paradigm is proposed, for we aim to reject, rather than substitute, meta-narratives.20  Nor 
is it our objective to glorify and resurrect Third World traditions, for tradition is seldom 
faultless and idyllic.21  Third world peoples have had varied and complex encounters with 
development. These experiences must not be over-simplified.22  Our objective is to begin 
to envision approaches that accord agency to the people development presumes to assist. 
We hope that these alternative visions can somehow give voice to the local, including the 
voice to embrace, transform, reject or otherwise engage the West and the entire 
modernization project.  We believe the West must abdicate some of the power it has 
presumed and to begin to re-imagine the lives and agency of others, and in the process 
perhaps reject often unarticulated but crippling assumptions about “the Other.”23  The 
objective is to pose different questions, to let others pose questions, to learn to listen and 
to actually hear the responses of others rather than assuming that the answers are already 
known.     
I. Constructing Development in Theory
A. The Birth of a Paradigm
It is difficult to imagine a world without development, for it seems as if 
development has always been one of the fundamental criteria by which nations and 
peoples are defined.  In fact, however, the contemporary concept of development has a 
quite short history. 24  Notions of progress and growth have been part of Western 
discourse for well over a hundred years and, more generally, since the enlightenment.  
“Development” as it is currently construed (i.e., modernization and national economic 
growth), however, is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon.25  In 1949, President 
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Harry Truman proposed a “fair deal” aimed at improving the lives of people inhabiting 
the underdeveloped areas of the globe.  In his now famous Point IV Program, he 
declared:
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery.  Their food is inadequate, they are victims of 
disease.  Their economic life is primitive and stagnant.  Their 
poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more 
prosperous areas.26
Truman’s declaration profoundly changed the manner in which the people of what would 
eventually become the Third World were viewed.  In a sense, he created the 
“underdeveloped world.”27  In the West this new perception of self and “the other” found 
immediate acceptance.28  “Billions of diverse and complex peoples were suddenly 
identified, homogenized and defined as backward, miserable victims” who would be 
rescued by the West.29  This perspective continues to define the development project.
Truman also proposed that the industrialized world should undertake to alleviate the 
newfound poverty in the underdeveloped world, but this call to action was a self-
interested one on the part of the United States.  Many American policy makers thought 
that if poor countries were not liberated from their poverty, they would be vulnerable to 
“communist subversion”.30  Consequently, bringing “progress” to the Third World was 
an integral part of the struggle against the Soviet Union and international communism.31
The development paradigm also originated within the context of collapsing colonial 
empires and a global economy dominated by the United States.32  As a result, the U.S. 
had a profound influence on the funding, objectives and approaches of the international 
financial institutions established at the end of the Second World War.  These institutions 
– mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – are at the center of 
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development theory and practice.33  Completing this scenario were Western beliefs in the 
ultimate superiority of Western culture, values and people, and the explicit and implicit 
racism that often persuaded the United States and former colonial powers that they had 
the right to intervene in politically weaker, poorer and darker countries.  Development 
provided the legal and political means, as well the moral justification for interventions 
that under other circumstances would probably have been considered impermissible.34
B.  The Discovery and Quantification of Global Poverty
If President Truman discovered global poverty, then the World Bank quantified it 
in 1948 by defining countries with an annual per capita income below $100 as poor.   
Two-thirds of the world’s peoples were instantly impoverished.35  Once annual per capita 
income was the gauge, the discernment of global poverty became “a comparative 
statistical operation.”36  Entire nations were regarded as poor because of their overall 
income.37   “Poor countries” came to be defined as those lacking the “wealth of more 
economically advantaged nations,”38 and because industrialized countries were the points 
of reference, the gap was enormous.39  Eradicating global poverty, as well as the 
expanding disparity between industrialized and unindustrialized countries, became an 
important challenge facing the international community.40  Of course, it is entirely 
plausible to maintain that President Truman and the World Bank were only stating the 
obvious, and articulating the willingness of the United States to lead Western countries in 
tackling a very real problem.  It can also be argued, however, that in certain significant 
respects poverty itself is a social construct, and in some senses an invention.41  While 
most definitions of poverty emphasize a lack of something or some deficiency, such 
definitions only demonstrate the basic relativity of the concept, for if poverty is defined 
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as lacking the necessities of life, it must be asked what is necessary, and who is to 
determine necessities.42  In the end, this question was answered by defining necessity in 
reference to the West; Third World nations and peoples were found to be sorely lacking.
Once problematized, poverty became the defining characteristic of the Third 
World, and the “agreed” solution was economic growth and development.43  Indeed, the 
Third World increasingly became part of a “system of thought and practice where 
particular interventions to eradicate poverty became central to the world order.”44  While 
traditional responses to poverty were based on “the pluralistic, culturally established and 
holistic perceptions of each particular space, post-war programs of action represented a 
universalistic, one-track, income-based and culturally lacking recipe for abstract 
solutions.”45  The perception of a global economy that would save the world’s poor
“reinforced and legitimized pauperizing economic and political systems,” and led the 
victims of these systems to view their particular situation in the same terms.46  As more 
people came to trust that poverty could be eradicated through adopting (and, more 
recently, integratng into) a “modern economy,” the search for modes of life and social 
organization based on simplicity, or on voluntary or moral forms of poverty were 
devalued and discredited.”47
People now identified as impoverished may have viewed themselves and their 
place within their respective communities quite differently before the advent of 
“development,” 48 as most societies had found ways of “defining and treating poverty that 
accommodated visions of community, frugality and sufficiency.” 49  Professor Nanda 
Shrestha, writing of “becoming a development category,” describes one such different 
vision.50  Without romanticizing the pre-development period, Professor Shrestha paints a 
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complex picture of his village, his family and his life in 1940s Nepal.  He begins by 
describing life in Nepal before “development,” where his family was extremely poor by 
World Bank standards.  Nonetheless, neither his family nor others in the village thought 
that people were lesser beings because of their poverty.  This is not to say that life was 
idyllic and indeed he notes elements of a type of caste system, which he does not defend.  
Yet, Professor Shrestha also observes a sense of responsibility and a community that 
protected even the very poor, such as his family, from utter destitution.
While most traditional societies rejected the idea that poverty necessarily reflected 
personal inadequacy, this belief was a major component of the new international value 
system. 51  Within this new paradigm economic poverty was perceived and acted upon as 
a disgrace and a scourge.52  Accordingly, with development, the poverty experienced by 
Professor Shrestha and his family became a problem to be solved, and development 
experts were thought to have the solution.  All that the Nepalese brought to the table was 
summarily discarded by those who assumed that the culture, knowledge, wisdom, insight 
and judgment that Nepalese villagers brought to their own lives and existence was for the 
most part worthless.  In some ways the villagers came to believe this of themselves.  The 
Nepalese began to want to be like the developers.  In the end, development plans and 
strategies did not actually lessen poverty, but they did diminish self-sufficiency and a 
sense of community, as functions that were formerly the collective responsibility of the 
community were now left to the developers.53
The purpose of this account is not to romanticize poverty or to champion non-
Western societies per se, nor is it to suggest that societies and cultures are fixed and 
impervious to change.  It is also understood that there are concrete aspects to poverty; 
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that poverty and want are not entirely socially constructed.  It is only to suggest that 
people existed and lived before the West came to their rescue, and they may have devised 
a variety of internal mechanisms to deal with those who had less, even if those 
mechanisms were imperfect.54  The possible value of such indigenous knowledge was not 
even considered as the Western concept of development was deployed.  Poverty was the 
singular factor by which the development project categorized peoples that were actually 
distinct, varied and in many instances quite self-sufficient.  As poverty became their 
defining characteristic, development became the obvious solution, to be pursued by 
following the path of the West toward the goal of modernization.
C.  The Meta-Narrative of Modernization
The road to development is littered with discarded models and philosophies, but 
at the heart of all development theories is the belief that the Third World should follow in 
the footsteps of the West.55  Development began as a quest for “modernity,”56 and while 
development’s history is complex, the modernization project has consistently been at its 
core.57  Modernization has been defined as “the process by which a society comes to be 
characterized by a belief in the rational and scientific control of man’s physical and social 
environment and the application of technology to that end.”58  All societies purportedly 
pass through distinct phases at they modernize.59  The Rostow blueprint, for example, 
mandated five stages, the first being traditional society, which possessed limited science, 
technology and output per person; the second, where modern science leads to increased 
production in agriculture and industry; and the third “take-off” stage where obstacles to 
growth are transcended, new technology becomes predominant and growth becomes self-
generating.  More refined and complex processes mark the last two phases, as original 
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industries are eclipsed and societies finally reach the level of high mass consumption.  
All societies are believed to traverse this particular path – that is, the progression is fixed 
and uni-linear.60  Early theorists could not agree on how modernization would actually 
occur, 61 although they did agree that it was essential to approximate the characteristics of 
the nations that comprised the industrialized Western world.62  It was therefore assumed 
that tradition was an impediment to modernization, and Third World countries were 
encouraged to abandon their traditional lifestyles, beliefs and value systems in favor of 
“modern” Western norms and values.63
The modernization discourse has had an enormous impact, and has persisted for 
several reasons including its compatibility with dominant neoclassical economic theories, 
as well as its simplicity and purported universality.  Perhaps another part of its appeal is 
its apparent optimism, for it represents a belief in “progress.”64  During the United 
Nations proclaimed “Development Decade” of the 1960s, however, modernization 
produced only minimal improvements in the material conditions of life in the Third 
World.  Eventually, initial modernization strategies were declared failures.65
Notwithstanding this inauspicious beginning, however, modernization theory remains the 
meta-narrative that informs all other development narratives.  Modernization continues to 
enjoy the unflagging support of major international financial institutions and other key 
national and international organizations that devise development strategies and allocate 
development resources.66  It is also a key component of “law and development” theory 
which, through multiple incarnations, has been the consistent companion of 
modernization.67
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D.   Law and Development
Western legal scholars entered the development discourse through an offshoot of 
modernization theory known as law and development.68  While modernization theorists 
equated Westernization and development, law and development theorists focused on the 
Westernization of Third World legal systems as a key prerequisite to, and catalyst for, 
development.  Both theories shared the underlying premise that the Westernization of 
Third World countries was essential for – indeed, was the essence of – development.69
Law and development theorists supposed that adopting Western legal systems would 
facilitate development by providing the necessary elements for a functioning market 
system.70  Westernizing the legal infrastructure of Third World countries was expected to 
create neutral, more accessible and more responsive government institutions.71  Benefits 
would include increased equality, freedom and participation, and these would in turn 
foster improved material standards of living.72  These benefits would then “trickle down” 
to the poorest of the poor.73
Despite its strong and promising start, the law and development movement that 
began in the early 1960s lasted little more than a decade.74  Perhaps the most significant 
factor in its demise was the rupture of the coalition that had given the movement the 
appearance of unanimity.  Western academics and practitioners who were the initial 
proponents of law and development had enjoyed an initially positive reception from 
Third World leaders and elites – many of whom were Western educated.75  By the early 
1970s, however, many political leaders and intellectuals in the Third World had turned to 
dependency theory and other radical analyses of their circumstances, and were 
demanding a New International Economic Order. 76  In this context, law and development 
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was widely denounced as “reflect[ing] the ideological hegemony of Western capitalism 
and the dominant economic forces of contemporary imperialism. …[and] as inadequate to 
explain development or underdevelopment…”77  Moreover, although the American 
experience was thought to exemplify the success of law and development, many 
observers expressed “doubt that the model accurately describe[d] legal life even in the 
United States.”78
Long after widespread reports of the movement’s demise, however, the core
premises of  law and development continue to inform most Western thinking (both 
popular and official) about development. 79  Indeed, with economic globalization as its 
battering ram, the law and development movement recast and reasserted itself in the 
1990s as “marketization” and “democratization.”80  The current reincarnation of the law 
and development movement is known as the “good governance” agenda, which has been 
critiqued as “an uneasy combination of two main objectives: on the one hand, a project 
limiting the power of the state in the economy while simultaneously expanding the role of 
the market and on the other, establishing liberal democracy as a counterpart to structural 
adjustment or neoliberal economic reform.”81  Capital exporting countries and the 
international financial institutions they control are actively promoting the good 
governance agenda.82  Like the modernization paradigm that is at its core, law and 
development continues to thrive, albeit in a new form.
Thus, as the first half of the Twentieth Century came to a close, a new entity was 
emerging in the international community, the underdeveloped world.  Once it was 
discovered and then defined as poor and pre-modern, the foundation was in place for its 
development.  As the second half of the 20th century progressed, “development” became 
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the stated objective of virtually every country in what became the Third World.  New 
nations differed on the question of how best to achieve development, but they 
unanimously agreed that development was their goal.83 International institutions, in turn, 
propounded a variety of mechanisms to assist newly sovereign entities as they moved in 
the expected linear fashion towards the promised goal of being developed.  Part II turns 
to the development institutions and the practices they propounded.
II.  Constructing Development in Practice
A. The Institutional Edifice
The International Monetary Fund (the IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) have come to exercise a profound 
influence on the economies of most Third World countries.84  Indeed, International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) virtually control the policy-making processes of some debtor 
countries.85  When they were established at the end of World War II, 86 however, the 
World Bank was to assist in rebuilding post War Europe and the IMF was to monitor and 
regulate the international monetary system.  Their evolution into institutions whose 
primary focus is the Third World is a crucial aspect of the evolving paradigm of 
development.87
1.  The World Bank  
 When the World Bank was founded at the end of World War II, its assigned 
priority was rebuilding Europe.88  In 1947, however, just three years after the Bank’s 
creation, the United States embarked on the Marshall Plan and took over most of the 
financing for the reconstruction of Europe. With its role in Europe eclipsed, 89 the Bank 
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was left to pursue its secondary charge: “the development of productive facilities and 
resources in less developed countries.”90  But even this function, as originally 
contemplated, bears little resemblance to the Bank’s contemporary role in the Third 
World.   The World Bank was intended to act as an intermediary between prospective 
borrowers and prospective investors, meaning it was to play the traditional role of a 
private, commercial bank – except that its depositors and borrowers would be member 
states.91 Under the terms of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank was to make loans based 
exclusively on “considerations of economy and efficiency;”92 it was expressly prohibited 
from entertaining “political or other non-economic influences or considerations.”93
The Bank’s evolution into an Institution that touches on almost all aspects of the 
economic, social and political lives of its borrowers has much to do with how 
development itself has evolved over the last fifty years and with other factors such as the 
post World War II struggle between capitalism and communism, a struggle within which 
the World Bank was a critical weapon.94 With the establishment of the Inter-American 
Development Bank in 1961, the shift began towards linking the extension of credit to the 
implementation of reforms.95  This opened the door to broader interventions in the 
political and social affairs of borrowing nations.96  The Bank eventually began insisting 
on internal changes as a condition of receiving assistance.  As the Bank’s role in devising 
and carrying out both the practical and theoretical elements of development has 
persistently expanded and grown, its position in the affairs of its Third World members 
expanded in tandem, and steadily and consistently grew ever broader and deeper. 97
2. The Evolving IMF Role in the Third World 
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The International Monetary Fund was initially founded to stabilize the 
international monetary system and promote international trade,98 by supervising 
international currency exchange rates and making short-term loans to member states 
when necessary to meet balance of payments difficulties.99  Many factors contributed to 
the subsequent transformation of the IMF’s role into a lender to Third World countries, 
but perhaps the most important was the 1971 U.S. decision to “float” the dollar.100  This 
determination caused such significant changes in the international monetary system that 
the IMF was eventually reduced to monitoring exchange rates rather than setting them.101
Still, most IMF activity was directed toward industrialized nations until the oil crisis in 
the early 1970s.  Newly established Euro-Markets were flooded with so-called “petro 
dollars,”102 and these markets usurped most of the IMF’s role as a lender to credit-worthy 
industrialized states who could now avoid IMF conditions.103  As credit-worthy 
borrowers sought loans elsewhere, the IMF found itself lending almost exclusively to 
Third World countries.104  Indeed, since the second amendment of its Articles of 
Agreement in 1978, the IMF has become primarily a lender to the Third World.105  This 
new role was cemented by the debt crises of the 1980s, as the IMF assumed increasing
control over the economies of states that had no alternative sources of outside financing.  
The Third World debt crisis in the 1980s also led the IMF and World Bank to effectively 
consolidate their policies toward the Third World.106
IFI performance as “the apparatus of management and control of social reality in 
the Third World”107 has provoked an intense barrage of criticism,108 ranging from liberal 
critics who generally accept the goals and objectives of IFIs but perceive problems in 
implementation,109 to those embracing a more radical perspective, who view IFIs as tools 
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of the industrialized north in their continuing exploitation of the South. 110  Others reject 
both critiques.111  What is certain, however, is the decisive and ever-expanding position 
of these institutions in the “cycles of convention wisdom” that make up the ensuing 
narrative of development.  
B.  Cycles of Conventional Wisdom112
The concept of development is “riddled with paradoxes, and few theories are 
more bedeviled by contested hypotheses.”113  Development has taken many shapes and 
forms since the 1950s, when economic growth was its sole objective.  In the 1960s, 
poverty alleviation and distributional equity were added as objectives.  ‘Basic Needs’ 
emerged in the 1970s, and the cultural dimension took its place beside economic 
development and more emphasis was placed on self-reliance.114  The 1980s brought 
gender issues and environmentalism as prominent themes.115  By the 1990s, globalization 
had become the focal point.116  While the following account attempts to break these and 
many other permutations into discrete time frames, there is considerabe overlap.  
Theories and practices sometimes evolved slowly; sometimes seemed to disappear, only 
to reappear in a different form; and sometimes gave way to polar opposite strategies.  
This brief account can only sketch how development has evolved and been transformed 
and adjusted over the last fifty years, as developers tried and failed to “better humankind 
through the alleviation of poverty and the realization of human potential.”117
1.   The “Golden Age” of Development: 1950-1970118
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The 20-year period from 1950 to 1970 has been labeled the “golden age” of 
development.119  The development project was in its infancy, but the clear “expert” 
consensus was that insufficient income was the key problem facing Third World 
countries, and economic growth was the solution.120  The prevailing orthodoxy postulated 
that national economic management would maximize growth and employment; 
accordingly, the state was to orchestrate development through the use of macroeconomic 
policy tools.121    Early development theory relied heavily on “state-led 
developmentalism.”122  National governments were to adopt policies that stimulated 
growth.123  The standard approach to economic development involved highly abstract 
plans, economic model building and parastatal agencies.124   Capital investment to build 
infrastructure, industrialize and to generally modernize societies was thought to be the 
most important ingredient in economic growth.125  Therefore, the World Bank extended 
project-based loans to build dams, highways and other infrastructure projects.126
Technology was also a critical component and given the lack of capital to purchase it, 
technical assistance became essential.127  As technology was introduced, Third World 
social and cultural factors were ignored because Western developers believed technology 
was culturally neutral and invariably beneficial. 128  Historical, institutional and economic 
realities were generally disregarded in the early days of the development project.129
Very few of the early plans for economic growth led to measurable successes, and 
it became apparent that the gains that were achieved would not automatically benefit the 
most needy citizens within target countries.130  The “trickle down” theory, which 
postulated that economic growth would necessarily shrink the gap between the rich and 
the poor, proved to be untrue.131  As optimism regarding economic growth began to 
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wane,132 Third World leaders began demanding permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources133 and a school of thought known as “dependency theory” emerged offering a 
radical critique of mainstream economics.134  Meanwhile, the Cold War between 
capitalism and communism had become the dominant factor in global politics and the 
primary consideration in U.S. policy toward the Third World.135
The perception grew that more coordination by international institutions would be 
needed to execute what was becoming the ever more complex undertaking of 
development.136 Thus, as the 1960s progressed (perhaps foreshadowing the 
contemporary idea of “comprehensive development”), developmentalism became more 
wide-ranging.137  Third World governments began to establish social programs that 
would more directly address poverty, by improving housing, education, health, energy 
and transportation.138 The World Bank began to support projects in these areas, as well 
projects focusing on population control, nutrition and urban development.139  This 
represented a significant change in Bank policy, as the Bank moved beyond lending 
funds for profit-oriented projects towards funding social projects involving non-economic 
policy choices. 140  Development had begun its expansion beyond economic growth.
2.   The Second Phase:  Integrating Social and Economic Elements
By the early 1970’s, the World Bank focused its resources and policies 
exclusively on the Third World.141  What has been called the “second era of 
development”142 was characterized by escalating efforts to integrate social considerations 
into the pursuit of economic goals.143    It was conceded that the development strategies 
then in place would not eliminate hunger and poverty, and “Basic Needs” became the 
new maxim within the development community.144  Rather than focusing on the 
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infrastructure and mega-projects that had previously dominated development strategies 
and funding, the ‘Basic Needs’ approach proposed that poverty be dealt with by focusing 
directly on food, clothing, shelter, education and employment.145 Moreover, people 
whose basic needs were met might be less susceptible to “Communist subversion,”146
which was an important consideration during the Cold War.  “Basic Needs” was quite 
popular because it was universalistic, yet easily tailored to be country-specific;147 it 
remained in favor until policies centered on the poor were abandoned in favor of
structural adjustment lending.148
Policy studies that examined processes, values and social consequences were 
prominent during this phase.149  Moreover, the presumptions that policy-making was 
exclusively a state activity and that Third World governments acted on behalf of their 
respective populations, also began to be challenged.150  As developers explored ways to 
deliver aid that would meet basic needs, Western non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) emerged to assist.151  “Grassroots development” and “empowerment” became 
the mottos of the day, as “bottom up” theories such as micro-development, 152
endogenous development,153 sustainable development154 and other themes began to 
emerge to replace “top down” theories.155
Indeed, as the 1970s progressed, “major problems, such as the environment, over-
population, food scarcity, the role of women, habitat destruction and unemployment were 
brought to the fore, and each new conundrum had an independent career that demanded 
both public and institutional consideration.”156  What these numerous theories have in 
common, however, is that they originated in the West, and more specifically the 
international institutions that by this time defined, designed and controlled 
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developmentalism.   They often followed new domestic policy prescriptions and 
emphases in the industrialized countries.  For example, ‘Basic Needs’ followed on the 
heels of the War on Poverty in the United States, which may have suggested the 
model.157 Emphasis on the role of women in development cannot be separated from the 
feminist movement in the United States.  Environmental concerns surfaced as the 
environment became an issue in the United States and Europe.158  This pedigree 
highlights the extent to which policies are designed and imposed separate and apart from 
the communities they purport to serve.159
On the other hand, the complex responses, both real and anticipated, of Third 
World peoples to development interventions have cannot be discounted.  The idea of 
meeting ‘Basic Needs’ for example, was largely a response to Cold War concerns that 
poor populations may be susceptible to communist subversion.160  Micro-development 
and participation are partly in response to policy failures, but may also have been 
responses to changing perceptions of the objects of development.161 Certainly, the 
relationship between developers and the objects of development were and remain 
complex.  Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that the majority of power has resided in the 
developers, as the lost decade for development amply demonstrates.
3.  The Third World Debt Crisis and the 
       “Lost Decade” for Development (1980-1990) 
The 1980s are often termed development’s “lost decade”162 as a combination of 
factors led to the debacle of structural adjustment.163  Chief among these factors was what 
has come to be known as the Third World debt crisis, which even today remains a critical 
issue.164  Most analysts trace the roots of the Third World debt crisis to the oil crises of 
the early and mid 1970s, when spiking oil prices simultaneously impoverished oil-
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importing Third World countries and flooded international financial markets with oil 
profits in need of investment.165  The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(“OPEC”) became “a major creditor of the United States and Western Multinational 
banks166 that in turn loaned the money to poor, often politically unstable Third World 
countries.”167  Left with massive loans that carried skyrocketing interest rates, and at the 
same time unable to raise sufficient revenues through exports to pay these debts, Third 
World nations acquired growing deficits. 168
Structural adjustment became the method by which debtor countries were to 
correct ballooning deficits.169  These programs transformed the IMF from an institution 
that has been primarily concerned with stabilizing global exchange rates, into one deeply 
involved in the social and political policies of the poorest countries of the Third World.170
IMF lending has always been conditional, but the short-term lending provisions originally 
utilized by the IMF were thought inadequate to address the development problems faced 
by Third World nations.  So longer-term financing arrangements were implemented and 
the IMF broadened its traditional scope of inquiry to include evaluations of domestic 
issues such as labor, health care, and agriculture.171
By the mid-1980s, the World Bank had also begun to grant loans for adjustment 
purposes.172   Loans were now being made to meet balance-of-payments difficulties 
rather than for specific projects,173 and these loans were conditional on the debtor
nation’s promise to take certain steps to reform “inappropriate public policies”.174   These 
loans were the Bank’s first foray into the domestic policies of its debtors, and were the 
predecessor of structural adjustment programs (“SAPs”).175  Although the Bank had been 
steadily embracing a broader vision of its role in the development process,176 it had yet to 
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involve itself directly in the social or political affairs of its borrowers.177  As the 
international debt crisis widened and deepened,178 however, the World Bank began to use 
structural adjustment programs in an ever more intrusive way.179
The Bank concluded that the primary impediment to economic growth was Third 
World government policies.180  Rather than relying entirely on macroeconomic 
indicators,181 The World Bank began to condition its loans on Bank judgments regarding 
an increasingly wide range of domestic policies.182  The World Bank was prohibited from 
becoming involved in the politics of borrowing nations by its Articles of Agreement,183
so its growing role in the domestic policies of its borrowers was rationalized by broadly 
interpreting the concept of “economic development.”184  Under this rubric, the World 
Bank’s scope increased to encompass legal and judicial reform, family planning, 
education, developing the private sector and health care, among various other 
initiatives.185    Moreover, if structural adjustment conditions were not met, future 
assistance could be denied186 and adherence to these conditions was critical in securing 
access to private capital.187    Consequently, the pressure on countries facing economic 
crisis to conform to SAP conditions was extraordinarily high.188
Some critics contend that SAPs amount to “economic coercion.”189  The have 
caused legendary devastation.190  Structural adjustment led to severe deterioration in 
living conditions,191 as cutbacks in government spending led to drastic declines in 
medical service, public education and other services.192 This often led to violent protests 
as basic necessities became unaffordable,193 and popular protests sometimes triggered 
government repression.  Structural adjustment thus came to be associated with 
deteriorations in freedom and, at times, human rights abuses.194
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Some observers maintain that Structural Adjustment Programs were never 
intended to achieve their stated purposes, but were only implemented to further Western 
interests, such as the repayment of Third World debt to Western banks.195 Structural 
adjustment, in part, entailed turning Third World countries into “favorable investment 
climates” for multinational corporations.196  But this goal often conflicted with meeting 
the basic needs of the general public,197 as did trade liberalization.198 But even when 
viewed more favorably, SAPs and the conditions that they imposed curtailed the 
governing capacity of member states by vastly limiting the range of available economic, 
political and social policy options.199  Once a state accepted financial assistance from 
World Bank or IMF entities, a great deal of state decision-making authority was 
effectively delegated to these institutions,200 and the debtor nation, in effect, became an 
instrument of the IFI, as lending officials exerted control over a wide range of domestic 
sectors, including those entrusted with providing education, health care and social 
services, and protecting the rights of the nation’s workforce.201  By shaping and 
determining the policy choices available to governments, conditionalities foreclose 
political prerogatives that are generally thought to constitute the core of state 
sovereignty.202
Structural adjustment was in most respects a failure, for as the 1980s drew to a 
close, developing countries were poorer, more debt-ridden, and even less able to provide 
services such as education and health care.  Governments were also facing angry 
populations who were no longer able to obtain the most elementary goods and services.  
Sovereign policy choices and prerogatives were increasingly limited and shaped by 
international predilections emanating from international financial institutions and by the 
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escalating rhetoric of globalization.  The dramatic failure of SAPs in addressing the 
economic disasters experienced by much of Sub-Saharan Africa and other countries 
during the 1980s prompted yet another retooling of the IFI approach to the Third 
World.203  It is in this environment that the “Washington Consensus” began to take shape.
4.   The Washington “Consensus” and the “New” Conditionality204
  The 1990s brought the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
making the United States the world’s sole superpower.  With the demise of the Soviet 
Union and China’s move towards a market economy, alternative economic models 
disappeared and the political and economic views of the United States began to 
completely dominate both theory and practice.  Modernization was now defined as 
integration into the global economy, and development as economic liberalization, 
privatization and embracing the “free market”.205
The World Bank articulated the new orthodoxy in a series of reports that began in 
1991 and culminated with its 1999 Report, “Entering Into the 21st Century”, which 
consolidated a decade-long process of devising and defining what the World Bank termed 
a Comprehensive Development Framework.206  With this report, development indeed 
became all encompassing.207  According to the Bank, the underlying premise of the CDF 
is that growth must include consideration of structural, 208 human,209 physical, 210 and 
sector-specific211 aspects of development.   All of these strategies were to be achieved 
through market-friendly policies and market incentives.212  The necessary actors would 
be governments, local organizations,213 and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).214
The CDF also co-opted development strategies previously termed “alternative”215 – such 
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as environmental management, human resource development, building self-reliance,216
and concentrating on civil society, 217 social institutions, and human rights.218
The groundwork for the CDF was laid in the 1989 Report, Sub-Saharan Africa: 
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, which introduced “good governance” as a 
programmatic priority.219  Defined as an initiative to build pluralistic institutions that 
would perform functions in much the same manner as Western governments,220 good 
governance also emphasized privatization and “marketization”, as opposed to 
government regulation of the economy.221  The 1990 World Development Report 
proposed that the poor be integrated into the labor force.222  Thus, at the center of the 
CDF agenda is incorporating the poor into what is now the global capitalist system, by 
putting them to work in the service of international capital.223  Throughout the 1990s, the 
Bank promulgated a series of reports prescribing market friendly interventions such as 
creating a competitive environment where private enterprises can flourish, integrating 
into the global economy, and investing in people so that the populace might participate in 
the market.224  In addition, governments were urged to define and protect property rights; 
provide effective legal, judicial, and regulatory systems; make available an efficient civil 
service and protect the environment.225  Previous orthodoxies have been reversed, as the 
need for import substitution and a strong state have been replaced by export-led growth 
and a state that exists primarily to support private markets.226     Thus, the Comprehensive 
Development Framework concretizes the new neo-liberal orthodoxy of markets and 
democracy. 
It is evident that the World Bank has sought to respond to some of its critics and 
move beyond the macroeconomic failures of structural adjustment.  The problem is that 
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the Bank and other international financial institutions227 are only capable of modifying 
their policies within the same discursive space.  The Comprehensive Development 
Framework demonstrates just how all-inclusive and wide-ranging interventions in the 
Third World have become.  Unfortunately, these economic programs have in reality 
exacerbated inequality and poverty within the populations of many Third World 
countries.228
III. Legal Constructions of Development
  As the cycles of conventional wisdom promulgated by international institutions 
waxed and waned, the nations of the Third World began to take rather bold steps in the 
international legal arena to obtain and solidify a legal right to development.  While firmly 
rooted in the belief that development was the ultimate objective, the movements that 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were quite strident attempts to take control of this 
process and to transform the economic and political relationship between the North and 
the South.229  As the lost development decade of the 1980s unfolded and these 
movements collapsed, Third World states attempted to incorporate development into the 
burgeoning rights discourse, and thus to explicitly claim comprehensive development as a 
legal right.  More recently this quest has ripened into the more radical demand for 
reparations.230 These efforts in many ways mirror the larger evolution of the development 
discourse, with the movement to establish a law of international development, countries 
of the Third World seized the legal initiative to establish development as a legally 
mandated imperative.
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The movement to establish a law of international development231 became the focal 
point and the vehicle for a profound and historic political confrontation between the West 
and the Third World.  Although couched in legal terms, this confrontation was and 
remains fundamentally ideological. 232  International law was an instrument that promoted 
the interests of the North at the expense of the South.   The South now sought to turn the 
tables by using international law to re-order the international political and economic 
sphere and to achieve the goal of development. 233  Coinciding with the rise of 
dependency theory, which posed a more radical critique of the economic relationships
among the countries of the world,234 and more specifically “the persistent and indeed 
widening inequalities between the societies of the South and the industrialized countries 
of the West,”235 the law of development sought no less than a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the West and the Third World.  With the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) as their institutional forum,236 Third World 
leaders declared that “more than foreign aid, what was needed for the Third World to 
break out of the vicious circle of poverty was a change in the terms governing its 
relationship with the industrial world”.237  Although largely rejected in the West, 238 the 
international law of development has been championed in the Third World since the 
1960s.239 It has been an avowedly activist movement from its inception,240 and in due 
course, advocated a broad range of development-related programs.241  The opening 
gambit, the movement and demand for permanent sovereignty over natural resources was 
less wide-ranging than what was to follow, but was surely no less far-reaching.
A.   Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
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The movement for permanent sovereignty over natural resources (“PSNR”) 
embodied and symbolized the conflict of economic interests between capital exporting 
and capital importing nations.242  Control over the natural resources located in what we 
now call the Third World was a principal impetus for European colonial conquest.  As 
colonialism ended, it was immediately clear to the leaders of newly independent nations 
that control of those same resources would be the key to future economic viability.243
Natural resources were the “natural” starting point, and a boundary that developing 
countries could point to as evidence of the absence of genuine equality in the community 
of nations.244 Accordingly, newly independent states quickly sought to renegotiate or 
void the extraordinarily inequitable arrangements that had been imposed upon them 
during the colonial period, and to establish that the ultimate authority over natural 
resources is vested in the nation-state where those resources are located.245
Although the movement for PSNR is typically associated with the debate 
surrounding the December 14, 1962 passage of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
1803,246 in fact, it was underway a full decade earlier.247    Still, the 1962 Resolution and 
surrounding debate are said by many commentators to reflect the most contentious 
question of the new international economic order.248  A threshold legal question was 
whether the inalienability of natural resources constituted a peremptory norm of 
international law under the doctrine of jus cogens, or whether individual cases should be 
resolved by balancing strict enforcement of contractual obligations under the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda against relief based on changed circumstances under the doctrine of 
rebus sic stantibus.249  The concrete manifestation of this seemingly theoretical issue was 
the enforceability or voidability of long-term concessions providing for the extraction of 
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natural resources on terms extremely favorable to Western based transnational 
corporations.250  Although these agreements should have been highly suspect based on 
the circumstances under which they typically were negotiated, Third World governments 
were having little success with individual challenges – a series of which were made in 
arbitrations after World War II.251
Therefore, Third World countries sought, through the PSNR declaration, to 
establish the right to expropriate foreign enterprises if they deemed it necessary to do 
so.252   It was clear that resolutions according the right to nationalize were widely 
supported and would be easily passed by the UN General Assembly, so Western interests 
turned their energy and attention to the issue of compensation for expropriations. Western 
states and interests contended that the relevant law was “well settled” – state 
expropriation of foreign-owned property required payment of  “prompt, adequate, and 
effective” compensation under the “Hull formula”.253  Rejecting the unspoken premise 
that foreign ownership was presumptively legitimate, and realizing that such a standard 
would preclude nationalizations in many poor nations, Third World leaders contended 
that the national tribunals of the host country, in accordance with national law, should 
determine compensation.254  The standard, ultimately incorporated into U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 1803, requires “appropriate compensation.”255  This would appear 
to reflect a compromise, but it has proved to be a victory for capital exporting nations 
who have had the political and economic power to insist on the traditional (Western) Hull 
formula.256  This constraint made nationalization too costly for many non-oil exporting 
states.  
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Nonetheless, the principle of permanent sovereignty over national resources has 
been reiterated in subsequent resolutions and declarations, and clearly reflects at least a 
Third World consensus not just on what the law should be – but on what the law is.257
Although PSNR ultimately proved to be a hollow victory, the PSNR movement and 
General Assembly Resolution 1803 were important in establishing momentum for an 
international law of development.  This movement next appeared in the form of demands 
for a New International Economic Order.
B.   A New International Economic Order
In the early 1970s, the United Nations was again the forum for an exceedingly 
contentious series of debates between Third World leaders and representatives of the 
Western, capital exporting countries.  Although the debates were again cast in legal 
terms, the conflict remained fundamentally ideological, having to do with the 
international distribution of power.  The principles of the movement for a new 
international economic order (“NIEO”) were embodied in a set of instruments passed by 
the United Nations General Assembly.  These instruments include the Declaration on the 
Establishment of the New International Economic Order,258 the Programme of Action on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order259 and the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States.260  The principles embodied in these documents 
represent an expansion of the movement for permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, and continuation of the legal effort by Southern countries to find voice and to 
exercise more power over their political and economic destinies.261  Relying on the 
discourse of sovereignty and believing in both the power of international law and the 
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importance of development, the NIEO movement asserted that full and permanent 
sovereignty was not limited to natural resources, but applied to all economic activities.262
Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1976,263 the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (“the Charter”) was the documentary centerpiece of this 
phase of the movement.264  The NIEO agenda, as articulated in the Charter, included 
subjecting private foreign capital to the domestic laws of Third World host countries, full 
and effective participation in world governance, special trade preferences, stabilizing 
export prices for commodities exported by Southern countries, debt forgiveness or 
rescheduling, and technology transfer.265  The Charter also explicitly recognized the 
sovereign right to nationalize foreign property and to determine what compensation 
should be paid,266 and confirmed the right of host nation governments to supervise 
transnational corporations operating within their jurisdictions.267  The Charter further 
mandated that industrialized countries cooperate to improve living standards and the
general welfare in developing countries.268
Northern opposition to the NIEO generally and to the Charter in particular was 
immediate, uniform and adamant.269 Technically, Northern countries objected to the 
Charter’s alleged rejection of “established principles of international law” – principles 
they contended were “neutral” and “universal.”270  Third World leaders and scholars, 
however, contended (and still do) that international law was contrived in part to enable 
and justify colonialism, and has been an instrument “for enhancing and aggravating 
human suffering, not for alleviating it.”271  Yet even as the NIEO movement sought to 
change legal principles, it also relied on law,272 seeking only to change its content and to 
use it as a force for change.  Given the overwhelming majorities that approved these 
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declarations, Southern countries took the position that resolutions comprising the New 
International Economic Order were legally binding on all nation states, but the West 
disagreed and has never accepted them.273 Although Northern countries detailed their 
objections to specific provisions of the Charter,274 it was unmistakable that the 
disagreement was not merely technical.  Rather, the NIEO movement brought into focus 
a fundamental political conflict between the West and the Third World.275  The debt crisis 
in the early 1980s was perhaps the final blow to the NIEO as many Third World 
governments were now pleading for sufficient funds to stay afloat rather than demanding 
economic and political concessions.276  Although the NIEO failed to produce the desired 
redistribution of international economic power, the Third World has been persistent, and 
many of the principles found in the New International Economic Order were soon 
reformulated and reintroduced as the Right to Development.277
C.  The Right to Development
In 1986, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development 
(“UNDRD”),278 whose objective was to convert development from being merely a goal 
or aspiration into an entitlement, both for countries and for their individual citizens.279
The movement for a right to development continued Third World demands for a more 
equitable distribution of international power, but it did so in a less threatening and 
strident manner than NIEO demands, perhaps reflecting the weakened position of Third 
World countries in the wake of the debt crisis.280  The UNDRD also sought to expand the 
definition of development to include technology, human rights, participation, equal 
opportunity, accountability, and differential treatment for developing countries.281
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Development as a human right evolved in part from earlier assertions regarding 
the law of development.282  It was first articulated by Senegalese Justice Keba M’Baye,283
who proclaimed that “development is the right of all men.”284 Justice M’Baye reasoned 
that a human right to development was needed to rectify the injustices of an international 
economic system in which the North benefits at the expense of the South.285  M’Baye 
also maintained that basic principles of humanity support a right to development,286 he 
observed an “inherent correlation between the enjoyment of human rights and economic 
development,” believing that human rights could not be enjoyed without economic 
development.287
However, those who expected the UNDRD to mark a turning point in 
international economic relations have been sorely disappointed.288  While development as 
a human right has been advocated by developing countries 289 it has been just as 
vigorously opposed by those nations that would be obliged to render the substantial 
material assistance necessary to effectuate the right, and by the international financial 
institutions whose support and commitment would be needed to implement it. 290 To 
acknowledge a right to development would mean conceding that there is an obligation to 
provide foreign assistance and to take part in the development project.  The West has 
vehemently and consistently rejected legal obligations of this variety.  The UNDRD has 
not been an exception and, of course, there is no effective sanction for non-recognition of 
the UNDRD.291
The UNDRD also clearly defines development as comprehensive.  While earlier 
international law of development efforts were framed as demands to modify the 
international distribution of economic and political power, the right to development 
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attempts to utilize the human rights framework.  Perhaps this reflects the weaker position 
of Third World countries by the 1980s, or it may signify an altered post Cold War 
political landscape that has changed the nature of what can be claimed and the mode in 
which those claims can be made. While Third World scholars and nations have continued 
to assert the right to development, some have also harkened back to more radical 
demands292 and have sought to hold industrialized countries to account by demanding 
reparations.293
D.  Reparations
If one accepts the proposition that the Third World has been severely and 
systematically exploited through arrangements that include slavery and colonialism,294
then the idea of compensation for that harm should hardly be remarkable. 295  But calls for 
reparations to the victims of slavery and colonialism have been extremely 
controversial.296  Drawing on the vigorously debated movement in the U.S. for 
reparations to the descendants of African slaves,297 the international struggle for 
reparations has been contested in the United Nations and its associated institutions.  The 
latest skirmish was the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (the “Conference” or “WCAR”). 298 Preparations for 
the Conference included four regional conferences and each Regional Conference 
adopted reports addressing the most important issues to the region. 299  These Regional 
Conferences revealed that the most important issues to many Third World countries 
included the legacy of colonialism, slavery and the slave trade,300 matters that were not 
priorities for Western nations.301    Indeed, the African regional Declaration focused 
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primarily on injuries stemming from slavery and colonialism,302 and recommended 
international compensation for its victims.303
Although later events diverted attention from the WCAR debate over 
reparations,304 it was apparent that reparations were a clear priority for many nations of 
the world.305  The Declaration ultimately adopted by the Conference concluded that 
colonialism led to racism, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and that “the 
effects and persistence of these structures and practices have been among the factors 
contributing to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of the world 
today.”306  Nonetheless, the Programme of Action did not endorse reparations for those 
countries that had been the victims of colonialism.  Instead it acknowledged a “need to 
develop programmes for the social and economic development of these societies and the 
Diaspora, within the framework of a new partnership based on the spirit of solidarity and 
mutual respect.”307
Many who supported reparations were very disappointed.308  Yet, the inability to 
garner sufficient support for reparations is not surprising, nor is endorsement and 
adoption of the alternative programs for economic and social development.  To demand 
reparations is to demand compensation that can be utilized as the payee sees fit.  Harking 
back to the more militant demands of the New International Order, reparations are a more 
radical demand to return plundered assets, jurisdiction and authority to their rightful 
possessors, the governments and peoples of the Third World.  It would indeed be 
surprising that an international community that views certain peoples as underdeveloped 
and in need of developing into something else would adopt such a concept.309  Additional 
programs, designed and implemented by international institutions, however, do fit within 
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the current paradigm that defines the Third World.  Thus putting the case for reparations 
on the international public record is an act of historic significance – despite its rejection 
by those countries and interests currently in power.310  Moreover, its overwhelming 
rejection by the West and the endorsement in its stead of development says much about 
development as discourse.
International law proved incapable of being a starting place for reordering the 
international economic system and sharing economic and power with the Thi rd World.  
International law is based in part on shared interests,311 but it is also based on power and 
that power resides with the industrialized world, and more particularly these days, with 
the United States.  Law has been used in the service of development and as a mechanism 
to control the Third World, through such principles as prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.  When Third World nations sought to use law as a source of strength and 
power they were rebuffed and then simply ignored, as their proposals died a slow but 
inevitable death.  International law proved incapable of assisting the non-West, for its 
purpose is to serve the West.  In the era of globalization, international law will be an even 
stronger part of the edifice that locks the Third World into chasing a future that is made 
in the West through the discourse of Development
V.  Deconstructing Development
‘Development is the process by which other peoples are “dominated, and 
their destinies are shaped, according to an essentially Western way of 
conceiving and perceiving the world; it is part of an imperial process 
whereby other peoples are appropriated and turned into objects”. 
Development is a fundamental part of the process ‘whereby the 
developed countries manage, control and even create the Third World 
economically, politically, sociologically and culturally’.312
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Development can be viewed as an idea, an objective or as an activity.313  Previous 
parts of this article have discussed development within each of these contexts.  This part 
turns to deconstructing the development paradigm by interrogating development as 
discourse314 and as ideology.315   Postmodernism’s considerations of difference and 
discourse, and its challenge to the universalizing “truths” of enlightenment thinking, 
greatly assist in appraising development in both theory and practice.316  Scholars have 
drawn on this perspective to question whether development is synonymous with 
westernization and modernization, and whether Western political, social and economic 
institutions and practices (whether liberal or socialist) are the keys to solving the 
problems of the Third World.317
A.  Positioning Development in the Western Imagination
If development is a natural and universal process, and an inherent part of the 
human condition, we can only critique its successes or failures – not the concept itself. It 
often seems that development is indeed innate, for it is seldom contested in a fundamental 
fashion and the reaction to those who raise such queries is often incredulity or outright 
dismissal.  Although it is shrouded by a discourse that portrays it as a universal and 
invariably desirable process, development is actually a set of  “practices and beliefs that 
are woven into the fabric of Western culture and is specific to it.”318   Development is 
neither an innate process, nor a trans-cultural concept that can claim universal validity. 319
Rather, many of the ideas embedded within the development paradigm, such as progress, 
planning, poverty and modernization are firmly rooted within Western economic, 
political and cultural thought.320
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 The widespread acceptance of development as instinctive or natural has much to 
do with the power of the West to construct the prism through which the world is 
perceived.  At the heart of this overwhelmingly dominant western world view321 is Euro-
centrism – “the conscious or unconscious process by which Europe and Euro-American 
assumptions are constructed as, or assumed to be, the normal, the natural or the 
universal.”322  This perspective has become the near-exclusive organizing principle and 
evaluative standard for humankind.323  The West not only influences and alters but, in 
some ways, essentially produces other cultures.324  Indeed, much of the non-West now 
uses the West, almost instinctively, as the standard for judging the worth of its 
societies.325   Euro-centrism also organizes the system of thought known as 
development.326  This is not to suggest that development is inherently flawed or invalid 
because it emanates from the West.327  Rather, it is to submit that because development is 
merely a particular system of thought, it is not impervious to fundamental challenge or
critique.  The power of Euro-centrism makes this critique difficult,328  However, reduces 
even development’s most serious critics to attacking it from within the boundaries of the 
paradigm.329
Locating development within the Western imagination may seem to suggest that 
the Third World is “a passive vessel for ideas that emanate from the West”.330 But neither 
the West nor its ideas are a homogenous totality, and certainly the millions of people who 
have been on the receiving end of development policies possess complex histories, 
societies, politics, cultures and individual lives.  They have responded to development in 
countless ways, and development itself has changed and evolved, at times in reaction to 
these multiple responses.  Nonetheless, for the most part the development project 
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continues to be shaped by Western elites and experts, who define its objects, theories and 
practices.331  Its theoretical underpinnings can be found in enlightenment philosophy,332
and its veneer of universality and inevitability is part of the Eurocentrism that shapes 
most contemporary worldviews, and simultaneously devalues and marginalizes the 
knowledge of others.333  Development thus elevates and reinforces the power of the West, 
as it controls and in essence creates the Third World.334
Development is rooted in an evolutionary myth that reduces history to a series of 
formal stages.335  Although this myth is founded on the particular experiences of 
European societies, the development paradigm regards these stages as universal and 
applicable to all societies.336  It is the norm by which other social orders are judged,337
and all societies are presumed to transverse the same fixed and linear path.338  This linear 
view of the past, present and future is necessarily imbued with hierarchy for the concept 
of development suggests that:
There are nations that have embraced Western technology enough to be 
developed; there are other nations on a lower scale of civilization that are 
developing; and there are still other nations that, steeped in religion and 
tradition, reject all forms of liberalism and secularism and thus remain 
underdeveloped . . .339
Western industrialized nations are at the pinnacle of this edifice and the nations of 
the Third World are necessarily subordinate to those at the apex.  But development holds
out the prospect that, with the assistance of the “more advanced,” the underdeveloped 
could catch up and also become modern and developed.340 These assumptions were a 
natural extension of a colonial discourse that emphasized Third World cultural, political, 
social and racial inferiority341 and justified itself, in part, by a paternalistic mission to 
uplift and civilize the natives.342  While development is a postcolonial (if not a neo-
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colonial) discourse,343 it has strong colonial roots.344 Indeed, the transition from 
colonialism to the development process may have been merely a shift in emphasis rather 
than the end of one project and the beginning of another.345  The rhetoric of colonialism 
re-emerged in the language of international development agencies through a discourse 
that emphasized the vulnerability and helplessness of Third World peoples.346  The World 
Bank sent “missions” to underdeveloped countries to formulate wide-ranging 
development programs that would, in effect, bring salvation.347  There was now a moral 
imperative to intervene,348 even as the power relationship that formerly existed between 
the colonizer and the colonized continued.349 By the middle of the 20th century, those 
whom Europeans had previously designated as “uncivilized” and “backward” now had a 
new appellation: underdeveloped.350
B. Constructing the Underdeveloped 
A critical aspect of the dominance of the West resides in its power to produce and 
propagate knowledge and to thereby create categories such as the underdeveloped. 351
The West has been able to define and indeed to create the “Other” – objects to be studied, 
described and developed,352 and that “Other” is invariably lacking, deficient, inferior,353
and in need of Western assistance.354  This power to define and represent others is 
assumed “in the portrayal of ways in which people live their lives, in articulating their 
experiences – and on this basis, in shaping the processes of change.”355  Peoples with 
complex and varied histories, cultures and communities became homogenized masses 
mired in intolerable poverty and in need of Western assistance.356  The objects of 
development proliferated and included, inter alia, poverty, insufficient technology and 
capital, rapid population growth, inadequate public services, and archaic agricultural 
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practices; new problems were continually incorporated, categorized and further 
defined.357  Indeed, the “vast surface over which the discourse effortlessly moved 
eventually covered practically the entire cultural, economic and political geography of the 
Third World.”358
Development problems were invariably framed in a manner that required Western 
intervention and the input of “experts”,359 and it was the discourse of development that 
determined who qualified as “expert.”360  Economists, demographers, educators, 
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and specialists in agriculture, public health 
and nutrition were enlisted to carry out the modernization project.361  Development 
professionals were generally dispassionate academics and practitioners, who were usually 
far removed from the experiences and lives in which they intervened.362  Locating 
knowledge in specialists, however, privileges some voices and silences others.363  It also 
means solutions emanate from foreign sources,364 while local knowledge and ways of 
knowing and being are ignored, discarded or co-opted. 365  Overpowered by the 
hegemonic discourse of the West, Third World societies often were effectively prevented 
from articulating their own identities and worldviews. Many seem to have internalized
the perspectives of the modernizers and developers, a process facilitated by comprador 
Third World intellectuals.366
The post war development discourse established a discursive practice that in turn 
established the rules of the game.367  This discourse permits “the systematic creation of 
objects, concepts and strategies,”368 as it determines who can speak, from what points of 
view, and with what authority.  It establishes the criteria that define expertise and that 
expertise was deemed to reside in Western systems of thought, values and ways of life.  
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Dominant strands of development theory and practice (including most “alternative” 
theories) are constructed in the West and implemented in the Third World.369  Western 
policy-makers decide which projects will be funded and where aid money will be spent or
withdrawn.370   Third World governments are granted ostensible authority over their 
citizens, but rich countries and international lending institutions very often decide what 
will actually be done in Third World countries.371  Thus, the hierarchical relationship that 
once existed between the colonizer and the colonized continues.372
An example of how the problem and then the solution are constructed within the 
development paradigm can be discerned in an oft-told depiction of Egypt.  Popular 
representations of Egypt invariably describe it as an overpopulated country, whose 
population is crowded within a narrow strip of land in the Nile Valley, and is growing at 
a rate that outpaces its ability to grow sufficient food.373 The obvious response to the 
“natural limits of geography and demography” is technological and managerial 
assistance, entailing the massive input of Western expertise and capital resources.374  Yet 
substantial questions can be raised regarding the claim that Egypt has too many people,375
that it lacks the ability to grow sufficient food376 or that it possesses too little land.377  If 
the problem is redefined as changing consumption patterns and access to land, then the 
solutions also change and may encompass political and social constructs that are beyond 
the reach of Western development experts. 
This misrepresentation of Egypt does not merely give rise to ineffective policies.
Its simplistic and unchallenged premises378 show how Western-based development 
institutions continue to present the countries and peoples of the Third World (such as 
Egypt and its peoples) as objects of development, as something external to the expertise 
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that is development, despite the tremendous involvement379 of these institutions in the 
affairs of Third World nations and communities.380
VI.  Conclusion: Envisioning a Post Development World
All developing countries are caught in a time warp of sorts, 
where they can never really catch up with the West, …for the 
West has become the past, present and future of the non-
West.381
Can development be transformed? What shape would a transformed development 
paradigm take?  If development turns out to be incapable of fundamental change, what 
would the world look like without it? This part begins the process of thinking about these 
questions and contemplating a world without development.  If development depends on 
shared beliefs rather than destiny, it is possible to at least ask whether Third World 
societies must necessarily reproduce themselves according to Western notions of 
development, or remain forever at the margins of the international community.382    Must 
one develop or perish?383  We do not propose a substitute grand vision; our aim is to 
challenge the narrative of development, not to replace it with another.
Development theory and practice are in a quandary.  There is a gap between 
academics and practitioners.384  Development thought and policy have been subjected to 
the postmodern critique385 discussed in this article, and have broadened into diverse and 
sometimes inconsistent theories and modes of analysis.386  These diverse perspectives are 
partly in response to a pervasive disillusionment with the failures of development,387 and 
partly in support of the rising voices of indigenous resistance to development.388  At its 
most radical, anti-developmentalism urges abandoning “Western universalism or Euro-
Americanism and calls for identifying other visions, other ways of knowing and being, 
Deconstructing Development – Gordon/Sylvester
Page 47 of 92
and for recognition that development has been an illusion.”389  It suggests that by 
challenging the central concepts that set boundaries on our thinking development can be 
exposed and “rejected as degenerate, ecologically maladaptive, and an empty dream.”390
Somewhat less radically, there is the hope that exposing the ideology underlying 
development might lead to transformative responses from development’s proponents and 
practitioners.391
The institutions, experts and politicians involved in technical assistance, however, 
view the concept of development as incontestable, even while conceding some of its 
failures.392  Some proponents fear that if they criticize development, already inadequate 
assistance could be terminated or diverted to other ends.393  Moreover, some development 
projects  have been beneficial394 and imposed relatively little negative impact.395  The 
postmodern analysis has also been criticized as challenging the notion of collective action 
and interests, and as making “even the possibility of international intervention in pursuit 
of development illusory and reactionary”.396  Post developmentalism seems to encourage 
disengagement, and the abrogation of any Western accountability for the current state of 
affairs in Third World nations.397  It is believed to offer little to those who aspire to safe 
drinking water, a roof that does not leak and other material goods most citizens of 
industrialized countries take for granted.398  Post-development theorists are charged with 
attempting “to reinvent a pre-colonial Eden that never existed and is no less violent in 
scripting identity, than are identities constructed in the name of development”.399  Adding 
to the complexity is the daunting task of considering a post development world in the 
wake of fifty years of development that has left many individuals worse off400 and 
countries mired in debt and enmeshed in a system that has in effect led to re-
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colonization.401  What is more, in an era of globalization, is it even possible to escape the 
development paradigm?402 These critiques raise serious questions to which -- absent a 
new meta-narrative -- there is no comprehensive “answer.”  Instead, there may be a range 
of inquiries that might help shift the entire approach to development and to the Third 
World. 403  Our objective is to begin a paradigm shift that relocates the locus of control 
and authority.
With this possibility in mind, consider a question.  Is it possible the Third World 
would have been better off without the official development assistance it has been 
accorded since the 1950s, keeping in mind the successes and failures of development and 
its impact on war, peace, government structures, sovereignty, debt and a host of other 
issues?  Professors Simon and Narman pose a simpler form of this question404 and of 
course find it impossible to answer.405 Yet perhaps it is a question that nonetheless 
should be asked, as the liberal consensus constructs globalization in a manner that 
threatens to consign permanently the people of the Third World to do the work that 
people in the West no longer want to do.406  The Western assumption is that material 
wealth means personal contentment, and the middle classes and elites of the South seem 
to have adopted this view.407  But perhaps this is not entirely the case for everyone.  The 
desirability of material wealth may vary for different peoples depending on their 
particular values and mores, just as such needs and desires vary within the Western 
world.  Development is assumed to improve the lives of its targets, but who defines 
“improvement”, and who determines priorities and the desirability of interventions in 
pursuit of change.  The answers to these multifaceted questions are even more complex 
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after fifty years of development, during which a plethora of policies have rained down 
upon a broad range of societies, cultures and peoples.
Consider a second question.  Was everything in the previous “non-developed 
world” really so terrible?  Surely the pre-colonial world was not an idyllic paradise.  And
is true that people did not have many of the goods that are now deemed necessities in the 
west.408  But perhaps people were productive enough to produce what they needed, a 
capacity that is sorely lacking today as many countries are barely able to feed their 
people.409  Certainly, the pre-development world was affected to varying degrees by 
colonialism, which had uneven and often destabilizing consequences for the colonized.410
Nonetheless it is important to ask how people viewed themselves and their communities 
before the advent of development.411 Is it possible that a sense of inclusiveness, 
cohesiveness, belief in local capabilities, and a perception of self-worth could 
characterize communities -- even when those communities were what many today would 
characterize as poor?412  This is not to champion or romanticize mythical “timeless 
traditions.”413  Rather, it is to acknowledge that before development people were not 
helpless, incompetent, inferior creatures in need of salvation from the West, but instead 
were quite capable and diverse human beings organized into myriad, complex 
communities.  A post development paradigm must consider how local communities might 
begin to regain the agency to identify and name ones own dreams, viewpoints and ways 
of being. 
This transformation must also interrogate how and why non-Western cultures and 
systems of thought are treated as somehow inferior, if not unacceptable.414  This query is 
really directed more to Western communities and their views of the non-Western 
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“Other.”  To return agency to the peoples of the Third World would mean abdicating the 
power to name and define the problem, as well as the scope and content of the dialogue, 
and the substance and scale of any solutions.415   It is undeniable that many in the 
development industry are very intelligent people with good hearts and only the best of 
intentions.  They truly care about the work they are doing and the people they are trying 
to assist.  But it can be difficult to revise long held perspectives and perceptions, 
especially when those perspectives are an integral part of the cultural milieu in which one 
exists.416  Images of the Third World as deficient and inferior are inherent in the words 
“underdeveloped,” “undeveloped,” and “developing.”  This, of course, empowers the 
developer.  Moreover, even as one tries to escape the development prism, there is often a 
nagging suspicion that without the West the peoples of the Third World really are 
somewhat helpless and not quite up to the task regardless of how it is defined.417   When 
coupled with the racism that generally presumes the Other as not quite competent, it 
becomes even more difficult to move beyond these beliefs.418  Yet the crucial question is 
control over destinies, the importing and imposition of values, and who is given the 
power to define?419  Besides its economic and technological might, the West has the 
power to define.420  This power must be returned to the peoples of the Third World, who 
must determine the narratives that are to govern their lives.
This necessarily raises questions as to who exactly are “the people”, and how to 
go about determining what “they” want.  It may be that “the people” are incapable of 
being concretely defined, and that any attempt to do so risks essentializing broad and 
diverse communities.  No attempt is made here to do so.  Moreover, no assumptions are 
made about the extent or the manner in which peoples may want to engage or disengage 
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from the West or the development project, nor as to how people define their basic needs 
or how those needs should be met.  Indeed, it is fully expected that many will completely 
embrace the West and what it has to offer; that others may be more selective, finding 
value in some facets and unsuitability in others; while still others will reject the West 
across-the-board.  Rather than making such determinations, the work to be done in the 
West is to try to figure out ways to somehow create a space to let people determine these 
things for themselves.  
What separates this undertaking from alternative development approaches such as 
participation,421 is a different attitude and perspective in the West.  The struggle to make 
this change begins with Western interrogation of the assumption of power over others, 
and the usurpation of agency and voice.  Those in the West who are concerned about 
poor peoples in the Third World must begin to question the power presumed to reside in 
self and in the West.  At all points along the political spectrum, whatever the critique, the 
power to change or improve the lives of Third World peoples is assumed to reside in the 
West.  This may not be true in the final analysis.  But whether it is or not, giving up this 
power may bring about a humility that permits a true exchange and a dialogue that does 
not frame the questions, control the dialogue and assume the answers, for it entertains the 
possibility that those answers may lie elsewhere.
Consider a third and final question?  What if development had succeeded?  What 
if the governments, institutions and people charged with realizing the development 
project had succeeded in fulfilling its many promises, and there had actually been 
sufficient funds and resources to make development a reality and all so-called 
underdeveloped countries were now on economic par with the industrialized countries?  
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It is doubtful the planet could support a world in which everyone consumed as many 
resources and generated as much waste as the industrialized world.422  Perhaps this 
indicates that development as currently defined is not universally attainable,423 and 
replicating western consumption patterns may not be a desirable goal due to its global 
impact.  This is not to say that the people of the Third World should not have access to 
the material goods widely enjoyed in the West.  The people who will be affected must 
determine the desirability of those goods, and of adopting the lifestyle associated with a 
consumer culture.424  It is only to say that perhaps modernization as it is currently 
configured is ultimately unsustainable and the entire international community should 
begin to re-think development in all of its manifestations.425
There is evidence to suggest that this transformation may already be taking place 
on both the local and global levels.  The rising voices confronting globalization raise one 
set of challenges426  At the local level, the development paradigm is being contested and 
transformed by “social movements that are characterized by social actors, as opposed to 
structures; the promotion of democratic, egalitarian and participatory styles of politics; 
and a search, not for grand structural transformations but rather, for the construction of 
identities and greater autonomy through modifications in everyday practices and 
beliefs.”427  While certainly not a grand break with the past,428 these developments clearly 
signal a new direction.429  It may be these local and particular movements that point us 
towards a post-development world that is not tied to grand schemes and designs, but is 
rooted in the diverse and the specific.  In the face of globalization, which is presented as 
inevitable, focusing on the local may seem parochial.  But almost all global actors, 
including multinational corporations, whose reach and power seems to be almost infinite, 
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in fact operate locally.  Products and services must be made and sold within localities and 
it may be on the local level that such entities, and the notion of the global and universal, 
can be most effectively questioned and, if necessary, challenged.430
Does this mean that there is no role for those in the West who wish to assist and 
act in solidarity with those in the Third World who seem to be on the economic and 
political periphery?  On the contrary, there may be a number of ways to engage, although 
the nature of that engagement may have to evolve.  Documenting and sharing the local 
encounters noted above can be of immense assistance for such information can not only 
be encouraging and inspiring, but may help other communities in devising strategies and 
tactics.431  Scholars, attorneys, economists and others might also engage Western 
institutions on expunging the obscene debt that is draining many of the very poorest 
countries.432  The debt did not exist in 1950 and has many roots, but surely it is tied to the 
modernization project.  This article does not address wars and other instances of extreme 
dislocation that may require certain types of interventions be it from the West or other 
Third World nations.  Although the legality of such interventions is the subject of endless 
debate,433 this may be another area in which concerned communities in the West can 
assert positive influence.
There is certainly work to be done in shaping assistance when assistance is 
desired, although it may be difficult to let go of deep-rooted assumptions and long-held 
power.  Without doubt, critically questioning the very concept of development is the first 
step in fundamentally changing the manner in which one thinks about development and 
its objects, and is the place to begin probing accepted wisdom about “the Other.”  There 
is little to suggest that the people whose lives have been dramatically changed by 
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development necessarily refuse to accept change.  What may be desired is change that 
helps people enhance inborn and cultural capacities, and change that allows individuals to 
blossom and leaves them free to change the rules and content of change, according to 
their own ethics and aspirations.434  The objective it is to pose different questions, to hear 
the responses of others, and to not assume that the answers reside in the West.  It is to 
slowly, but steadily and surely, accomplish a paradigm shift.
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text for a response to this contention.
11
 Majid Rahnema, Towards Post-Development: Searching for Signposts, a New Language and New 
Paradigms, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER 384 (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Rahnema, Towards Post-Development]. 
12
 For a discussion of the ways in which development has stripped many Third World states of significant 
aspects of their sovereignty, see infra Part III; see also Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a 
Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 903 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, Saving Failed 
States]. 
13 Saving Failed States, supra note 12.  Development confirms and validates racial hierarchy, which 
explains in part why after the disintegration of the USSR, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics 
– whether industrialized or not – were immediately understood to be in a different global category than the 
developing Third World.  Ruth Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (2003) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy]; cf. Kothari, supra note 7, at 8 (maintaining that “the 
development project is expansionist and has found new territory” for with the triumph of neoliberalism, 
development has broadened its breadth to include the transitional economies of Europe and the former 
Soviet Republics).
14 Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 934.
15 See supra notes 1, 5 and accompanying text; Kothari, supra note 7, at 7–12.
16
 Some development strategies such as micro-development, participation, and sustainable development 
began life as “alternative development” strategies.  These alternative theories have been institutionalized 
and absorbed into mainstream development theory and in the process watered down and stripped of any 
semblance of their sometimes-radical origins.  As reconstituted, they reproduce the same power 
relationships found in conventional development theory and practice.  Moreover, even these “alternative 
theories” generally originate in the West and are then imposed on the Third World.  Kothari, supra note 7, 
at 9–10.  See also supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
17
 Michael Cowen & Robert Shenton, The Invention of Development, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 7, 28 
(Johanthan Crush ed., 1995).
18
 Of course the level of control varies, given that some Third World countries are larger, and more 
politically and economically powerful than others.  This is not to suggest that all Third World countries are 
homogenous or indistinguishable from each other.
19 ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD 
WORLD  12–14 (1995).
20
 This article takes up the bold challenge by Professor Tayyab Mahmud in his brilliant article: Postcolonial 
Imaginaries: Alternative Development or Alternatives to Development?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 25 (1999), and critically examines the post development literature.
21
 Kiely, supra note 7, at 24 (criticizing the anti-development critique as romanticizing pre-colonial cultures 
that may never have existed). 
22
 On problems with marginalizing and representing the other, see Uma Kothari, Feminist and Postcolonial 
Challenges to Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE CRITICAL PERSEPCTIVES, supra note 
7, at 48– 50.
23
 On constructing “the Other” in opposition to self, see EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 1–8 (1994).
24
 The origins of development are quite complex, but a unitary meaning seemed to congeal around the end 
of the Second World War.  Development came to signify indefinite growth, maturity and the capacity to 
grow without end.  This expectation was based on a number of developmental hypotheses including “the 
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omnipotence of technique, the asymptotic assumption relating to science, the rationality of economic 
mechanisms, and the presumption of social engineering as a prerequisite for growth.”  Michael Watts, “A 
New Deal in Emotions”: Theory and Practice and the Crisis of Development, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 17, at 44, 49–50.
25
 For an extensive discussion of the concept of development before 1949, see Cowen & Shenton, supra
note 17, at 27; Watts, supra note 24, at 44.  The mandate system and later the trusteeship system were also 
precursors of development.  Id.  See also Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 940–53, on the mandate 
and trusteeship systems.
26 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 3.
27
 Truman’s plan facilitated the establishment of numerous “international institutions, professions, 
organizations and institutions whose existence was dedicated to development. Development was 
industrialized.”  Watts, supra note 24, at 44–45.
28 Esteva, supra note 1, at 10.  Indeed, “as a neocolonial discipline, the authoritative discourse of 
development reproduces unequal relations by assuming the power to label groups of people … in 
development we have constructed an entity called the Third World.”  KOTHARI, supra note 23, at 38.
29 Esteva, supra note 1, at 9.
30
 In 1956, John Foster Dulles stated that defeat in the contest for development of the underdeveloped 
countries “could be as disastrous as defeat in the arms race.”  CHRONICLE OF THE 20TH CENTURY 776 
(Clifton Daniel ed., 1992).  Indeed, the introduction to a development economics textbook used in the U.S. 
in the early 1960s made the point rather bluntly: “the Cold War is not going very well for the Western 
World.  Soviet or Chinese influence is infiltrating into many of the underdeveloped countries, in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.”  11 STEPHEN ENKE, ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPMENT (1963), quoted in 1 
DEVESH KAPUR, THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 144 n. 10 (Brookings Institute 1997).  The 
World Bank was pressed into service to address this problem.  See also supra notes 24, 27 and 
accompanying text discussing how the Cold War helped shaped World Bank policies. See also ESCOBAR, 
supra note 19, at 34; Pierre de Senarclens, How the United Nations Promotes Development Through 
Technical Assistance, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 190 (Noting that just as the 
Marshall Plan was to contain the communist threat in Europe, economic aid became part of American 
political strategy.  The Cold War thus animated and colored the development project, as anti-communist 
credentials became a condition for assistance.).
31
 Senarclens, supra note 30. 
32
 “At the end of the Second World War, the United States controlled approximately 70% of the world’s 
gold and foreign exchange reserves and 40% of industrial output.”  Kiely, supra note 7, at 26.
33 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 32 (noting that “1945 marked a profound transformation in world affairs” as 
the United States assumed the “undisputable position of economic and military preeminence, placing under 
its tutelage the entire Western system”).  
34 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 28; Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 13, at 1.
35 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23–24; Majid Rahnema, Poverty, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 161.
36 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23 (quoting Wolfgang Sachs, The Archaeology of the Development Idea, 
23(4) INTERCULTURE 1–37 (1990)).  The origins of standard of living and the projection of global poverty 
are relatively new constructs that are “encased in development plans, foreign aid reports and national 
accounts data building in part on the Keynesian revolution.”  Watts, supra note 24, at 51.
37
 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 161. 
38 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 23.
39
 Senarclens, supra note 30.
40 Id. During the decades following the Second World War and throughout the decolonization era, the idea 
of “convergence” – that the gap between the rich and the poor would shrink – dominated thinking about 
development. There clearly has been no such convergence and the entire idea appears to have been 
discarded. See generally Lant G. Pritchett, Forget Convergence: Divergence, Past, Present, and Future, 33 
FIN. & DEV. 2 (1996); Jeffrey Williamson, Globalization, Convergence, and History, 56 J. ECON. HIST. 
277 (1996).  For example, during the last two decades, China and India have experienced faster income 
growth than the world’s rich countries.  Nonetheless, it would require another 100 years of growth at rates 
higher than those of the U.S., for China and India to reach today’s level of average income in the U.S.  
Nancy Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World, 98 FOREIGN POL’Y 76 (1998). 
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41 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 158 (detailing the many ways in which a variety of cultures define and 
perceive poverty).
42 Id. at 159.  See also Ivan Illich, Needs, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 88.
43 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24.
44
 This assumption justified the basic tenets of intervention: poverty was too global and delicate a matter to 
taken out of the hands of professionals and institutions that were trained and empowered for this purpose; 
programs had to be charted in terms of economic resources and needs; and the agents that would be 
primarily responsible for designing and executing such strategies would be governments and other 
institutions.  Rahnema, supra note 35, at 164.  Professor Rahnema explains that anti-poverty programs 
claim to be based on an assessment of needs, but that within the global context, needs are identified in an 
abstract manner.  Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 163.  Thus impoverished wage earners focused their struggles on limited objectives such as raising 
income.  Labor unions were utilized while informal and formal community organizations that had 
traditionally assisted the poor were disregarded and ignored.  Id.
47 Id.
48 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24.
49
 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 163; Illich, supra note 42, at 88.
50
 Nanda Shrestha, Becoming a Development Category, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 266.  
Except where noted, this account of life in Nepal before and after development is from this fascinating 
chapter by Professor Shrestha.
51
 Rahnema, supra note 35, at 163.
52 Id.
53 Shrestha, supra note 50, at 266. Professor Shrestha notes how a road that had fallen into disrepair would 
have been mended through the collective efforts of the village in the pre-development world.  This sense of 
collective action disappeared with the advent of development, as everyone waited for the developers to fix 
it. 
54
  Ted Lewellen, Deconstructing Development: Toward an Anthropological Definition of a Value-Laden 
Concept, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association at Washington, DC 
(Nov. 1997) ( noting that “many currently ‘underdeveloped’ regions of the world were developing quite 
well before their cultures were crushed or shifted in entirely new directions by Western expansion since the 
16th Century”).
55 See, e.g., Ziauddin Sardar, Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
THEORY, supra note 4, at 53; see also Richard Cameron Blake, The World Bank’s Draft Comprehensive 
Development Framework and the Micro-Paradigm of Law and Development, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 159, 166 (2000) (stating “as developing countries created ‘economic, political, and social institutions 
similar to those in the West,’ economic development would inevitably result”); Aoki, supra note 3, at 927–
28.
56 OZAY MEHMET, WESTERNIZING THE THIRD WORLD: EUROCENTRICITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
THEORIES 60 (2d ed. 1995) (noting traditional societies were viewed as exercising little control over their 
environment, as “lacking the traits of modern persons, and as devoid of political consciousness or active 
involvement in shaping their future.”)
57
 Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 7.  Professors Kothari and Minougue contend that successive 
development theories have simply been reformulations of modernization theory, which they posit as the 
mega theory of development.  Id. at 7–8.
58
 Sardar, supra note 55, at 52.
59 JAMES MITTELMAN & MUSTAPHA KAMAL PASHA, OUT FROM UNDERDEVELOPMENT REVISITED: 
CHANGING GLOBAL STRUCTURES AND THE REMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 38 (1997).
60 Id. (paraphrasing W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
(1960)).
61
 In the early years, all parties seemed to focus on increasing foreign aid from industrialized countries.  See
GABE S. VARGES, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER LEGAL DEBATE 3–4, 29 (1983).  Adeoye 
Akinsanya & Arthur Davies, Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: an Overview, 33 
INT’L L.Q. 208, 209 (1984) (Noting that “for the developing nations, the realization of their economic 
backwardness and lack of progress in combating it led them, at first, to press for more foreign aid from the 
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industrial countries.” The United Nations proclaimed the 1960s the “Development Decade” and 
announced, “less developed countries were to be assisted in achieving five percent annual growth in 
aggregate national income through expanded international trade and an annual flow of international 
assistance and capital.”).
62 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 39; Sardar, supra note 55, at 52 (Noting one early indicator of 
modernization was urbanization, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the populations of the 
newly independent countries were based in rural areas.  Other indicators included literacy and voting.  
Based on these indicators, the only road to modernization was industrialization.).
63 Sardar, supra note 55, at 52.  Professor Mittelman and Pasha illustrate the impact modernization theories 
can have by recounting the experiences of farmers in a district in Tanzania.  In this district, land is in short 
supply and most farmers interplant bananas (the staple food) and coffee, because they do not have enough 
acreage to plant them separately.  The government’s agricultural extension officers, however, advised them 
to plant coffee separately because bananas draw nitrogen and water from the soil and shade the coffee crop.  
This advice is based on experiments performed in laboratories and benefits only a minority of wealthier 
landowners who have enough land to segregate the crops and cultivate land under conditions similar to 
those in the lab.  Larger landowners are also likely to mingle with government experts, which facilitate the 
kind of communication that leads to the adoption of such changes.  Peasants resist the proposed innovations 
because they are useless or harmful to them.  Government officers then regard the peasants as traditional, 
meaning irresponsible, stupid and lazy.  The Modernization hypothesis is then invoked to justify supporting 
the agents of change and to legitimize coercing those now termed traditional peasants.  MITTELMAN  & 
PASHA, supra note 59, at 39.
64
 For a critique of progress, see José María Sbert, Progress, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 192; Vincent Tucker, The Myth of Development: A Critique of a Eurocentric Discourse, in
CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY, supra note 4, at 4–5 (Noting that progress as a concept became pre-
eminent during the French and English revolutions, as both nations set out to change the world and the 
manner in which it was perceived.  This worldview eventually came to be perceived as self-evident and 
universally valid.  The rights of man (albeit not all men or any women) were championed, science appeared 
to be capable of capturing nature and it was a period exploration and experimentation.  The new mission 
was modernity for the entire world and progress came to be fashioned in evolutionary terms.  It is forgotten 
or omitted, however, that a belief in “progress” also justified colonialism and imperialism, and has 
“legitimized” genocide, slavery, and a host of other atrocities.).
65 See VARGES, supra note 61, at 29. 
66 DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 271; Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 8.
See supra notes 30, 55, 61 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of these institutions and their 
role in the development project.
67
 Undoubtedly, the relationship of law to development has been an ever-present but contested theme.  See
discussion infra Part V for Third World efforts to use law as a tool for achieving and consolidating 
international political and economic.
68
 Modernization theory arose following WWII and was supported primarily by American scholars.  Brian 
Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470, 471 (1995) 
(reviewing 2 LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed., 1992); LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD
(Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993)).
69 Id. at 471 (stating that “[t]he law and development movement adopted the basic tenets of modernization 
theory, adhering to the notion that evolutionary progress would ultimately result in legal ideals and 
institutions similar to those in the West”).
70
 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1071.  Its earliest proponents 
placed “extreme reliance on law as an agent of modernization and progress predicated on a study of the 
ideal types of law and administration that could facilitate progress.”  Lakshman Marasinghe, Law and 
Development: A Jurisprudence for the Developing World, 8 DEV. EXPRESS 1, 2 (1998/1999).
71
 Professor Tamanaha has summarized the law and development paradigm as follows:
1) society is made up of individuals who consent to the state for their own welfare; 2) the 
state exercises control over individuals through law, and it is constrained by law; 3) laws 
are designed to achieve social purposes and do not offer a special advantage to any 
individual or groups within the society; 4) laws are applied equally to all citizens; 5) 
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courts are the primary legal institution with the responsibility for defining and applying 
the law; 6) adjudication is based upon a comprehensive body of authoritative rules and 
doctrines, and judicial decisions are not subject to outside influence; and 7) legal actors 
follow the restraining rules and most of the population has internalized the law, and 
where there are violations of the rules enforcement action will guarantee conformity
Tamanaha, supra note 68, at 473 (paraphrasing Trubek, supra note 70, at 1071).
72
 Trubek, supra note 70, at 1073.  Development was assumed to involve an increase in man’s rational 
capacity to control the world, and thus in his ability to improve his material well being.  But “development” 
offered more than increased rationality and material satisfaction; it also promised greater equality, 
enhanced freedom, and fuller participation in the community.  As an ideal, therefore, “development” held 
the promise of a life that would be richer in all ways for all Third World people.
73
 Blake, supra note 55, at 167. 
74 Several factors contributed to the movement’s abrupt demise, including a sharp drop in funding by both 
the public and private sectors in the United States.  The U.S. Agency for International Development and the 
Ford Foundation, for example, were major funding sources for academic and fieldwork in law and 
development; their financial support declined sharply in the early mid-1970s.  Some observers believe this 
policy change reflected popular disillusionment and a general loss of faith in government and the viability 
of overseas interventions – resulting significantly from the Viet Nam war and Watergate.  See Maxwell O. 
Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 167, 169 (1997).
75 Id.
76
 Francis G. Snyder, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
723, 727–28 (1980) (Discussing the two ways scholars reacted to the lack of success of  these philosophies.  
Some argued that their failure “was the inevitable consequence of the transition to capitalist development… 
The other elaborated a radical critique, suggesting that capitalist development in the periphery would not 
reproduce the historical capitalist path… The first approach is still followed by the majority of development 
practitioners.”).
77 Id. at 731; see also Aoki, supra note 3, at 928. 
78
 Trubek, supra note 70, at 1081.  Critics of the movement also observed that “the development equation 
contain[ed] a heavy social element, for which law is not the complete answer.”  Marasinghe, supra note 70, 
at 2.  Of course, modernization has continually reappeared in different guises.  See supra notes 67–69 and 
accompanying text.
79
 For example, the intersection of law and economic development in the Third World continues to generate 
significant attention – as evidenced by a 1992 book with precisely that title.  The book was edited by P. 
Ebow Bondzi-Simpson who, in the opening chapter, asserts that:
Law may be used to promote development as an institutional enterprise, providing a 
framework for procedures to be adopted, mechanisms for the settlement of disputes 
and/or agencies to monitor or review programs taken in pursuit of development.  As a 
normative device, law may provide a catalog of substantive rights, obligations and 
entitlements.  In either respect, law may be used to promote desired action or to curb or 
regulate undesired actions or consequences. 
P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson, Confronting the Dilemmas of Development Through Law, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 6 (P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson ed., 1992).
80
 Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a NewParadigm for Law and Development,
108 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15 (1998) (noting that the overwhelming majority of development literature still 
“urge[s] the rapid and full-blown liberalization and marketization of developing world economies”); id. at
17–18 (listing the many organizations that follow an agenda which promotes marketization and 
democratization).  Professor Maxwell Chuibundu notes:
Now that the globe seems to be marching to one drum beat, that of the free enterprise 
capitalist system, it follows that the legal institutions and practices that have fostered and 
sustained the triumph of the capitalist mode of production, accumulation, distribution, 
and consumption are best suited for other societies, appropriately modified at the margins 
to account for the peculiar foibles of those societies.
Chibundu, supra note 74, at 222.
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81
  James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa’s Economic and Political 
Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and States, 45 VILL. 
L. REV. 971, 1000 (2000).
82
 In a 1989 report the World Bank identified bad government (including poor policies, incompetence and 
corruption) as the primary obstacle to economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.  See WORLD BANK, 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY 
(1989).
83
 Chibundu, supra note 74, at 190–91. 
84
 Mary C. Tsai, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin, 31 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 1317 (2000); Anthony Galano III, International Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt 
Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have Undermined Brazil’s National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 323 (1994); JACQUES J. POLAK & CATHERINE GWIN, THE WORLD BANK AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP (1994).  International Financial 
Institutions or IFIs increasingly embrace an ever-widening array of governmental functions, such as 
judicial and public service reorganization, government auditing functions, and labor and environmental 
concerns. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial 
Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 243, 266 (2000) [hereinafter Anghie, Time 
Present and Time Past] (noting World Bank interference in any activity that involves development); see 
also James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter-Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and 
Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999) [hereinafter 
Gathii, Good Governance]. 
85
 One means is through “conditionality” – the IFI practice of making loans conditional on policy and/or 
structural changes by the borrowing state Conditionality allows the World Bank and the IMF to restrict 
credit if a country’s fails to comply with the terms of its lending agreement.  Tsai, supra note 84; POLAK & 
GWIN, supra note 84.  See infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
86
 The World Bank and the IMF are also known as the Bretton Woods institutions, because they were 
formed at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944.  The two organizations have similar governance 
structures, operating according to a weighted voting system that is based on contributions made by 
members.  The broad legal framework for the two institutions is also similar, with emphasis on an 
ostensibly non-political character. See Anghie, supra note 84, at 269; Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 
84, at 225.
87 Cf. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the 
Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 529, 530 (2000) [hereinafter Rajagopal, From 
Resistance to Renewal].  Professor Rajagopal rejects the prevailing “functionalist” conception of 
international institutions.  He notes that the functionalist “theory explains the emergence of international
institutions as a result of a pragmatic necessity to serve concrete functions… The central proposition of this 
theory is that institutions are born and expand due to top-down policy decisions that correlate with the 
functional needs of international society.”  Not coincidentally, this top-down conception is consistent with 
the “hegemonic nature of international law as an elitist discipline.”
88
 Section I of Article I of IBRD’s Articles of Agreement states that the Bank is:
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating 
the investment of capital for productive purpose, including the restoration of economies 
destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime 
needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in 
less developed countries.  
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, art. I, §1, 60 Stat. 1440, 16 
U.S.T. 1942, as amended (1945), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20049557~menuPK:63
000601~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600~theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited on Feb. 22, 2004).
89
 John D. Ciorciari, A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions in 
International Peace Operations, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 292, 298–99 (1998).
90
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. I, § 
1.
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91 See Ciorciari, supra note 89, at 298–99; Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)?, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1989, 1991 (1994).
92 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. III, 
§ 5(b).
93 Id.
94 Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 438 (“Indeed, it was commonplace in 
development thinking in the late 1950s and early 1960s that poor countries would succumb to Communism 
if they were not rescued from poverty.”  Initially the Bank employed direct “Project lending” to support 
anti-communist regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  For example, Nicaragua, whose ruling Samoza 
family was cooperating closely with the U.S. military, received 10 World Bank loans between 1951 and 
1960.  Guatemala, however, with three times Nicaragua’s population, received no World Bank support 
until the overthrow of its supposedly communist regime in 1955.  Loans were used to build dams, highways 
and other infra-structure projects that would facilitate economic growth.  As these projects failed to achieve 
their intended results, however, it became apparent that securing the allegiance of Third World regimes –
particularly oppressive ones – would not necessarily pacify the populations who were subject to those 
regimes, and thus there might be a need for direct programs to alleviate poverty.  In other words, preventing 
communist subversion in the Third World was going to require programs to alleviate poverty within Third 
World countries, and this was not being accomplished by the World Bank’s project-based lending in 
support of infrastructure and the required shift in policy began at the regional level.)
95
  In 1959, U.S. President Eisenhower explained the establishment of the Inter-American Development 
Bank as follows: 
Traditional unilateral aid was sustaining a prevailing social order, which was unjust to the 
masses of the people, but we could do nothing directly about this without violating the 
policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations.  The creation of the new 
bank changed this, for now the Americas had a multinational instrument, secure against 
control by any one country, for bettering the life of people throughout the Americas; if 
this instrument insisted upon social reform as a condition of extending development 
credit, it could scarcely be charged with “intervention.”
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE, 1956-61: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 516 (1965), quoted in 1 
DEVESH KAPUR, supra note 30, at at 155.  Thus was established the regional mechanism for development 
assistance conditioned on specific internal reforms by the country receiving the assistance.  
96
 The establishment of the IDA was the most significant institutional factor in the World Bank’s shift away 
from project-lending based on traditional financial criteria and toward investing in “human capital” and 
poverty reduction programs in the Third World. It was the model for multilateral institutions that would 
have the credibility to insist on internal changes without charging individual nations with violating the 
international principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. The same mechanism and 
rationale were implemented without the regional limitation when the International Development 
Association (IDA) was established as a part of the World Bank in 1961.  Rajagopal, From Resistance to 
Renewal, supra note 87, at 552.
97 See infra notes 112, 143 and accompanying text for discussion in the cycles of conventional wisdom. 
98
 The principal task originally assigned to the IMF was “to promote international monetary cooperation” 
and “to give confidence to members by making the Fund’s resources temporarily available to them under 
adequate safeguards.”  Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. I(i), I(v), 60 Stat. 
1401, 29 U.S.T. 2203, as amended (1945), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; see also Enrique R. Carrasco, Income 
Distribution and the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social 
Development, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996); Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the 
IMF, and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996); Stephen Anthony, IMF 
Structural Adjustment Programs: An Economic Evaluation, 3 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 133 (1998).  
99
 Carreau, supra note 91 (Noting that in essence, the IMF’s member states agreed to relinquish some of 
their sovereignty over their national monetary systems in exchange for short-term assistance when needed, 
and for the stability the IMF would bring to the international monetary system.  The IMF’s normative 
powers thus depended on the cooperation of its member states.).
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100 Id. (also noting that this decision may have been in violation of the par value system established in the 
IMF Articles of Agreement).
101 Id.
102
 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 47.   
103
 Carreau, supra note 91 (noting that IMF lending has always been conditional; borrowers are required to 
adopt stabilization plans and to correct the types of imbalances that were that thought to have figured 
significantly in precipitating World War II).
104
 Professor Carreau observes:
Gradually and involuntarily, the IMF has lost its influence over its most developed 
member states, which remain bound by very limited monetary obligations since the 
collapse of the par value system in 1971 and which have abstained from turning to the 
IMF for assistance… because of the conditions imposed.
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997.
105 Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 570.
106
 For example, the IMF now recognizes economic growth as an objective – even though economic growth 
was not one of its original purposes and is still not mentioned in the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.  
JACQUES J. POLAK, 184 THE CHANGING NATURE OF IMF CONDITIONALITY, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE, at 1, 17 (1991).  It defines desirable economic growth as “high quality growth rather than flash in 
the pan growth fueled by inflation and excessive borrowing, or growth at the expense of the poor, of the 
environment, or growth run by the state.”  IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus, quoted in id., at 
19.  This model of economic growth is quite compatible with the World Bank’s theory of economic 
development.  Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 573.  Professor Carreau notes:  
The IMF’s role seems limited to controlling the economies of member states requesting 
financial assistance, namely developing countries and former command economy 
countries that have no alternative sources of outside financing…  Its assistance, originally 
limited to financing short-term difficulties, has been completely modified to address 
long-term, structural imbalances.  And this is precisely the World Bank’s mission.
Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997–98.
107 Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 541.
108
 Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, To Lend or Not To Lend: Oil, Human Rights, and the World Bank’s Internal 
Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 197 (2001). 
109
 Liberal critics generally accept the candor and validity of IFI goals of alleviating poverty and improving 
standards of living in the Third World.  See Operational Directive 4.15: Poverty Reduction (1992), THE 
WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL 2 (1992) (stating that “sustainable poverty reduction is the Bank’s 
overarching objective”); Policy Development and Review Department, The Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) – Operational Issues, International Monetary Fund, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2004) (proclaiming “poverty 
reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more explicit element of a renewed growth-
oriented economic strategy” of the IMF).  In their view the problem is ineffective strategies and/or 
improper implementation by IFIs themselves and/or by Third World governments.  Some liberal critics also 
allege that IFIs are “out of touch” because they are Western-dominated and unrepresentative).  See, e.g., 
Oscar Shachter, The Evolving Law of International Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1976). 
110
 Critics embracing a more radical perspective contend that IFIs are in place primarily to maintain the 
international economic status quo, and to enable the countries of the industrialized North to continue 
exploiting the countries of the South.  See, e.g., Saving Failed States, supra note 12; David Greenberg, Law 
and Development in Light of Dependency Theory, 3 RES. IN L. & SOC. 129, 152 (1980); James Thuo 
Gathii, Af rica’s Economic and Political Predicaments, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971, 1002 [hereinafter Gathii, 
Africa Predicaments]; Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 224 (relating the hierarchical nature of 
the international order and demonstrating that decisions to undertake national economic management have 
been taken out of the hands of developing countries through structural adjustment programs that are 
required for the continuance of foreign aid). Critics also point out that eighty percent of U.S. aid to Africa, 
for example, is spent on American commodities, expertise, and subcontractors; only twenty percent of the 
money ever leaves the U.S.  It is also noteworthy that in 1989, the Bank employed 80,000 consultants on 
Africa with only one percent of them being African, meaning the other ninety-nine percent come from 
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outside the continent.  Ernesto Hernandez-Cata, Remark, Panel Three: The Role of Multi-Lateral 
Institutions in African Development, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 708, 711 (1999).
111
 For example, Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal contends that both the liberal and radical critiques are 
useful but flawed.  He believes that the liberal critique (1) fails to acknowledge that IFI interventions in the 
Third World often worsen circumstances by exacerbating class divisions that are already too broad, and (2) 
is inadequate to explain not only the general failure of IFI poverty reduction programs, but also the 
widespread popular resistance to those programs in the Third World.  He believes the radical critique, on 
the other hand, oversimplifies complex and differing relationships, leads to “policy paralysis, and fails to 
explain the continuing participation of legions of intelligent and genuinely well-intentioned individuals in 
“development work.”  Professor Rajagopal suggests an alternative analysis that differs from the liberal and 
radical critiques.  He maintains that just as the Third World is defined by the concept of development, IFIs 
are defined by their mission, and the development project has become that mission.   He continues: 
IFIs have had a complex relationship with Third World resistance. …it is the process by 
which [IFIs] have dealt with that resistance, and not so much the resistance itself, that 
have revealed the centrality of the resistance to the formation of the [IFIs’] changing 
institutional agendas…. This … is hardly acknowledged by the [IFIs], who see their 
evolution as being governed purely by the laws of economics, finance, or their Articles of 
Agreement.  It matters less that poverty alleviation programs never alleviate poverty or 
that conditionalities never achieve their stated goals.  Rather, these specific interventions 
… redound to the authority and expansion of international institutions. 
Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 576.
112
 The phrase “cycles of conventional wisdom” is borrowed from an article by economist Paul Krugman 
that discusses the myriad models of development promulgated by development specialists and how these 
models were developed.  He concludes that development specialists are a closed insular group that does not 
rely upon proven methods or past experience, and appear unable to accomplish modernization.  Paul 
Krugman, Cycles of Conventional Wisdom in Eocnomic Development, 72 INT’L AFFAIRS 717, 717 (1996). 
113 Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 1.  Definitions of “development” abound.  Professor Simon asserts 
that these definitions are “contextual and contingent upon the ideological, epistemological or 
methodological orientation of their purveyors, and there has never been a consensus or unanimity about the 
meaning or content of development.”  Simon, supra note 10, at 17. 
114
 Autonomous decision-making and implementation by both nations and peoples were emphasized. 
Sardar, supra note 55. See also Rosemary McGee, Participating in Development, in DEVELOPMENT 
THEORY AND PRACTICE CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 92. 
115
 Finite resources and the fragility of the global environment were additional factors to be considered and 
taken into account. Sardar, supra note 55, at 53.   This followed on the heals of the Stockholm Conference 
on the Environment in 1972 and was popularized by such publications as WORLD COMMISSION ON 
EMPLOYMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
116
 “Liberalization” and “open markets” have become the driving force of development.  Sardar, supra note 
55.
117
 Cowen & Shenton, supra note 17, at 27.
118
 The so-called “golden age of development” overlapped with the beginning of what would be series of 
United Nations Development Decades. Pursuant to a request by President John F. Kennedy, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations unanimously approved Resolution 1710, which declared the first 
Development Decade in 1961.  The goal was to attain, “in each under-developed country a substantial 
increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting its own target, taking as the objective a minimum 
annual rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 percent at the end of the Decade.”  G.A. Res. 1710, 
U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1084th plen. mtg., at 17, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); DUSAN DJONOVICH, 1 
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1972).  In some 
respects, these resolutions reflect the failures of development, the hopes of Third World nations, and 
convey the progression of development in theory and practice.
119 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 63.
120 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 24 (stating development theory was strongly influenced by the neo-
Keynesian consensus that dominated economic thinking and practice in the post-War period); Paul 
Cammack, Neoliberalism, the World Bank and the New Politics of Development, in DEVELOPMENT 
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THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 157, 161 (noting that it was assumed that states could and should 
intervene directly in production and distribution, making development an active, state-led process).
121
 Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 161; MEHMET, supra note 56, at 60.
122 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96.  This is quite ironic given the contemporary near-religious devotion to 
the free market.  
123
 Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 161; MEHMET, supra note 56, at 60.
124 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96.  Planners did not consider how countries would administer these 
ambitious plans; indeed institution building was ignored and Western planners utilized a “how to do” 
approach.  Id.
125
 Because underdeveloped countries were believed to be “trapped in a vicious circle of poverty and thus 
lacking capital, it would therefore have to come from abroad.” ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40. 
126
 “Project lending” was aimed primarily at developing infrastructure; it was intended to facilitate business 
by cultivating the factors necessary for economic growth.  Bank officials believed it was crucial to 
construct electric power plants and roads because industry could not be developed without electricity and 
the means to transport finished products.  Thus in the absence of this kind of infrastructure, most economic 
activities would be difficult if not impossible.  For example, good roads were necessary because no investor 
would want to invest in a country if its products could not be transported.  Sandra Blanco, Symposium: Part 
One: Pursuing the Good Life: The meaning of Development as It Relates to the World Bank and the IMF, 9 
TRANSNAT’L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (1999).  Consequently, the Bank mainly financed dams, 
highways, and other large-scale infrastructure projects.  Tsai, supra note 84.
127 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that technology not only “amplified material progress, [but]
would confer … a sense of direction and significance”; it was the key to modernization and indeed the 
transfer of technology became an important component of the development project). 
128 Id.
129 MEHMET, supra note 56, at 96.  Institutional efficiency, indigenous history and culture and critical issues 
such as land reform were not part of the planning process, plans were generally derived in a vacuum.  Id.
130
 Blanco, supra note 126, at 111.
131 Id.
132 Esteva, supra note 1, at 13.
133 See discussion infra Part II.A.
134
 The multiplying failures of the development project and other events supported the dependency critique. 
For example, when internal forces extended state control over the economy through nationalizations, and 
sought to give workers and farmers more of a share in national wealth, private investors would flee and 
foreign loans would be denied.  This financial strangulation sometimes led to military coups and military 
incursions into the political process.  The repetition of this course of events fueled radical intellectuals who 
emphasized the impact of imperialism which used political, military and economic dominance to control 
production in foreign nations.  They also emphasized the impact of external forces from the economies of 
the “center” on the economies of the “periphery”, and focused on domination and subordination in general, 
and specifically on the effects of imperialism and colonialism.  MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 
44–45.  
135 See discussion infra Part II.A.
136 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40.
137
 Senarclens, supra note 30. 
138
 Blanco, supra note 126, at 111.
139 Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999.
140
 This was also arguably a violation of its Articles of Agreement. The World Bank Articles of Agreement 
provide that the World Bank’s lending policy is to be dictated by purely financial considerations, meaning 
its funds can be lent only on projects that are reasonably expected to generate sufficient funds to repay the 
loan.  Although it was believed these projects would contribute to the overall development of member 
States, these projects could not be viewed as profit-oriented. Indeed, many of these projects did not 
generate any income whatsoever.  Thus, the Bank increased its financial exposure, and borrowing members 
had to utilize already limited foreign exchange resources to repay the Bank.  Not surprisingly, the Bank 
began to face defaults.  Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999. 
141
 Jennifer N. Weidner, World Bank Study, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193 (2001).
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142
 In 1970, the UN General Assembly declared the beginning of a Second Development Decade (1971-
1981) that called for a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, growth in primary education, 
prevention and treatment of disease, and improved nutrition and housing.  It also called for adjustments in 
trade policies and for economically advantaged countries to support the development endeavors of 
developing countries.  EDMUND OZMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 528 (Anthony Mango ed., 2003).  See also G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., 1912th plen. mtg., at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8124 and /Add.1 (1970).
143 Esteva, supra note 1, at 13–14.  As early as 1962 ECOSOC had recommended that the economic and 
social aspects of development be integrated.  Proposals for Action of the First UN Development Decade 
(1960-70), declared that “development is growth plus change…. Change is social and cultural as well as 
economic, and qualitative as well as quantitative… The key concept must be improved quality of peoples’ 
lives.   Nonetheless, development continued to be perceived as a “definable path of economic growth 
passing through various stages, and “integration” simply linked the social aspect to the economic aspect.  
Solon L. Barraclough, In Quest of Sustainable Development (unpublished paper, UNRISD).
144
 Development was in reality more likely to worsen levels of absolute poverty for a large segment of the 
population.
145 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 92.
146 See discussion supra Part III.A1. 
147 Esteva, supra note 1, at 15.  It also dovetailed with the World Bank strategy of targeting groups such as 
the rural poor and small farmers.
148
 See infra notes 142–43, 147 and accompanying text. This coincided with the end of Robert McNamara’s 
tenure as President of the World Bank.
149 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 42.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 92.
152
 For example, “Micro-development” theorists advocated targeting the individual rather than 
infrastructure and governments, on the premise that development would occur when people were 
empowered to confront and address their poverty. Once empowered, people would “organize themselves 
and overcome the obstacles to their social, cultural and economic well-being” with foreign organizations 
relegated to a supportive role. Empirically, micro-development theory assumes that poverty results from 
lack [of] access to resources that are essential to the satisfaction of basic human needs,” and that this lack 
of access is a ‘product of lack of power in social relations.’”  See Blake, supra note 55, at 166.  Micro-
development theorists also emphasize a more equitable distribution of international economic power, which 
can occur only at the macro level.  Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Right to Development as a Human Right: 
Results of the Global Consultation, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 322, 327 (1991).
153
 Endogenous development proposed that the distinctiveness of individual cultures and societies should be 
at the center of determining the goals to be pursued.  This approach was generally accepted for a period of 
time, even though it was at odds with core assumptions of the development project, which are 
universalistic.  Esteva, supra note 1, at 15.
154
 Sustainable development was defined as economic growth that takes account of environmental concerns.  
See David P. Forsythe, The United Nations, Human Rights, and Development, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 334, 334 
(1997).  Like micro-development, it had a social dimension, emphasizing that development is more than 
economic growth.  See also Blake, supra note 55, at 168; Forsythe, supra note 154, at 335.  Both micro-
development and sustainable development concentrate on education and literacy, health services, poverty 
alleviation, environmental protection, community cooperation and participation, and social and cultural 
cohesiveness; success is not measured solely in terms of economic growth.  Results can be intangible, such 
as improved skills in communication, leadership or management; a stronger sense of self; the establishment 
of civil liberties; or the increased ability to leverage services from the state.  Results can also be tangible, 
such as increases in the production of agricultural or manufactured goods; a rise in family incomes; a 
building used for organizational activities; or a road or water system.  Id. at 166–68.  The Stockholm 
conference on the environment was in 1972, and the notion of sustainable development was further defined 
and cemented with the publication of the Brandt Report, entitled Our Common Future.
155 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 93.  The problem was that neither theorists nor NGOs bothered 
with the endogenous cultures from which successful grassroots institutions might emerge.  Id. See also
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McGee, supra note 114, at 92; Majid Rahnema, Participation, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 116 [hereinafter Rahnema, Participation]. 
156
 “The complex relation between one particular problem and the other problems would be established and 
then unified with the problem currently at the center of the process”.  Esteva, Development, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY at 14.
157 Wolfgang Sachs, Environment, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that 
the ebb and flow of international development theories generally follow political sensibilities in the West).  
For a discussion of the emergence of “basic needs” as a development strategy, see Arturo Escobar,
Planning, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 17, at 137–39 [hereinafter Escobar, Planning]; 
see also Illich, supra note 42, at 88–101.
158
 Sachs, supra note 157, at 26.
159 McGee, supra note 114, at 92; Rahnema, supra note 155, at 116.
160 See Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87.  
161
 For an analysis of participation, see Rahnema, supra note 155, at 116.  The emergence of these 
paradigms may also reflect the influence of NGOS.  McGee, supra note 114, at 92.
162
 On December 5, 1980, the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 35/36 that established the need 
for a Third Development Decade for the 1980s.  It called for accelerating development, promoting 
economic and social development, reducing disparities between Northern and Southern tier countries, and 
early eradication of poverty and dependency.   The definitive objective was the “constant improvement of 
the well being of the entire population through full participation in the process of development and the fair 
distribution of benefits to women.”  G.A. Res. 36, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 83d plen. mtg., at 106, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/35/36 (1980).  Part of the strategy included establishing a new international economic order, 
which would include industrialization and a more stable, equitable and effective international monetary 
system.  OZMANCZYK, supra note 142, at 528.
163 See infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
164
 The crushing burden of this debt continues to cement the dependent status of the poorest countries in the 
international financial system.  The combined total external debt of the Third World now exceeds two 
trillion dollars.  See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, 
at 196 (1999).  The legion and, thus far, unsuccessful proposals for resolving the crisis have included the 
“Baker plan”; the “Brady plan”; “debt-for-equity,” “debt-for-nature,” and “debt-for-development” plans; 
“securitization”; and the “Miyazawa,” “Mitterand,” and “Robinson” proposals.  Sylvester, supra note 6, at 
265–76.  The program currently in effect is the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) Debt Initiative.  
HIPC was launched by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996, and then revised in 1999.  Assistance 
provided by HIPC is in addition to such relief as a debtor country may be able to arrange directly with 
creditors.  The World Bank’s web site outlines the initiative as follows:
Eligible countries will qualify for debt relief in two stages.  In the first stage the debtor 
country will need to demonstrate the capacity to use prudently the assistance granted by 
establishing a satisfactory track record, normally of three years... In the second stage … 
the country will implement a full-fledged poverty reduction strategy, which has been 
prepared with broad participation of civil society, and an agreed set of measures aimed at 
enhancing economic growth.  
The World Bank Group, Ethiopia Receives Debt Relief Under HIPC Initiative: Total Support Worth 
US$1.9 Billion, at http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about background.html (last visited July 13, 2003).  The 
program now involves 42 countries: 34 in Africa, four in Latin America, three in Asia and one in the 
Middle East.  The World Bank Group, HIPC, HIPC Map, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/map/map.html (last visited July 13, 2003).  The results of the HIPC 
Initiative remain to be seen.  Its implementation to date, however, has been no less top-down and inflexible 
than previous IFI programs, according to participating country government officials with whom one of the 
present authors has spoken.  Professor Thomas observes that, “[t]he debt burden is directly related to world 
hunger and poverty because debtor governments must divert precious and scarce resources to paying down 
external debt instead of meeting the pressing needs of their populations.”  Chantal Thomas, International 
Debt Forgiveness and Global Poverty Reduction, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1711, 1712 (2000).  Many Third 
World governments spend more than twice as much servicing external debt as they do on health and 
education.  See Oxfam International Advocacy Offce & UNICEF, Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction: 
Meeting the Challenge, § 2.1 (1999), available at
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http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp9908_debt_relief_and_poverty_reduction.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 
2004).  “In Zambia – where infant mortality rates are increasing, over half a million children are out of 
school, and illiteracy is rising – debt servicing claims more of the national budget that health and education 
combined.”  Id., at § 3.2 (emphasis omitted).
165
 Jerome I. Levinson, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 489 (1989).
166
 Oil prices, which had increased five-fold between 1971 and 1974, doubled again in 1980.  Id. at 491, 
495–96.
167
 By 1974, OPEC annual revenues exceeded $100 billion. Sylvester, supra note 6, at 264.  The 
precariousness of the situation was compounded by political instability in Middle East, the 1979 fall of the 
Shah of Iran, and double digit inflation in the United States.  Id.
168 Id. at 265 (Noting that these developments affected Third World debtors in two critical ways.  First, a 
significant portion of the loans carried floating interest rates, and these rates skyrocketed.  Second, because 
of tight money and weakened demand, third world debtors had trouble selling their exports to raise 
revenue.  In 1982, Mexico made its historic declaration of inability to meet even the interest payments on 
its external debts, and the “third world debt crisis” was well on its way to becoming a household phrase.)  
169
 Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for National 
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161 (1998); 
Anthony, supra note 98.  Adjustment lending consisted of six core objectives.  These were: “[1] raising 
saving rates, [2] securing financial stability, [3] liberalizing and opening economies to foreign trade, [4] 
reducing state intervention and making markets more efficient, [5] reorienting government spending and 
improving revenue collection, and [6] mobilizing external sources.”  IMF Development and Review 
Department, Experience Under the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 
1997, at 32, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/imf.pdf (last visited Nov. 
16, 2003).
170
 Swaminathan, supra note 169; Bradlow, supra note 98; Anthony, supra note 98.  Organization of 
Economic Development members and countries such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand 
could bypass the IMF and its constraints.  Carreau, supra note 91, at 1996.
171
 Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 178–79; Bradlow, supra note 98.  The IMF’s Articles of Agreement 
explicitly prohibits any consideration of a nation’s political affairs in making loan determinations   
Bradlow.  Carreau, supra note 91, at 1997.  Indeed, the IMF was to only be concerned with attaining 
specifically prescribed macroeconomic goals, rather than with how a Member State actually reached those 
goals.  Although conditions were always attached to IMF lending, they were limited to macro-economic 
variables such as debt, money supply, and inflation.  Id.  But with its involvement in the Third World, these 
constraints began to dissolve, as the Fund’s primary role shifted to handling the economies of developing 
countries and more recently countries in transition.  Moreover, stabilization programs sponsored and 
approved by the Fund are ‘a seal of international approval of a State’s economic policies that acts as a de 
facto guarantee for prospective private lenders.  Id.
172 Id. at 1999.  Loans were made for adjustment in given sectors (sector adjustment) or for national 
economies as a whole (structural adjustment).
173
 Tsai, supra note 84, at 1331–32; Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 169–70; Weidner, supra note 141, at 
200.  
174
 The Bank, of course, determined which policies were “appropriate” – and it did so against the backdrop 
of the “cold war” between the West and the Soviet bloc.  Weidner, supra note 141.
175
 Initially, the Bank developed two types of policy-based loans for the Third World. The first of these was 
termed a “structural adjustment loan,” or SAL.  SALs generally run eight to ten years and require the 
borrowing country to conform to certain Bank guidelines regarding economic policies.  The stated 
objectives of SALs are: “(1) correcting balance of payments imbalances, (2) eliminating distortions and 
promoting microeconomic efficiency, (3) reducing high inflation rates, (4) protecting or resuming output 
growth, and (5) minimizing the cost of adjustment to the poorest” segments of the population.  The second 
type of policy-based lending is “sector adjustment loans,” or SECALs.  SECALs are similar to SALs in that 
both are conditioned on implementing policy-based initiatives.  SECALs, however, are generally more 
narrowly defined, and specific sectors of the economy are targeted for fiscal reform.  Usually the focus is 
on exports, agriculture, industry, energy, and public enterprises.  SALs and SECALS are both referred to as 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) because they promote economic liberalization by forcing nations to 
address inequity in their fiscal policies.  Carrasco, supra note 98, at 29; Tsai, supra note 84, at 1320–21; 3 
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THE WORLD BANK: LENDING ON A GLOBAL SCALE, RETHINKING BRETTON WOODS 11 (Jo Marie 
Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1996).
176
 Carreau, supra note 91, at 1999.  
177
 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 38–39; Uriz, supra note 108, at 203–04.
178 See infra Part II.B.3 for discussion of the magnitude and significance of Third World debt. 
179
 Carrasco, supra note 98, at 38–39; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57.
180
 The bank turned to alleviating Third World poverty by promoting economic growth. 
181 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 98, art. 4(1); Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57.
182
 Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57 (noting that in the 1980s, the Bank became heavily involved in funding 
development projects in such spheres as health, education, agriculture and housing).
183 See supra note 176–77; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 47, 54.
184
 Weidner, supra note 141, at 198–99; Bradlow, supra note 98, at 60.
185 See Bradlow, supra note 98, at 57; Uriz, supra note 108, at 205; Weidner, supra note 141, at 198–99.
186
 Carrasco, supra note 98, at 38–39; Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322.
187
 The “seal of approval” earned by complying with World Bank and IMF credit packages was critical to 
attaining private loans from the commercial banks of developed countries.  See Tsai, supra note 84, at 
1322; Galano III, supra note 84, at 339; Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary 
Interventions after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 445 (1997).
188
 Tsai, supra note 84, at 1322.
189 3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 134; George B.N. Ayittey, Aid for Black Elephants: How 
Foreign Assistance Has Failed Africa, in PERPETUATING POVERTY: THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF, AND THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 115–16, 140–42 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vásquez eds., 1994).  
190
 Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 177–89. 
191 See Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252–53 (commenting on adverse effects of 
IFI structural adjustment programs in the Third World.).  Somalia and Rwanda are two examples of states 
that were subjects of extensive structural adjustment programs that may have contributed to their collapse.  
See id. at 263;  .
192
 With reductions in the size of governments, unemployment rose in countries where the state was the 
largest employer and privatizing state activities often contributed to more hardships for the working poor.  
Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 180–82; Ayittey, supra note 189, at 140–41; Orford, supra note 187, at 
470–71.
193
 Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 180–82; Ayittey, supra note 189, at 140–41.
194
 Orford, supra note 187, at 456; Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 181; Rajagopal, From Resistance to 
Renewal, supra note 87, at 575; 3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 14–15, 46–48; PERPETUATING 
POVERTY, supra note 189, at 59–60.
195
 For example, James Thuo Gathii opines that structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa primarily 
focused on producing a conducive framework within which the repayment of the debts owed by African 
states to international banks and lending agencies is facilitated, and the unhindered influx of new 
international capital into these countries is secured.  Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 207.  
196
 Structural adjustment programs typically involved currency devaluations, producer price increases, trade 
liberalization, privatization, and a range of specific institutional changes prescribed under the heading of 
“good governance.”  Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252–53.  See also, Antony 
Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. 
REV. 887, 908 (2000) (discussing good governance and the IFI goal of furthering neo-liberal economic 
polices through structural adjustment entailing privatization, trade liberalization and currency devaluation).
197
 Swaminathan, supra note 169, at 181 (noting that regulations that protected labor, for example, were 
usually early casualties of such policies); Orford, supra note 187, at 453–55.  Higher interest rates may 
attract foreign investors, but they can also inflict unbearable economic pressures on small businesses, 
including farmers who may be forced to sell their land because they can no longer obtain operating capital.   
3 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 10, 47.
198
 Trade liberalization often had devastating effects on Third World countries.  Eliminating tariffs, for 
example, can promote access to domestic markets, but it can also make it much more difficult for local 
producers to compete against foreign suppliers; as local businesses fail, additional jobs are lost. 
Encouraging export production also leads to the increased harvesting of cash crops, which can cause 
domestic food shortages and accelerate soil erosion.  SAPs thus tended to make countries more dependent 
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on imported goods and manufactured items, and more predisposed to overexploit their natural resources.  3 
THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 47.
199
 Tsai, supra note 84, at 1321; Orford, supra note 187, at 470.
200
 Of course the specific terms of the agreements governing this assistance varied as did the actual 
conditions imposed. 
201 Id. at 470–71.
202
 Tsai, supra note 84, at 1319; Galano III, supra note 84, at 323; Orford, supra note 187, at 470.
203 Watts, supra note 24, at 58. 
204
 As had been the case since 1961, the UN General Assembly declared yet another development decade, 
to begin on January 1, 1990.  Resolution 45/199 again declared the objective of accelerated development, 
calling for a surge in the pace of economic growth in developing countries; a development process that is 
responsive to social needs, seeks to reduce extreme poverty, promotes the development and utilization of 
human resources and skills and is environmentally sustainable; an improvement in international monetary, 
financial and trade mechanisms in support of development; a strong and stable world economy with sound 
national and international macroeconomic management; the strengthening of  international cooperation for 
development; and special efforts to assist the least developed countries.  G.A. Res. 199, U.N. GAOR, 45th 
Sess., 71st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/199 (1990).
205 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 42.  It is sometimes termed the three Ds:  denationalization, 
deregulation, and devaluation.  Id. 
206
 For a discussion of these reports, which were promulgated throughout the 1990s, see Cammack, supra 
note 120, at 157, 164.
207
 The World Bank Group, CDF Proposal, A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (A 
Discussion Draft) (Jan. 21, 1999) (memorandum from James D. Wolfensohn, President, to the Board, 
Management, and Staff of the World Bank Group), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CDF/Resources/cdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) [hereinafter “CDF 
Proposal”]; Blake, supra note 55, at 160. According to this report, the World Bank would henceforth be 
guided by four guiding principles:  (1) development goals and strategies should be determined by 
individual member states, and not by the World Bank; (2) development should be holistic in nature, so that 
growth focuses not just on economic variables, but also on social and political implications; (3) the 
development process should involve all actors affected by World Bank lending practices; and (4) 
development policies should have a long-term focus.  CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 22 –24.  The Bank 
believes the CDF is an improvement over its previous adherence to macroeconomic indicators as the sole 
gauge of a nation’s economic health, while acknowledging that the CDF has not met with universal 
approval.  See, e.g., Uriz, supra note 108, at 205; Blake, supra note 55, at 177.
208
 Structural aspects included good and clean governance, a well-organized financial system, and an 
adequate social safety net to accommodate the short-term negative impact of some World Bank programs. 
CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 10–12; see Blake, supra note 55, at 162. 
209
 Human aspects encompassed education, health, and population issues.  CDF Proposal, supra note 207, 
at 13–14; see Blake, supra note 55, at 162.  
210
 Physical characteristics for growth included quantifiable achievements in building infrastructure, 
including adequate water and sewer systems, access to energy, access and transportation inlays.  CDF 
Proposal, supra note 207, at 15–18; see Blake, supra note 55, at 163. 
211
 Sector-specific aspects of development referred to strategies to promote the advancement of rural, urban, 
and private sectors.  CDF Proposal, supra note 207, at 18–20; Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164.
212
 Cammack, supra note 120, at 157, 164.
213
 Weidner, supra note 141, at 223–24; Blake, supra note 55, at 163.
214
 NGOs had long been critical of – and largely ignored by – the international financial institutions.  The 
Bank now invites selected NGOs to assist take part in development projects.  By 1999, 52% of Bank 
projects involved some type of NGO participation.  Weidner, supra note 141, at 220.  A rather striking and 
wide-ranging example of NGO participation in World Bank programs began in 1995 when the Bank 
entered into a joint initiative with the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative Network 
(SAPRIN).  Today, SAPRIN works in 17 countries where it consults with World Bank officials on the 
effects of specific lending arrangements. The objective of SAPRIN is to legitimize local knowledge in the 
analysis of economic-reform programs and to make space for, and institutionalize, grassroots involvement 
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in macroeconomic decision-making.  See Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International 
Network, at http://www.saprin.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
215
 Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 9.
216 Watts, supra note 24, at 58.  The rationale behind building self-reliance was “the desire to release those 
energies that permit ordinary people to take charge of their lives.”  Id.
217
 Civil society is also central in the alternatives to development paradigm, which has focused on “new 
social movements.”  Id. at 58.  Both the new development economics of the 1990s and the anti-
development paradigm assert alternative strategies; both speak of an expanded role for civil society and 
both question the form, function and character of the developmental state.  Id. at 59. 
218 Id. at 58. 
219
 Uriz, supra note 108, at 204.  The good governance initiative was defined as “a systematic effort to 
build pluralistic institutional structures, a determination to respect the rule of law, and a vigorous protection 
of freedom of the press and human rights.”  Id.
220 Id. at 204–05 (noting that good governance has been criticized as entailing a variety of interventions that 
are inconsistent with the Bank’s mandate and, as a doubtful solution to the multifaceted crises of the Third 
World).  Professor Gathii  contends that “good governance” policies are based on the questionable 
assumption that reducing governmental intervention in the economy will automatically increase economic 
growth and personal freedom.  The Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission on 
Africa identified external economic dependence as a major factor in Africa’s poor economic performance 
in the Lagos Report of 1980, and recommended that external dependence on Western countries be reduced 
and replaced with a self-sustaining development strategy based on the maximum internal use of the 
continent’s resources.  Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 109.  Professor Gathii also maintains 
that the good governance agenda focuses too much attention on internal policy failures within Third World 
countries and not enough on the historical and international economic factors that Southern governments 
believe are the primary causes of their current difficulties.  See Gathii, Africa Predicaments, supra note 
110, at 1008 (noting that African governments take the opposite view of IFIs and other proponents of the 
good governance agenda, and contrasting the Lagos Report with the Berg Report’s emphasis on improper 
economic policies pursued by African governments as the main cause of the crisis and proposing a market-
based economic strategy).
221 See Gathii, Good Governance, supra note 84, at 108.
222
 Cammack, supra note 120, at 164.  This policy promoted a pattern of growth that would utilize the most 
abundant asset possessed by the poor – their labor.  The prevailing logic is that governments should pursue 
policies that provide businesses (capital) across the globe with an adequate number of healthy and educated 
workers, and to impose disciplines that ensure these workers remain available.  Basic social services, such 
as primary education, health care and family planning, which make it possible for the poor to work, are to 
be made available and this would more easily allow capital to exploit the global labor market.  Benefits are 
to be targeted to potential workers, which then makes it difficult to survive outside of the labor market, and 
creates safety nets that propel workers back into the market if they temporarily drop out.  
223 Id.  As Professor Cammack puts it, the CDF entails putting the poor to work, in the name of poverty 
alleviation.  Of course, it also means low wage workers for global capital.  
224
 For example, governments should provide health care, education, nutrition and family planning services, 
which are spheres that often are not well-served by the private market.  Id. at 166.  
225 Id.
226
 State managed stabilization policies to prevent recession or depression have given way to internationally 
managed policies of restructuring, often deliberately inducing domestic recession; re-distributive taxation 
to bring about greater equality of incomes has been abandoned in favor fiscal reform that rewards 
entrepreneurship and accentuates inequality; measures to regulate prices have been dropped; public control 
over the labor and money markets has been systematically stripped away; the indefinite extension of the 
sphere of wants to be satisfied by public enterprise has been thrown into reverse and social security 
legislation has been restructured to promote rather than work against market forces.”  Id. at 164.
227
 The IMF approach to the Third World has continued to evolve, but it has been “less comprehensive” in 
its interventions in the name of development.  Although it is outside the scope of its mandate, the IMF 
expressly supports Third World economic growth.  The IMF also now includes poverty alleviation among 
its major goals, although its Articles of Agreement do not contemplate this objective.  Carrasco, supra note 
98, at 39–41; Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal, supra note 87, at 569–74.  The IMF created the 
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Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999.  As described by the IMF, this new endeavor 
“aims at making poverty reduction efforts among low-income members a key and more explicit element of 
a renewed growth-oriented strategy.”  Creation of the PRGF was significant because it was the first time 
the IMF had officially declared that “growth-policies should be implemented in a framework in which the 
pressing need to reduce poverty is also a central objective.”  International Monetary Fund, Policy 
Development and Review Department, The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – Operational 
Issues (Dec. 13, 1999), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/poverty2.htm (last visited June 7, 2002) 
[hereinafter PRGF].  Instead of pursuing strictly macroeconomic objectives, “high quality” economic 
development has become the IMF’s new emphasis, and “high quality” development includes considering 
the social and political consequences of IMF lending.  Carrasco, supra note 98, at 569–74.  “Good 
governance” in borrowing countries is also currently a stated goal of the IMF, and thus the IMF’s stated 
objectives are now more similar to those of the World Bank.  Id.; PRGF, supra note 227.  Unlike the World 
Bank the IMF has not formalized relations with NGOs.  Bradlow, supra note 98, at 77.  The IMF continues 
to utilize adjustment lending.  PGRF, supra note 227.  Yet even the IMF and World Bank acknowledge it is 
problematic. See generally International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Board for the 
Financial Year Ended April 30, 1997, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/97/97imf.htm 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (1998).
228
 See Anghie, Time Present and Time Past, supra note 84, at 252–53 (noting that IFI loans are part of an 
adjustment lending process and are supposed to ameliorate some of the consequences of the fundamental 
changes the Bank requires countries to undertake); Chua, supra note 80. 
229
 The emergence of a “Third World,” that stood separate and apart from the first and second world also 
emerged during this era, as did the nationalizations of oil companies, events that empowered and 
emboldened nations in the Middle East.  Given the raging Cold War, the time may also have been ripe to 
make demands for social justice. The 1960s was also a time of political protest in the United States and 
across Europe, and thus “demands” for justice were part of a larger trend, so to speak.  
230
 At this point, the demand for reparations has only been articulated in limited forums and within few 
documents.  See infra notes 295–96 and accompanying text for discussion in reparations.  It cannot be
equated with the sustained movements for Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the New 
International Economic Order, or the Right to Development.   
231
 Development law or the “law of development” was recognized as branch of international law in the 
1960s.  Héctor Gros Espiell, The Right of Development as a Human Right, 16 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 189, 190
(1981).  After 1960 the United Nations began to give attention to the concept of development, and 
gradually shaped a new juridical discipline, “the international law of development,” which attempted to 
characterize, and make enforceable a system of rights and obligations.  Id.   Not to be confused with the 
“law and development” discussed, see infra Part I.D, the international law of development comprises
principles promoting the economic and social development of the Third World, while seeking to strengthen 
and assert in international relations.  Nina M. Eejima, Sustainable Development and the Search for a Better 
Environment, a Better World: A Work in Progress, 18 UCLA J. ENVT’L. L & POL’Y 99, 109 (1999/2000).  
Indeed, the law of development rejects a key premise of law and development, holding instead that “[t]he 
problem was not simply that economic and social institutions in the peripheral countries were not 
modern…but rather that these societies were characterized by… structures where the economic and social 
institutions were geared to meet the demands of developed societies rather than the needs of the developing 
societies.”  Chibundu, supra note 74, at 191.
232
 Although it gained widespread attention in the 1960s and 1970s, the roots of the law of development go 
considerably deeper.  Early antecedents include the Drago Doctrne, by which Latin American states sought 
to prohibit armed foreign (i.e., U.S.) intervention predicated on civil disputes.  See Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 9, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (entered into force Dec. 26, 
1934).  In 1902, Argentina’s Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that forcible U.S. 
intervention in Argentina to secure payment of debts allegedly owed to private U.S. citizens and companies 
was unjustified and dangerous.  Argentine Republic: “Monroe Doctrine” and Diplomatic Claims of 
European Powers, in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, ISSUE 1903, Argentine Republic: “Monroe Doctrine” and Diplomatic 
Claims of European Powers 1–5 (1903) (note from Luis M. Drago to the U.S. Department of State).  
Professor Richard Falk has observed that the concept of a state protecting its nationals abroad has also been 
used “as a means to impose the external will of richer and more powerful nations [on others].”  Richard 
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Falk, Historical Tendencies, Modernizing and Revolutionary Nations, and the International Legal Order. 8 
HOW. L. J. 128, 133 (1962).
233
 The European origin of an international law that purports to be “universal” was and remains a persistent 
underlying theme. See, e.g., T.O. Elias, Modern Sources of International Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN 
A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP C. JESSUP 49 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972); 
R.P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 55, 56 (1966); Jorge Castaneda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of 
International Law, 15 INT’L ORG. 38, 39 (1961); B. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED 
WORLD 10 (1960); JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 44 (Oxford University Press 1997).  But the 
problem was not merely with the origin of the law; the problem was with the law’s application.  Judge 
Philip C. Jessup, in describing the need for revising of traditional international law, acknowledged the 
Third World view that “the rules of law were developed by the exploiting imperialistic powers to promote 
their interests at the expense of the countries which in earlier centuries were either colonies or politically 
and militarily weak and provided important sources of raw materials and perhaps labor to the exploiting 
powers.”  Philip C. Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 419 
(1973).
234
 See Snyder, supra note 76, at 737 (quoting COLIN LEYS, UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM, 1964-1971 (1975)) (stating that underdevelopment theory is 
… partly a correction and partly an expansion of Marx’s interpretation of history, an expansion of his 
method and central ideas to a problem which, on a world scale, was still in embryo at his death: the failure 
of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to follow a path of autonomous, capitalist development, 
leading to their “regeneration” after they had been brought within the world capitalist economy).  
Dependency theory has been criticized as accepting the fundamental premises of the development 
paradigm.  Id.
235 See Chibundu, supra note 74, at 189.
236
 Akinsanya & Davies, supra note 61, at 209–11 (noting that since it was established in 1964 UNCTAD 
has been “one of the forums used by the developing countries to press home their demand for a New 
International Economic Order” and that it has become an “important intervener on behalf of less developed 
countries in their relations with advanced industrial States” (quoting Robert S. Walters, UNCTAD: 
Intervener Between Poor and Rich States, 7 J.W.T. L. 528 (1973))).  UNCTAD’s recommendations are not 
legally binding, however.  See also VARGES, supra note 61, at 3 (discussing how unification enabled 
developing countries to be a force that could not be ignored).
237 See VARGES, supra note 61, at 3. Dependency theorists acknowledged that developed countries may at 
some time have been “undeveloped,” but argued that they never played the role of the “underdeveloped” 
country within the world capitalist system. See Snyder, supra note 76, at 748.
The original centers of capitalism established their wealth and their power through incorporating 
and exploiting other parts of the world.  The primary accumulation of capital in the metropoles or 
center was fed through a drain of wealth from the satellite or peripheral countries, typically 
involving their colonization, a “surplus drain” which continues to the present day even if its forms 
may have changed, and direct colonial rule is no longer a necessary condition of this process.
Id. at 726 (quoting Harry Bernstein, Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of Development?, in
DAVID LEHNMAN ED., DEVELOPMENT THEORY: FOUR CRITICAL STUDIES (David Lehmann ed., 1979)); see
also Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. 
L. REV. 841, 850 (2000). Using critical race theory to evaluate international law, Mutua states, “What the 
world has witnessed in the last five centuries is the universalization of an international law that is particular 
to Europe and seeks not universal justice, but an international legal order that erects, preserves and 
embraces European and American domination of the globe.” Id.
238
 Third World leaders warned that the unequal distribution of power threatens peace, and that permitting 
the existence of such a system could potentially give rise to a “major worldwide revolution.”  See VARGES, 
supra note 61, at 6. Given the wholesale rejection of all aspects of the law of development, however, the 
West apparently did not take this threat seriously, or perhaps believed it had other mechanisms at its 
disposal to deal with outbreaks of violence.
239 See generally Schachter, supra note 109.  Through the international law of development, dependency 
theorists and their allies attempted to establish an enforceable system of rights and obligations based on 
international law.
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240 According to  Professor Espiell, 
The affirmation that there is and there must be an international law of development, 
implies an acceptance that law must be an instrument for the transformation of society, a 
tool for effective action in the struggle of all peoples and all men against poverty, 
dependence and ignorance.  The international law of development must not be 
understood as a mere compilation of norms relating to a single subject – development.  
On the contrary, it constitutes a juridical system bound to enable development and hasten 
it.  It is, therefore, essentially a teleological law, whose characteristics are determined by 
the mission assigned to it.
HÉCTOR GROS ESPIELL, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DEL DESARROLLO (1975), translated and quoted in
Espiell, supra note 231, at 190.
241
 Tamanaha, supra note 68, at 471 (noting such demands as such as “preferential treatment, entitlement to 
developmental assistance, debt relief, low interest loans or outright grants, and the low-cost transfer of 
technology”).
242
 Franz Xavier Perrez, The Relationship Between “Permanent Sovereignty” and the Obligation Not to 
Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 ENVT'L. L. 1187, 1190 (1996) (citing MILAN BULAJIC, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 269 (2d ed. 1993)). 
243 See WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 28, 162, 168 (1972).  The natural 
resources at issue include a vast array of minerals as well as oil and gas.  
244
 Third World leaders believed that “the right to freely dispose of natural resources and wealth was the 
seminal source of a series of corollary state rights, including the right to freely determine and control the 
prospecting, exploration, development, exploitation, use and marketing of its natural resources and to 
subject such activities to national laws within the limits of its exclusive economic jurisdiction under 
prevailing international law.” See Eejima, supra 231, at 110.
245
 Perrez, supra note 242, at 1190.
246
 G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1194th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 223 (1963).  Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of eighty-seven to two, with twelve states 
abstaining.  See KAMAL HOSSAIN, SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY EDS., PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
NATURAL RESOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 91 (1984); Perrez, supra note 
242, at 1191–92.
247
 In 1952, Chile asserted the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources at the U.N. 
Commission on Human Rights.  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.24 (1952).  Also in 1952, The General Assembly 
passed Resolutions 523 (VI) and 626 (VII), the latter entitled: “Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and 
Resources.”  G.A. Res. 523, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 
(1952) ; G.A. Res. 626, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., 411th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.411 (1952).  See
HOSSAIN, supra note 246, at 2.
248 See JERZY MAKARCZYK, PRINCIPLES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 184, 198, 199 (1988).
249 See HOSSAIN, supra note 246.  
250 See MAKARCZYK, supra note 248.
251 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1958); Sapphire Int’l 
Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (Cavin Arb. 1963); Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of 
the Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (Arb. Trib. 1951) – all enforcing the validity of long-term pro-Western 
concessions over the objections of Third World hosts.  Consequently, nationalizing these concessions 
bound host states to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation to the alien owners.
252 See Perrez, supra note 242, at 1191–92.
253 See Patrick Norton, A Law for the Future or a Law for the Past? Modern Tribunals and the Law of 
International Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L. L. 474, 475–76 (1991); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Story of 
the U.N.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 49 A.B.A. J. 463, 465 (1963) 
[hereinafter Schwebel, Permanent Sovereignty].  The “Hull formula” refers to a pronouncement by U.S. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in connection with a 1938 dispute over Mexico’s nationalization of foreign-
owned oil fields. See G. HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655–65 (1942). 
254 See G. Roy, Is the Law of the Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal 
International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 863 (1961); M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
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ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 895–
932 (1984).   
255
 G.A. Res. 1803, supra note 246, at 15.  At the time of its adoption, the United States delegation argued 
that the phrase “appropriate compensation” made “in accordance with international law” meant “prompt, 
adequate and effective” compensation as required under international law.  Andrew T. Guzman, Why 
LDC’S Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 639, 649 (1998) (citing Schwebel, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 253).
256
 Subsequent state practice of paying what amounts to prompt, adequate and effective compensation, 
albeit often under pain of international economic ostracism or worse military intervention, has reinforced 
the Hull formula.  Industrialized states can now point to extensive state practice to support their position, as 
well as a series of bilateral investment treaties that require payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. Guzman, supra note 255, at 648 .  That Third World nations have taken these actions under 
pain of economic banishment appears to be besides the point.
257 NICOLASS JAN SCHRIVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 3, 4 (2002). 
258
 G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201(s_VI) (1974).
259 G.A. Res. 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
260
 Report of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc. A/9946, 28 (Dec. 9, 1974) and U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 
(XXIX) (Jan 15, 1975); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2315th plen. mtg., at 50, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3281 (1974).
261 VARGES, supra note 61, at 5, 37.  
262 Id.
263
 CERDS was adopted by a General Assembly vote of 120 to six, with 10 abstentions.  Belgium, 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States 
voted against the Charter.  Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Spain abstained.  See RALPH STUART SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD: A 
DISCUSSION PAPER (1976).
264
 In April 1972 President Echeverria of Mexico proposed that the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) draft a charter delineating the economic rights of nations.  In May 1972 
UNCTAD voted to establish a working group to draft such a charter; UNCTAD Res. 45 (III), U.N. Doc. 
TD/180.  The United States abstained from the vote, but agreed to participate in the Working Group.  See
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS § 26.2, at 1166 (3d ed. 1995).  The need for such a charter was explained by Mexico’s 
Secretary of Foreign Relations: 
[T]he underdeveloped countries…have decided not to continue to play a passive role, but 
to be active participants in the changing of those structures that hinder their well-
being…[T]he interdependence of all the components of the global economic system 
demands a modification of the international structures that condition their behavior…The 
greatest menace to peace that we face nowadays is the increasing tension and the very 
noticeable separation between the industrialized countries and those which are 
underdeveloped. 
Emilio O. Rabasa, Address Before the 68th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 
in 68 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 302, 303–05 (1974).
265 See JACKSON, supra note 264, at 1166–67. 
266
 Marjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights, 29 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 427, 438 (2001).  Capital exporting states voted against this provision and have 
never accepted it.  Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter provides that each state has the right to: 
Nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case 
appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking 
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent.  In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its 
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other 
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peaceful means be sought on the basis of sovereign equality of States and in accordance 
with the principle of free choice of means. 
Tali Levy, NAFTA’s Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A Reassessment of the 
“Prompt, Adequate and Effective Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 423, 436 (1995).
267
 Under the Charter, the right to supervise foreign business operations included the right to establish 
performance requirements that would ensure that foreign investment served the economic and social 
priorities of national development in the host nation.  See G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 260, at 52.  Cohn, 
supra note 266, at 438.
268
 Cohn, supra note 266, at 53–54.  Every state is also charged with a duty to cooperate in promoting the 
steady and increasing expansion and liberalization of world trade.  In a reference intended to accommodate 
socialist nations, CERDS stipulated the right to engage in international trade and economic cooperation 
irrespective of political and economic differences.  Id. at 53–54, 438.
269 See Akinsanya & Davies, supra note 61, at 211.
270 See supra note 233 and accompanying text for discussion in European origins of international law.  See
also, e.g., Elias, supra note 233; Anand, supra note 233; Castaneda, supra note 233, at 39; ROLING, supra
note 233, at 5; BRIERLY, supra note 233, at 44.
271
 Makua wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1113, 1140 (1995); see also Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1999).
272
 Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Relations appealed for support for the NIEO this way:
Let us subject the fundamental economic elements for the future of world development to 
the rule of law…. Let us codify norms and create an authentic body of rules that will 
allow the international community to settle disputes and control abuses.  Law represents a 
force in itself that can become a basic source of innovation for society. 
Emilio O. Rabasa, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 68 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 302, 
303–05 (1974) (address at joint luncheon with the Section on International Law of the American Bar 
Association).  Secretary Rabasa also analogized specifically to various U.S. legislative measures such as 
the Social Security Act of 1935, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, the Employment Act of 1946, and the Economic Opportunity act of 1964 as establishing a principle 
of redistributing wealth for the protection and betterment of the disadvantaged within U.S. society.  “Why 
not then transfer the philosophy that has been the basis for this new process to the international field?” he 
asked.  Id.
273 See Charles N. Brower & John B. Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A 
Reflection or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT’L LAW 295, 300 (1975).  There is continuing debate on 
whether these resolutions reflected opino juris, that is evidence of what the overwhelming majority of states 
believed the law to be, and whether simply voting for a resolution was the kind of state practice necessary 
to form customary international law.  Most western scholars have strenuously argued against according the 
status of law to UN resolutions, especially after large Third World majorities began to find voice in the 
General Assembly.  Third World nations have taken the opposing view, arguing that at the least such 
resolutions reflect some version of state practice or opino juris.  See generally ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
(1963).
274
 Brower & Tepe, supra note 273, at 295, 300–01.
275 See Stephen M. Schwebel, Counselor on International Law, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the 
68th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, in 68 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 209, 
210–12 (1974).  U.S. State Department attorney Stephen Schwebel summed up the Northern view:
If the Charter turns out to be simply a statement of the alleged rights of the developing 
countries and the alleged duties of the developed, it will be a kind of bill of particulars, if 
not an indictment, which will have no more impact on international economic affairs, not 
to speak of international law, than a number of self-serving calls which developing 
countries have issued in the past in UNCTAD and elsewhere.
Brower & Tepe, supra note 273.
276 See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of the Third World debt crisis.
277
 Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1425, 1431 (2000) (“The NIEO challenged the status quo, and the far-reaching implications 
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of its implementation, were met with substantial resistance by industrialized countries.  Notwithstanding 
these controversies, it is clear that many NIEO provisions have helped shape the right to development.”) 
278
 G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex at 186, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1983). 
279
 The right to development purports to operate both collectively at the international level, and individually 
at the domestic level.  This evolution – from collective to both collective and individual, and from 
international to both international and domestic – were key to the transition from the law of development to 
the right to development.  Espiell, supra note 231, at 192.  “After initiation of the process designed to 
establish a law of development and the right to develop, conceived of as a collective right, the idea of the 
right to development as a human right that is a right belonging to individuals began to take shape.”  Id.  The 
results of this transition can be seen in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESR”), G.A. Res. 2200A, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), both of which incorporate many of 
the principles of the human right to development. 
280
 It also sought to empower individuals and sub-national groups within individual countries. See G.A. 
Res. 128, supra note 278, at arts. 1.1, 2.1, 2.3 (stating that individuals are the primary beneficiaries of the 
right, and that both individuals and the state must work for “the constant improvement of the well-being of 
the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting there from”).
281 See Mickelson, supra note 3, at 12 (quoting Keba M’Baye, First President of the Supreme Court of 
Senegal, who emphasized this point in his 1972 speech introducing the right to development: “Economic 
growth must be accompanied by socio-cultural progress; that means, in the simplest possible terms, that we 
must give it a human dimension … growth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the achievement 
of development”); Barsh, supra note 152, at 328 (stating that participants of the Global Consultations 
concerned with the implementation of the right to development were “especially critical of international 
development strategies which have been ‘oriented merely towards economic growth and financial 
considerations’”); Forysthe, supra note 154, at 334.
282 The law of development asserted the need for a right of development similar to a human right, but this 
right was thought to be a collective one – whereas human rights are typically thought of as individual.  
Espiell, supra note 231, at 190.  
283 See Bunn, supra note 277, at 1433; Mickelson, supra note 3, at 10; Espiell, supra note 231, at 192 (all 
identifying Justice Keba M’Baye as author of the Right to Development).  This pronouncement was made 
in his inaugural lecture at the Third Session of Instruction of the International Institute for Human Rights.  
Id.
284
 Espiell, supra n 231, at 192 (quoting Keba M’Baye, Le Droit au développement comme un droit de 
l’Homme, in 5 REVUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 503, 505 (1972)). Following M’Baye’s lead, Professor 
Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo of Spain also identified the Right to Development as a human right.  Carrillo 
Salcedo, El Derecho al desarollo como un derecho humamo, in 25 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL 119–25 (1972) (“The right of development as a right of states and peoples must 
unavoidably be founded on the recognition of the right of every man to a free and worthy life in his 
community.  Every human being has the right to live, which implies the right to aspire to an increasingly 
better existence.”)).
285
 Even the “development assistance” contributed by the North, he observed, served principally to enable 
underdeveloped countries to become markets for Northern goods and services.  See M’Baye, supra note 
284, at 15 (noting that development assistance is “in many cases little more than a disguised export 
subsidy,” designed to improve the underdeveloped countries’ ability to act as a market for the finished or 
semi-finished products of the developed world); Mickelson, supra note 3, at 381–83 (Addressing M’Baye’s 
observation that, “the deep division between the South and North posed an increasing threat to international 
stability, and hence raising the standard of living in poor countries could be “a form of life insurance” for 
rich countries.  M’Baye also stated that since industrialized countries designed and benefited from the 
current international economic system, they were responsible for its injurious consequences.) “Given their 
power in the system and their utilization of that power to their own advantage, the rich countries of the 
North should assume responsibilities for their actions.”  Id. at 13 (quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 505, 
521–22).  
286
 Mickelson, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 524).
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287 Id. at 14 (quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 529).  See also Espiell, supra note 231, at 192 (quoting 
M’Baye, supra note 284, at 515) (acknowledging M’Baye’s belief that “[e]ach man has the right to live and 
the right to live better”).
288
 It should be noted that in his 1972 speech, M’Baye expressed reservations concerning efforts to legalize 
a human right to development.  He maintained that these efforts were unnecessary because the human right 
to development already existed.  He also feared proponents of the right might lose sight of the desired end 
and find “victory” in a mere legal declaration.  See Mickelson, supra note 3, at 14.  Accordingly, M’Baye 
opposed those who called for completing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through by 
proclaiming a Right to Development, because he regarded this as unnecessary, and perhaps even 
counterproductive: “[I]t is hardly useful to encumber ourselves with a new proclamation, as if it were a 
matter of  creating a new right.  The right to development is already inscribed in international law.”  Id.
(quoting M’Baye, supra note 284, at 526).
289
 Bunn, supra note 277, at 1436.
[I]n terms of international human rights law, the existence of the right to development is a 
fait accompli.  Whatever reservations different groups may have as to its legitimacy, 
viability or usefulness, such doubts are now better left behind and replaced by efforts to 
ensure that the formal process of elaborating the content of the right is a productive and 
constructive exercise. 
Id. (quoting Philip Alston, Development and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus Cure as a Human Rights 
Strategy, in DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 31, 106 (International Commission of 
Jurists eds. 1981)).  Proponents of the right to development maintain that it has a rich legal foundation that 
includes the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial 
Prejudice and other international conventions.  Id.
290 See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to 
Development, 15 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 473, 478 (1985).  Scholars contesting its existence assert that these 
conventions merely make explicit references to “development” which does not mean they support a right to 
development.
291
 Advocates reason that the lack of universal recognition or sanctions for non-adherence does not render 
the UNDRD meaningless, given the initial rejection of many new international human rights.  Espiell, 
supra note 231, at 198 (“Consequently it is evident that the inadequacies that still plague the juridical 
characteristics of the right of development in general, and particularly as an individual right, do not allow 
the possibility of denying its legal existence, though it is still embryonic and imperfect.”) 
292
 One of the provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States foreshadowed 
contemporary demands for reparations.  Article 16 calls for restitution based on the injuries caused by 
“colonialism, apartheid, racial discrimination, neocolonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, 
occupation and domination.”  G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 260.
293
 M’Baye observed that since industrialized countries designed and benefited from the current 
international economic system, they were responsible for its injurious consequences   See Mickelson, supra 
note 3, at 383 (“Given their power in the system and their utilization of that power to their own advantage, 
the rich countries of the North should assume responsibilities of their actions.” (quoting M’Baye, supra 
note 284)).
294 See, e.g., RODNEY, supra note 243. 
295
 Conceptually, reparations may be the simplest approach to international economic justice.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines reparation as both “[t]he act of making amends for a wrong” and [c]ompensation for an 
injury or wrong, esp. for wartime damages or breach of an international obligation.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1301 (7th ed. 1999).  Perhaps it is the natural successor to the NIEO and the right to 
development, insofar as the simplicity of the demand for reparations represents an evolutionary focusing 
and sharpening of the Third World position.
296
 This may be because the simplicity and directness of the idea leaves virtually no room for obfuscation or 
for “spinning” compensation as charitable assistance.   Although reparations focus on repairing the injury 
suffered by victims, assigning responsibility for payment seems to require the assignment of blame, and 
this inevitably triggers belligerent resistance to reparations proposals.  It explains, for example, the 
European Union’s refusal, as recently as 2001, to apologize for Western Europe’s substantial role in the 
Atlantic slave trade.  At the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, the lead E.U. negotiator, Belgian 
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Foreign Minister Louis Michel, equivocated thusly, “[s]lavery today is, of course, a crime against 
humanity, slavery yesterday, in the past was of course… a very grave thing, a very horrible thing…It is 
very difficult to consider that you can compare slavery today to slavery in the past.”  Europeans at U.N. 
Meeting Agree to Apology for Slavery – But Not to Reparations, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (MISSOURI), 
Sept. 8, 2001, at 20.
297The movement for reparations is really a collection of movements.  See, e.g., RANDAL ROBINSON, THE 
DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); RICHARD F. AMERICA, PAYING THE SOCIAL DEBT: WHAT 
WHITE AMERICA OWES BLACK AMERICA (1993) (in support of reparations); DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL 
WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (2003); David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why 
Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks – and Racist Too, 31 BLACK SCHOLAR 48 (2002) 
(opposing reparations).  The reparations movement within the United States has had the benefit of 
substantial scholarly analysis.  For an excellent summary of legal issues and citations to a wealth of 
writings on the topic, see Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for 
Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2003).  Much of the analysis focuses on substantive and 
procedural legal issues that are specific to the U.S. legal system and on the anticipated legal battles over 
reparations within the domestic U.S. context.  See, e.g., Rhonda V. Magee, The Master’s Tools, from the 
Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies 
Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993); Adrienne D. Davis, The Case for United States Reparations to 
African-Americans, 7 HUM. RTS. BR. 3 (2000); BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2d 
ed. 2003); Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1968).  However, scholars 
in the U.S. – particularly within the legal academy – have also done a great deal of theoretical work that is 
likely to be useful in support of Third World demands for international reparations.  Some of this work is 
litigation oriented, but based on principles that might also conceivably resonate with the general public. 
Unjust enrichment is one such legal principle – and a politically interesting option because it does not 
require blame or fault; only (basically) that a benefit has been received and retained, and that injustice will 
result if the benefit is not disgorged.  See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999); 
DOUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDIES CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1999).  Difficulties with the technical 
application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment include calculating the benefit conferred and offsetting any 
gain received by the plaintiffs, and tracing the benefit to its present holders.  Brophy, supra note 297, at
522.  In light of the anticipated difficulty of achieving reparations through litigation, some supporters of 
reparations for African Americans are advocating a more overtly political approach that relies on the 
legislative process.  Id. at 523.
298
 Held in September in Durban, South Africa, the 2001 WCAR was actually the third in a series (and is 
thus sometimes referred to as the “Third World Conference Against Racism”).  The first World Conference 
Against Racism was convened in Geneva, Switzerland in August 1978, and attended by representatives of 
125 countries, as well as observers from U.N. agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-
governmental organizations.  REPORT OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE TO COMBAT RACISM AND RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 92/40, U.N. Sales No. E79.XIV.2 (1978) [hereinafter RACISM 
REPORT].  Because of a 1975 General Assembly Resolution equating Zionism with racism and racial 
discrimination the United States and Israel boycotted the 1978 Conference.  G.A. Res. 3379, U.N. GAOR, 
30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); RACISM REPORT, supra note 298.  See also 
U.S. Participation in the United Nations, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1977, at 
172 (1977).  The first Conference focused mainly on South Africa, with a majority of participating nations 
favoring strong international measures to oppose and dismantle the apartheid regime.  There was some 
disagreement regarding the nature of the measures that should be taken against South Africa, and some 
(mainly Western European) disagreement with the conference majority’s condemnation of Israel’s 
treatment of the Palestinians.  RACISM REPORT, supra note 298, at 15, 113, 129–30.  A second World 
Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination was held in August 1983. Geneva was again the 
venue, South Africa and the Middle East were again the principal topics, and the United States again chose 
not to attend because of the majority’s position on the latter.  See id.  As with the first conference, Western 
commentators proclaimed the second conference a failure.  See, e.g., Christopher N. Camponovo, Disaster 
in Durban: The United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, 
and Related Intolerance, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 659, 667 (2003)).  Despite majority agreement on 
its principal themes and conclusions, in 1997, the General Assembly resolved to convene a third World 
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Conference Against Racism, to be held in Durban, in the newly democratized South Africa.  G.A. Res. 
52/111, supra note 298.
299
 Regional conferences were held in Strasbourg, France; Santiago, Chile; Dakar, Senegal; and Teheran, 
Iran. In addition, five regional expert seminars were held in Geneva, Warsaw, Bangkok, Addis Ababa and 
Santiago during 1999 and 2000.  United Nations, World Conference Against Racism, Basic Information, 
The World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, at 
http://www.un.org/WCAR/e-kit/backgrounder1.htm (last visited May 22, 2002).
300
 For example, the Asian Preparatory Conference in Teheran concluded that “States which pursued 
policies or practices based on racial or national superiority, such as colonialism or other forms of alien 
domination or foreign occupation, slavery, the slave trade and ethnic cleansing, should assume 
responsibility … and compensate the victims of such policies and practices.”  Reports of Preparatory 
Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Report of the Asian 
Preparatory Meeting (Tehran, Feb. 19-21, 2001), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.189/PC.2/9 (2001).  At the Santiago Regional Conference, representatives of countries in North, 
Central and South America, and the Caribbean agreed to “take measures to alleviate inequities that still 
persist because of the shameful legacy of slavery.”   The delegates also condemned “the brutal crimes and 
injustices that were committed against indigenous peoples and Africans and their descendants who were 
subjected to slavery, the trans-Atlantic slave trade and other forms of servitude that today could constitute 
crimes against humanity.”  Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional 
and National Levels, Report of the Regional Conference of the Americas (Santiago, Chile, Dec. 5-7, 2000), 
U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., Annex IV-V, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/7 (2001) 
[hereinafter Santiago Report].
301
 These matters that were not addressed in the documents adopted by the European regional conference in 
Strasbourg .  See Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and 
National Levels, Final Documents of the European Conference Against Racism (Strasbourg, France, Oct. 
11-13, 2000), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., Annex IV-V, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/6 
(2001). Only over the strenuous objections of the United States and Canada, did the Santiago conference 
acknowledge that slavery was an international crime, resulting in:
[S]ubstantial and lasting economic, political and cultural damage to these peoples and… 
justice now requires substantial national and international efforts to repair such damage.  
Such reparation should be in the form of policies, programmes and measures adopted by 
the States, which benefited materially from these practices, and designed to rectify the 
economic, cultural and political damage, which inflict the affected communities and 
peoples.
Santiago Report, supra note 300, at 14, 70.
302
 The African regional Conference in Dakar, Senegal focused primarily on slavery and colonialism. The 
Declaration adopted by the Dakar conference stated: 
[T]he slave trade, …colonialism and apartheid…have had profound crippling effects on 
the economic development of Africa and…justice now requires that substantial national 
and international efforts be made to repair the damage; …States which pursued racist 
policies or acts of racial discrimination such as slavery and colonialism should assume 
their moral, economic, political and legal responsibilities…and provide adequate 
reparation to those communities or individuals who, individually or collectively, are 
victims of such racist policies or acts, regardless of when or by whom they were 
committed.
Reports of Preparatory Meetings and Activities at the International, Regional and National Levels, Report 
of the Regional Conference of Africa (Dakar, Jan. 22-24, 2001), U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Comm., 2d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 189/PC.2/8 (2001) [hereinafter Dakar Report].  The Dakar delegates 
recommended that a follow-up mechanism be established and entrusted with supervising implementation of 
the Declaration and Programme of Action to be adopted by the World Conference, and that such 
mechanism be required to report annually to the United Nations General Assembly.  Id.
303
 The Programme of Action adopted by the Dakar conference included the following language:
An International Compensation Scheme should be set up for victims of the slave trade, as 
well as victims of any other transnational racist policies and acts… A Development 
Reparation Fund should be set up to provide resources for the development process in 
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countries affected by colonialism…[S]uch reparation should be in the form of enhanced 
policies, programmes and measures to be adopted by States which benefit materially 
from these practices in order to rectify, through affirmative action, the economic, cultural 
and political damage which has been inflicted on the affected communities and peoples in 
the full implementation of their right to development.
Id.
304
 On the fourth day of the Durban conference, the United States and Israel withdrew their delegations in 
protest over the decided likelihood that the Conference would condemn Israel for its treatment of the 
Palestinians.  Rachel L. Swans, U.S. and Israelis quit Racism Talks over Denunciation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
4, 2001, at A1; Douglas Blackmon, U.S., Israel Pull Delegates out of U.N. Conference on Racism, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A12.  A few days after the Conference ended, the World Trade Center in New York 
and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. were attacked on September 11, 2001.  N.R. Kleinfeld, U.S. 
Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
2001, at A1.  These events diverted Western media attention first from the issue of reparations and then 
from the Conference in its entirety.
305 Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance (Durban, Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 2001), U.N. ESCOR, at 5–27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2002) 
[hereinafter Durban Report].  See also Celina Romany & Katherine Culliton, The UN World Conference 
Against Racism: A Race-Ethnic and Gender Perspective, 9 HUM. BRTB No.2, at 14, 15 (2002); Nicole 
Itano, Former Colonies Calling for Reparations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 5, 2001, at A-1, available 
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0905/p1s4-wogi.html.  Proponents of reparations – notably the African 
delegates who had met at the Dakar regional conference – also sought apologies for slavery and 
colonialism, noting “other groups that were subjected to other scourges and injustices have received 
repeated apologies from different countries, as well as ample reparations, on a bilateral basis, from both 
public and private sources and lately through certain international organizations.”  Dakar Report, supra
note 302, at ¶ 29.  Certain Native Americans, Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans interned during 
World War II, and South Africans have obtained some form of reparations in recent years. Brophy, supra
note 297, at 499.  Australia, Austria, France, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom – as well as religious denominations and multinational corporations – have in recent years offered 
apologies for past wrongs.  William Bradford, With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts: Reparations, 
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5– 6 
(2002/2003).  Professor Brophy adds that U.S. President Clinton “apologized for, was part of apologies for, 
or discussed apologizing for slavery, the genocide in Rwanda, executions of civilians during the Korean 
war, the United States’ support of Guatemala’s military while it committed genocide, medical experiments 
on African Americans at Tuskegee, radiation experiments, and the deprivation of native Hawaiians’ land.” 
Brophy, supra note 297, at 501.  Professor Bradford has termed this an age of apology.  Bradford, supra
note 305, at 5–6; Brophy, supra note 297, at 501.  Apologies would not be extended at this Conference, 
however.  The U.S. delegation withdrew from the Conference and did not endorse the final Declaration.  
Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 48 (2002).  European Union delegates avoided apologizing, declined to offer 
reparations, and refused to acknowledge that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was a crime against humanity at 
the time it occurred.  Michael Slackman, Divisive U.N. Race Talks End in Accord, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2001, at A1.
306 Durban Report, supra note 305, at 14.  The Declaration also proclaimed that “slavery and the slave trade 
are a crime against humanity.”  Id.
307 Id. at 158.
308
 For example, Fode Dabor, an ambassador from Sierra Leone and a member of the African negotiating 
committee at the Durban Conference, said, “[t]his is very bad, very disappointing, but we all had to go 
along because no one wanted to take the blame for the conference collapsing.  We lost on everything, the 
question of the apology, the question of the slave trade and the question of reparations.”  Slackman, supra
note 305.  Moreover, Western press accounts of the conference were overwhelmingly negative – many 
amounting, in fact, to ridicule of the Conference and the positions asserted by its majority.  See, e.g., 
Lantos, supra note 305, at 48; Anne Bayesfsky, The U.N. World Conference Against Racism: A racist anti-
racism conference, American Society of International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING 65–74 
(2002); Camponovo, supra note 298, at 667.
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309 See supra note 301 and accompanying text for discussion in U.S. objections given their role in the slave
trade and that perhaps there is no real regret for colonialism, slavery or other forms of exploitation. 
310
 The Durban conference contributes importantly to strengthening the case that is already 
supported by the great majority of the membership of the United Nations.  Samir Amin, World 
Conference Against Racism: A People’s Victory, 53 MONTHLY REV. 7, 20 (2001).
311 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1979).
312
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 1.
313
 As Professors Kothari and Minogue note, when development is explored as an idea, one is in the realm 
of theory.  When objectives are established, one is delineating the process by which ideas are turned into 
practice.  Examining actual practice entails analysis of these activities.  Of course, even the idea of 
development is contested territory.  Kothari & Minogue, supra note 7, at 12.  The meaning of development 
in practice is also contested.  See supra note 112, 143 and accompanying text for discussion in the cycles of 
conventional wisdom.
314
 This term is used is used in the broader Foucauldian sense of discourse: 
The key feature is that the world is not simply “there” to be talked about, rather it is 
through discourse itself that the world is brought into being.  It is also in such a discourse
that speakers and hearers, writers and readers, come to an understanding about 
themselves, their relationship to each other and their place in the world (the construction 
of subjectivity).  It is the “complex of signs and practices which organizes social 
existence and social reproduction”… There are certain unspoken rules controlling which 
statements can be made and which cannot within the discourse, and these rules determine 
the nature of the discourse…. These rules concern such things as classification, the 
ordering and distribution of that knowledge of the world that the discourse both enables 
and delimits.
BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., KEY CONCEPTS IN POST-COLONIAL STUDIES 71 (1998).  For a definition that uses 
law as an example of discourse, see HERBERT KOHL, POWERFUL IDEAS FOR POWERFUL THINKING 59 
(1993).
315
 Ideology has been defined as: 
Ideas, attitudes, and values that represent the interests of a group or class of people.  
These ideas are expressed through the arts, and in all of the ways in which a group within 
a society displays its perception of the world….  Ideas do not express realities so much as 
the values of the people who control society.  They are false in that they claim truth and 
universality even though they are rooted in historically based economic relationships.  
Analyzing an ideology consists . . . of discovering how dominant systems of ideas relate 
to the actual needs, demands, and self-descriptions of the ruling class.
HERBERT KOHL, FROM ARCHETYPE TO ZEITGEIST POWERFUL IDEAS FOR POWERFUL THINKING 59 (1992).
316
 Postmodernism is a rejection of modernity and is characterized by the acceptance of ephemerality, 
fragmentation, discontinuity and attacks on the notion that there might be a metalanguage or metatheory 
through which all things can be connected or represented.  There is “an intense distrust of all global or 
totalizing discourses, a rejection of metanarratives, of large-scale theoretical interpretations, of universal 
application.  Postmodernism also rejects the Hegelian view of history and the idea of progress.” MADAN 
SARUP ET. AL., IDENTITY, CULTURE AND THE POSTMODERN WORLD 95 (1996).
317
 The entire idea of development epitomizes modernity, which has been described as follows:
Modernity is usually perceived as positivistic, technocratic and rationalistic.  It has been identified with the 
belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization 
of knowledge and its production.  The modernity project came into focus during the eighteenth century, and 
was an extraordinary intellectual effort on the part of Enlightenment thinkers to develop objective science, 
universal morality and autonomous art.  Enlightenment thinkers embraced the idea of progress; they 
believed in justice and in the possibility of the human happiness.  SARUP, supra note 316, at 94; Jane L. 
Parpart, Post-Modernism, Gender and Development, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 253 (Jonathan Crush, ed. 
1995).
318
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 2 (Postulating that it may be because the “myth of development” is part of the 
social imaginary of Western societies, that despite the transfer of goods, gadgets, capital, technology, 
hospitals and roads, the economic and socioeconomic accomplishments of the West have not necessarily 
been replicated in Third World countries.  He also notes that the economic, social and political 
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transformations of the Third World are inseparable from the production and reproduction of meanings, 
symbols and knowledge that is cultural reproduction.).
319 Id.
320
 For critical analysis of these and other widely accepted development concepts, see THE DEVELOPMENT 
DICTIONARY, supra note 1.
321 See Sardar, supra note 55, at 44 (“Western civilization is not located in a geographical space, for in 
these days of globalization it envelopes the globe with its desires, images, politics, and consumer and 
cultural products.”).
322 ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 91.  By the eighteenth century, the concept of Europe was solidly 
constructed as a sign of superiority and as being in opposition to the rest of the world’s cultures.  
Eurocentrism is also present in the very existence of such fields as anthropology, in the assumptions and 
practices of Christianity through mission education and mission activity, and in the assumed superiority of 
Western mathematics, cartography, art and numerous other cultural and social practices which have been 
claimed, or assumed to be based on a universal, objective set of values.  Id. at 91–92. 
323
 For instance, the West defines “civilization” by reference to technology, thereby measuring other 
civilizations by technological capabilities.  The Eurocentric idea of nation-state has been deemed to be the 
only desirable and legitimate form of political organization, forcing non-Western societies to organize in 
this manner.  Groups without a state are viewed as people without a home, such as the Kurds, gypsies and 
Jews before the state of Israel was established.  Freedom is defined in a way that does not incorporate basic 
needs such as hunger and housing or the subordination of freedom for more eminent goals such as 
community and tradition.  Instead the focus is the individual – which is the epitome of the Western view of 
freedom.  All of these Eurocentric categories play an intrinsic role in development.  Sardar, supra note 55, 
at 49.
324 ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 91–92.
325
 The non-West includes intellectuals, academics, writers, thinkers, novelists, politicians and decision-
makers in Asia, Africa and Latin America who use the West as the yardstick for measuring the social and 
political progress within their own societies.  Accordingly, the non-West promotes Eurocentrism, both 
wittingly and unwittingly, and colludes in its own victimization while simultaneously maintaining the 
global system of inequality.  Sardar, supra note 55, at 44.  
326
 Whether employing such terms as First World and Third World, or describing developed nations as 
post-industrial societies or as nations in the throes of advanced capitalism and the non-West as merely 
industrializing, Eurocentrism cannot be expunged from the concept of development.  “Development 
continues to mean what it has always meant: a standard by which the West measures the non-West.”  Id. at 
49.
327
 Notwithstanding the at times dubious motivations of its proponents, modernization or progress as 
defined by the West is not by definition objectionable – although its desirability can certainly be debated. 
Indeed, it has been the subject of much debate.  For a variety of perspectives, see THE POST-DEVELOPMENT 
READER, supra note 11.  Rather, it is to suggest that although the dominant Western view is only one 
perspective, it has been held to be the universal point of reference and the only perspective deemed worthy 
of shaping countless lives for the last fifty-five years; other views have been dismissed as invalid or 
irrelevant.  Esteva, supra note 1, at 6.
328 For a discussion of natural law in both its traditional and modern permutations, see Brian Bix, Natural 
Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 223 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999).
329
 For example, despite the challenges dependency theory presented to the prevailing economic order, it 
shared many of the underlying premises of the modernization discourse, never questioning the desirability 
of development and conceiving of it in terms of economic growth, industrialization and liberal democracy. 
Tucker, supra note 64, at 14.  The postmodern critique itself can be criticized as being part of the Western 
imagination and Western discourse and its demolition of such grand narratives as religion, tradition and 
history may be inimical to the interests of the non-West for it is these things that make the non-West, the 
non-West.  Sardar, supra note 55, at 45.
330
 Professor Kiely warns that dismissing development as Eurocentrism is “too simplistic, for it 
homogenizes both the West and the Third World and reduces the latter to passive recipients of the ideas of 
the former.  It then becomes difficult to imagine how the people of the Third World could behave in any 
way other than being simple puppets of the West.”  He contends that a satisfactory analysis of development 
would regard it not only as a European creation, but also as a reflection of the responses, reactions and 
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resistance of the people who are its objects.  He cautions that critics be careful to not reduce development 
to an idea without a history and that is impervious to change, when in fact development discourse – its 
language, strategy and practice – has changed over time, both in response to previous strategies and to 
shifts in power relations in the world.  Kiely, supra note 7, at 36.  
331
 At the level of policy makers, who are comprised of and national and international elites, the West has 
largely won the political, social and ideological battle.  Most Third World elites attend university in the 
West, have professors and teachers from the West, and have in many respects accepted the Western view of 
the world.  Tucker, supra note 64, at 13 (discussing the preponderance of universities, institutes, research 
grants and foundations in the West, all of which support and solidify certain world views).  Those who 
reject a Eurocentric worldview are marginalized as radicals, fundamentalists, cultural nationalists, or as 
being irrational, crazy or otherwise to be dismissed.  See Sardar, supra note 55, at 44– 62.  At the grassroots 
level, the acceptance or rejection of Eurocentricity may be more complex.  Here resistance to development 
can be found in myriad acts that are often classified as ignorance or lack of common sense.  These voices 
are reduced to what post-colonialist term “clamor.”  Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International 
Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827, 835 (2000) [hereinafter Gordon, Critical Race Theory].  
332 SARUP ET. AL., supra note 316, at 94. (discussing the enlightenment foundations of modernity). 
333 Sardar, supra note 55, at 44, 47–49.
334
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 1.  
335
 Indeed these underlying assumptions are so taken for granted that they often escape critical scrutiny.  Id.
at 7.
336 See, e.g., Teodor Shanin, The Idea of Progress, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 
65. 
337
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 7.
338 MITTELMAN & PASHA, supra note 59, at 38.  See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text on
Modernization theory.
339
 Sardar, supra note 55, at 49.
340 Tucker, supra note 64, at 7.  Under the rubric of modernization, Westernization gained the status of a 
universal goal and destiny.  Progress became not only inevitable, but also obligatory and orthodox 
development hinged on the absolute certainty of universal modernity.  To the “West development” and 
“modernization” characterized efforts by those in the Third World whom they implicitly assumed to be 
destined to achieve their levels of consumption.  Id. See also Jose Maria Sbert, Progress, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 192. 
341
 Colonialism was legitimized and grounded in part in a racial discourse that defined white Europeans as a 
superior race with a superior culture, and other races as inferior and in need of being civilized by whites.  
See Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 908–09; Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, supra
note 13, at 14–15. This raises questions regarding the role of race and culture in constructing development 
as discourse, as the largely colored colonized world became the colonized and then the underdeveloped 
Other.  While race is only one of many factors, it is an additional means to separate developers from “the 
other.”  It may make it is easier to view such peoples as incapable and, implicitly, as inferior.  See, e.g., 
Leonard Frank, The Development Game, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 262 (A 
Canadian described the make-up of his development project assessment “team” that it included an 
American, a Korean, a Japanese, a Dane, and a Bangladeshi, thrown in only for color.  He also admits his 
surprise and discomfort when the “Other” looked too white). Certainly there are also issues of class, and 
Third World elites also generally promote the development project.  It has been demonstrated that 
development theory and practice is gendered.  See, e.g., Kothari, supra note 23, at 39.  Yet the Third World 
is largely the colored world and thus it is at least worth questioning the degree to which race figures into 
the international hierarchy that development epitomizes.  Power within development discourse resides in 
the West, and more specifically in international institutions that are dominated by western, and primarily 
white, nations.  This is not to say that these Institutions do not employ people from many nations, including 
people of color from all parts of the world.  Nonetheless, the policies that emanate from these institutions 
are formed in Western capitals and institutions.   Markets now dominate, because the U.S. has decided that 
markets dominate.  To work in these Institutions one must believe in the models they propound.  
Alternative views are simply absorbed, watered-down co-opted, or dismissed.
342 Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12 (discussing trusteeship and colonialism as part of the 
civilizing mission and the white man’s burden of uplifting the natives); Parpart, supra note 316, at 261.
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343
 In its simplest formulation, “post-colonial” or “postcolonial” refers, chronologically, to the post 
independence period.  However, since the late 1970s, the term has had a more complex meaning and is 
utilized to discuss the various cultural effects of colonization.  See ASHCROFT ET AL., supra noe 314, at 186.
Postcolonial theory has been described as an “umbrella term for diverse critical approaches that deconstruct 
Western thought, and refers not to a simple periodisation but rather to a methodological revisionism that 
enables a wholesale critique of Western structures of knowledge and power.”  Kothari, supra note 23, at 39.  
For a discussion of the shifting and sometimes vague distinctions between postcolonial and post-colonial, 
see ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 314, at 186–92. 
344
 Kothari, supra note 23, at 36–37 (noting that there may not be a clear distinction between the before of 
colonialism and the after of independence, that can be viewed as two sharply contrasting periods separated 
by the moment of decolonization).
345
 Indeed, as early as 1937, one colonial governor said, “the exploitation theory… is dead, and the 
development theory has taken its place.”  Bernard Bordillon, The African Producer in Nigeria, WEST 
AFRICA, Jan 30, 1937, at 75, cited in 1 DEVESH KAPUR ET AL, supra note 30, at 96 n.35.  It took a while 
after the governor’s insight for the rhetoric to change, but change it did.  See Kothari, supra note 23, at 37 
(discussing the extent to which the end of colonialism may or may not have signaled an end to empire, 
although it did effectively suggest the end of a specific form of imperialism even as imperial interest and 
global reach continued to be present).
346
 Parpart, supra note 316, at 261.  This language then provides the rationale for the neo-classic market-
oriented reforms being forced on Third World governments with the promise that they will reconstruct their 
economies.  Id. 
347 Escobar, Planning,  supra note 157, at 135.  
348
 While colonial discourse constructed an obligation to undertake the white man’s burden and civilize the 
natives, such considerations were clearly secondary to the economic and political aspects of colonialism.   
With development, the West now had an obligation, and indeed was morally obligated to intervene in the 
Third World and modernize the underdevelopment. 
349
 Kothari, supra note 23, at 39.  Professor Kathari continues that “the boundaries and distinctions that 
formerly marked the power relations between colonizers and the colonized continue to be played out, and 
are reinscribed on the relationship between development and administrators and recipients of aid.”  Id.
350
 Sbert, supra note 340, at 192.
351
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 13 (noting that the media is based in Western nations and is accompanied by 
the overwhelming dominance of European and North American Universities, foundations, institutes and 
research resources. Western scholars can obtain grants to study in the Third World, while it is more 
difficult for Third World scholars to study in the West, and when they do; they are socialized into the 
dominant paradigms of Western thinking.   The unequal relationship that persists between the West and the 
Third World is an integral part of this process).
352 Id.
353
 That the Other is lacking, deficient and inferior follows from a colonial discourse that viewed certain 
races and peoples as inferior and in need the benefits of civilization dispensed by their colonizer.  See 
generally Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12; BASIL DAVILSON, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN 
AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE (1993).
354
 On “helping,” see Marianne Gronemeyer, Helping, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 
53.
355 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 40–41.
356 Id. at 41 (noting that “abnormalities were identified, such as the illiterate, the underdeveloped, the 
malnourished, small farmers, or landless peasants, which development would later treat and reform”).
357
 Additional subjects included cities, rural areas, housing, schools, factories, hospitals, towns, regions and 
habitat.  These ever-proliferating categories came from a range of sources, including governments, 
universities, research centers and the expanding international institutional edifice.  Other categories and 
objects, such as cultural attitudes and values and the existence of racial, religious, geographic, or ethnic 
factors that were believed to be associated with backwardness, were later introduced, but with more caution 
or surreptitiously.  Id. at at 41–42.  Professor Escobar notes that the never-ending specification of problems 
required detailed observation at all levels of a particular society, and accordingly complete profiles of 
countries were developed and elaborated.  Id. at 42.  The techniques for gathering this data have been 
refined and expanded.  Indeed a cursory examination of the World Bank’s Website confirms this, for 
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complete country profiles of most countries can be found covering a wealth of information.  See infra notes 
378–79 and accompanying text for discussion in the reliability of this data and its place in World Bank 
analysis.
358
 “Client categories” were created and proliferated as populations were consistently and continually found 
to be lacking and in need of treatment and reform.  ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at at 41.
359 Tucker, supra note 64, at 7. Development planners and practitioners often dismiss as inconsequential 
the voices of the individuals whose impoverishment they seek to address.  Kothari, supra note 23, at 39.
360
 There is a close connection between control over knowledge and assertions of power.  For example, 
Western scientific knowledge is represented as universally valid and thus applicable to all, but not everyone 
qualified as an expert.
361 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41; Tucker, supra note 64, at 7.  Adaptation became a key concept, for 
peoples and groups had to adapt.  Tucker, supra note 64, at 7.  
362 See Anders Narman & David Simon, Introduction, in DEVELOPMENT AS THEORY AND PRACTICE 
CURRENT PROSEPCTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 8 (David Simon et al. eds., 
1999).  For a revealing account from inside the development community, see Frank, supra note 342, at 262.  
This account of how a multinational team of experts approved a project to develop a rural area on the 
North-West frontier of Afghanistan demonstrates that when the “facts” do not fit reality, reality is ignored; 
that local knowledge is purposely ignored when it would mean that expert knowledge is unnecessary; that 
areas can be “hot”  for all sorts of reasons, having very little to do with the needs of local people; and that 
the objects of development are presumed to be people of color (Mr. Frank notes his surprise that these 
people were not the colored people he usually encountered on such missions).  See also ESCOBAR, supra 
note 19, at 41.  Moreover, the expert focus on promoting change at any cost raises issues of cultural 
imperialism. 
363 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 45.  Escobar queries: why cash crops (to generate foreign exchange, and 
thus to obtain capital and technology) and centralized planning, instead of participatory and decentralized 
approaches; why agricultural development based on large mechanized farms, instead of alternative 
agricultural systems based on smaller farms, ecological considerations, integrated cropping and pest 
management; why rapid economic growth, but not internal markets to satisfy the needs of the masses of 
people; why capital intensive, but not labor intensive solutions.  Some of these choices are now being 
considered, given the profound disasters facing many developing countries and their developers.  But this 
reconsideration still takes place within the developmental framework.  Id. at 43.
364
 The historical and cultural location of the “expert” may make it impossible to shake off this status, by
simply adopting participatory techniques, for it is a question of political power.  Kothari, supra note 23, at 
39.  For a detailed critique of participation, see Rahnema, supra note 11, at 116.
365 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41 (noting that communities responded to the development agenda in 
myriad ways that sometimes incorporated resistance, and there were manifold failures as developers tried 
and failed to bring about modernization); Kothari, supra note 23, at 39 (noting development planners and 
practitioners often dismissed as inconsequential, the voices of the individuals whose impoverishment and 
marginality they were seeking to address); Tucker, supra note 64, at 7–8 (Observing that development was 
not conceived of as a cultural process.  Rather culture was a “residual variable that would disappear with 
the advent of modernization. Thus it is unsurprising that development has wrecked havoc on Third World 
cultures, ironically in their name and in their interest.  These multiple and varied encounters “were 
subsumed under the category of tradition, an essentially pejorative term that denoted divergence from the 
generally accepted norms of reason and progress.”).
366
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 13.
367 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41. 
368 Esteva, supra note 1, at 13.  See generally THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY, supra note 1
(deconstructing such familiar “devspeak” terms as, inter alia, planning, participation, poverty, progress, 
population, needs, helping, development).
369 Kothari, supra note 23, at 38; ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41 (remarking that it is “Western dominated 
institutions that determine the practices and procedures for all problems, theories, or objects that surface 
and are then named, analyzed and eventually transformed into a policy or a plan”).
370 ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 41.
371
 Within the broad parameters of the policies set by the West, Third World countries may have some 
agency over the specifics and emphasis of projects.  See Frank, supra note 342, at 262.
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372 Kothari , supra note 23, at 39.  Professor Kathori continues that “the boundaries and distinctions that 
formerly marked the power relations between colonizers and the colonized continue to be played out, and 
are reinscribed within the relationship between development and administrators and recipients of aid.” Id.
373
 The following discussion of Egypt can be found in Timothy Mitchell, The Object of Development 
America’s Egypt, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 129–57 (Jonathan Crush ed., 1995). Professor Mitchell 
contends that the following description of Egypt can be found in almost any study of Egypt produced by an 
American or an international development agency:
The geographical and demographic characteristics of Egypt delineate its basic problem.  
Although the country contains about 386,000 square miles, . . . only a narrow strip in the 
Nile Valley and its Delta is usable.  This areas of 15,000 square miles – less than 4 
percept of the land – is but an elongated oasis in the midst of desert.  Without the Nile, 
which flows through Egypt for about a thousand miles without being joined by a single 
tributary, the country would be part of the Sahara.  Crammed into the habitable area is 98 
per cent of the population . . . the population has been growing rapidly and is estimated to 
have doubled since 1947.
The popularity of this image of space and numbers is summed up in a World Bank report: “These two 
themes – the relatively fixed amount of usable land and the rapid growth of the population – will be seen as 
leitmotifs in the discussion of Egypt’s Economic problems.”  Moreover, the image of a traditional rural 
world implies a system of agriculture that is static and therefore incapable of changing itself; thus any 
impetus for change must come from the outside. Yet political and economic changes in rural Egypt have 
taken place since the Middle Ages.  Ignoring these transformations creates the impression that the poverty 
of the Nile Valley is a traditional poverty of a peasantry that only recently joined the twentieth century.  
Thus only external forces can provide the impetus to transform Egyptian agriculture.  New capital 
investment, new irrigation methods, improved seed varieties and cut flowers, all of which will bring the 
foreign capital required to finance such technologies, become the principal means to achieve this 
transformation.
374
 The World Bank posits that “the development problem is essentially a question of the quantity, quality 
and proportion of resources to be devoted to development on the one hand and to economic management on 
the other.”  Thus the productive limits imposed by nature will be overcome by the forces of technology, 
while existing natural resources will be made more productive by more efficient management, which turns 
out to mean dismantling the bureaucracy of the Egyptian state and permitting market forces to work their 
magic.  Mitchell, supra note 373, at 139.
375
 Professor Mitchell questions why population densities in Egypt are compared to those in Bangladesh 
and Indonesia, rather than say Belgium or South Korea where population densities “are respectively three 
and four times higher than Indonesia.” Id. In other words, high population density is not necessarily an 
indication of overpopulation.  While Egypt’s population level per hectare of arable land is similar to that of 
Bangladesh, and about double that of Indonesia, this comparison is misleading for Egyptian output per 
hectare is more than three times that of both countries.  A more realistic comparison might be with the 
Philippines and Thailand, countries that are similar in total population and per capita gross national 
product, combined with far greater areas of cultivated land.  But even with less land, Egypt’s agricultural 
population produces more crops per person than either of these countries.  Professor Mitchell also asserts 
that there is no prima facie evidence for the assumption that Egypt’s population of 50 million is too large 
for its cultivable area.  On a global level, given the demand on resources that the average Egyptian makes 
on world resources, versus the average citizen of industrialized countries, it is arguable whether Egyptian
population growth threaten the world’s limited resources.  But the corollary to the population argument is 
the rate at which the population is growing and that this rapid growth is surpassing the country’s ability to 
feed itself.  Id. at 131–32.
376
 Mitchell notes that according to World Bank tables, between 1965 and 1980, Egypt’s population grew at 
an annual rate of 2.1 percent a year, but agricultural production grew at an even faster rate of 2.7 percent a 
year.  Thus it is not true that the population has been growing faster that the county’s ability to feed itself.  
He maintains that the reason Egypt has had to import increasing amounts of food can be found by 
examining the kinds of food being consumed and who gets to consume it.  Egypt actually has a high rate of 
calorie consumption, with average protein consumption exceeding that found in most middle and high-
income countries.  The problem is that the shift has come in higher levels of food consumption among the 
better off, and most especially a higher consumption of meat, which means that food production has in part 
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shifted to food for animals that are then slaughtered and sold as meat.  It is the switch to meat consumption, 
rather than an increase in population that has required the dramatic increase in food imports. Id. at 132–36.
377
 The image of a narrow strip of fertile land crammed with millions of inhabitants enables the analysis of 
Egyptian economic development to quickly eclipse the issue of access to land, because with so many 
people occupying so little space the problem appears to be explained.  Images are painted of millions of 
tiny parcels and not enough land to go around. (The average size of a holding is two feddans, 94% of all 
owners have less than five feddans each, and only 0.2 percent have at least 50 feddans each.)  But given the 
extremely fertile soils, year-round sunshine and permanently available irrigation water, very high yields can 
be obtained from two or even three crops a year and thus holdings of less than five feddans are not as small 
as they may seem and are well above the minimum farm size required for a family farm to feed itself 
(estimated at 0.8 feddans).  These figures also fail to mention that the remaining six percent of landowners, 
with holdings from five feddans up to the legal limit of 50 feddans per individual or 100 feddans per family 
with dependent children, controlled 33 percent of the country’s agricultural area and this concentration is 
increasing.  It may also be that these official figures, which rely on village land registers, under-represent 
the concentration of landholding. Id. at 136–39.
378
 For a discussion of how World Bank data and studies are created and utilized, see Gavin Williams, 
Modernizing Malthus The World Bank, Population Control and the African Environment, in POWER OF 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 158 (analyzing a World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa and noting 
how data and impressive looking tables are often included, but bare little relation to the report, that much of 
the research that is commissioned is of poor quality and when it is good, it is not used or is shaped to fit 
pre-determined outcomes).  See also Frank, supra note 342, at 262.
379 The development project never sees itself as part of the problem and therefore developers rarely 
acknowledge responsibility for development’s many failures.  The World Bank acknowledges failures, but 
seldom acknowledges its involvement in such failures.  Typically the blame is placed on its partner 
governments, and sometimes on the people themselves.  An example can be found in the World Bank’s 
analysis of sub-Saharan Africa, which in itself is questionable given the great variety of cultures, 
conditions, environmental settings and other factors that can be found in Africa.  The Bank does not ask 
whether whole approaches, such importing chemical and mechanical technologies might be inappropriate.  
Instead it recommends more of the same.  The environmental consequences of World Bank strategies are 
rarely considered.  Instead, African women are identified as a cause of environmental damage.   The Bank 
overlooks the consequences of mechanized farming and chemical fertilizers, and of damns and irrigation 
projects.  The Report on Sub-Saharan Africa also draws no distinction between pastoralists and cultivators, 
or between capitalist farms and peasant smallholdings. Moreover, World Bank projects consistently 
privilege large-scale farmers who are politically influential, easier to reach and responsive to advice from 
project officials. Williams, supra note 378, at 158, 165.  Much credit is claimed for perceived successes, 
however, such as the so-called Asian miracles of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.  This 
too is a constructed space for it is doubtful that these “successes” had anything to do with the prescriptions 
advanced by development agencies.  See O’Hearn, supra note 4, at 113–34.
380
 Professor Mitchell notes:
The discourse of international development constitutes itself in this way as an expertise 
and intelligence that stands completely apart from the country and the people it describes.  
Much of this intelligence is generated inside organizations such as the World Bank and 
USAID, which play a powerful economic and political role within countries like Egypt.  
International development has a special need to overlook this internal involvement in the 
places and problems it analyzes.
Mitchell, supra note 373, at 130.
381 Sardar, supra note 55, at 46.  For example, the newly industrialized countries or larger Third World
countries such as China, India and Brazil are now engaged in manufacturing and industries that are no 
longer found in the post-industrialized West.   As the West abandons a particular activity, it is relegated to 
the Third World. Sardar writes:  
The present of the non-West is the past of the West, and the future of developing 
countries is the present of the West.  When the non-West reaches the point of 
development, it has already become the past of the West, meaning the non-West has no 
real future since its future is already known in Europe and America.  Parts of the non-
West are the distant, pre-industrial revolution past of the North.  The West was not just 
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history; it is remade in the present and reconstructed in the future. … At each stage, it is 
internalized more and more and becomes an integral part of the global consciousness.  As 
such, the future has been colonized by the West. … The future is defined in the image of 
the West… taking us towards a single, determined future. … An illusion of accelerated 
movement is produced to create an illusion of inevitability and to shroud the Eurocentric 
dimension of the exercise.  Conventionally, the colonization of the future was known as 
Westernization.  Now it goes under the rubric of globalization. The process that is 
transforming the world into the proverbial global village, rapidly shrinking distances, 
compressing space and time, is also shaping the world in the image of a single culture 
and civilization. In this Eurocentric vision of the future, technology is projected as an 
autonomous and desirable force.  Its desirable products generate more desire; its second-
order side effects require more technology to solve them.  Thus there is a perpetual 
feedback loop and this self-perpetuating momentum has locked us in a linear, one 
dimensional trajectory that has foreclosed the future of the non-West.
Id.
382
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 3.
383 Id.
384
 For a discussion of the gap between theoreticians and practitioners, see Narman & Simon, supra note at 
362, at 1–2 (Noting practitioners are preoccupied with action, which is often not placed in a larger context, 
while academics are concerned with understanding.  Politician, planners and administrators would prefer to 
not question development because it would threaten international consensus, instead devoting time to 
international conferences where declarations are formulated that are to be translated into development 
policy.).
385
 These critiques and post-modernism in general have also been subjected to critique   See Sardar, supra
note 55, at 45–46; supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.  Sardar, supra note 55, at 45.
386 Simon, supra note 10, at 17.
387 Id.  Professor Simon also cites “the collapse of socialism” which was viewed as an alternative model of 
development, the growing economic diversity of countries in the Third World, increasing concern for 
environmental sustainability; increasing assertiveness of voices from below and the rise of the postmodern 
challenge to universalizing theories and conventional practices of development.  Id.
388 See Arturo Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 
211, 216–20 [hereinafter Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era]; Watts, supra note 24, at 44, 57–60; 
D.L. Sheth, Alternatives from an Indian Grassroots Perspective, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, 
supra note 11, at 329.
389 Watts, supra note 24, at 44– 46.
390 Id. at 45.  Others state “development appears as a blunder of planetary proportions, an edifice which 
shows cracks and is starting to crumble.  At its most understated, there is a sense of malaise, a crisis of 
developmentalism (practice) and an impasse in development thinking (theory).
391 Martin Minogue and Uma Kothari, Conclusion: Orthodoxy and its Alternatives in Contemporary 
Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 179–80 [hereinafter Minogue & 
Kothari, Conclusion]. 
392
 Practitioners do usually agree, however, that development should have a human face, and that target 
populations should be permitted to participate in planning programs and implementing them. Rahnema, 
supra note 11, at 381.
393 Id. (Noting that there is a real danger that the many plausible arguments against development will be 
used to take funds that would be used for development and direct them to other uses.  Perhaps it is better to 
spend the funds on agricultural projects, food, shelter and health care, however questionable such spending 
may be from philosophical point of view, than on say security and weapons.  But are they not connected.  
Can repressive states obtain funds more easily when security requests are coupled with requests for 
development assistance.).  The recent spectacle at the UN, with the U.S. bribing or threatening states with 
development aid to persuade them to vote for a resolution to use force in Iraq, really crystallizes this point.
See, e.g., Henry J. Richardson, III, U.S. Hegemony, Race, and Oil in Deciding United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, 17 TEMP. INT’L L.J. 27 (2003).
394
 The so-called “Asian tigers” are often presented as proof that development can, and eventually will, 
work.  The economies of South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are frequently 
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offered as proof of the viability of the Washington consensus and the triumph of export led growth based 
on markets.  Yet the rapid modernization of these nations had little to do with the international 
development paradigm.  For a devastating critique of the viability, sustainability and perhaps the myth of 
the Asian Tigers, see O’Hearn, supra note 4, at 117.
395 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 381. Professor Rahnema was UN 
Representative in Mali and coordinator of other development projects.  She also notes that the bulk of the 
world’s resources are being utilized for arms and repressive governments and she questions whether or not 
these funds might be better spent on development projects, even if they are flawed.
396 Kiely, supra note 7, at 36.  Professor Kiely maintains that the idea that needs and poverty are solely 
social and cultural constructions, mistake the word for the world and can create conditions wherein a 
positive local politics of empowerment slides fitfully into an amoral politics of indifference.  Id.  In other 
words, it may case the rich to simply disengage.  See also Jan Nederveen Pieterse, My Paradigm or Yours? 
Alternative Development, Post-Development, Reflexive Development, 29 DEV. & CHANGE 343 (1998).
397 Simon, supra note 10, at 17.
398
 Both authors have visited Southern countries and witnessed the need for these “comforts,” and thus take 
these criticisms very seriously.  See Sylvester, supra note 6.
399 It is maintained that the anti-development thesis does not take us “beyond the dualisms of modernity and 
tradition, and dominant and dominated” and is rather vague about alternatives as it romanticizes local 
cultures. Kiely, supra note 7, at 36–37.  Professor Kiely notes that the idea that development always 
undermines authentic cultures “can itself be considered a form of cultural imperialism, based on a long 
tradition of romanticizing the ‘Other.’"  Id.
400 See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 8.  Professors Narman and Simon point out that silence is 
often taken for lack of knowledge, while it could really arise out of courtesy, a desire to not disagree or 
offend or to disclose information considered too private.   Noting the targets of development, however, 
have been quite “ingenious in filtering the advice and instructions received from development 
professionals.”  They have not been as passive as might be thought and have been able to be selective in 
accordance with their own needs and perceptions through their cultural filters.
401 Given the amount of controlled exercised by international financial institutions over the economies, 
politics and societal choices in the nations of the Third World, it does not seem to be too far from 
colonialism.  Indeed the discourse of racial, social, political and cultural superiority that justified 
colonialism, underlies the development discourse. Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 926.
402
 It has been argued that nations do not necessarily participate in the globalization project “as nations 
inevitably on their way to modernity, but as pragmatic and strategic actors in a much more restricted game 
that is governed by free trade, specializing in what can be done without the aid of protection, privatization, 
and living within ones means.” O’Hearn, supra note 4, at 117.
403 Escobar posits that there is little point in speculating in the abstract about the character of a post-
development era, for if we accept that critical thought must be situated, then a discussion of these issues 
should be practice-oriented, engaging with the political claims and actions of oppositional movements.  See
Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, supra note 388, at 211, 216. 
404
 Simply put, “would the Third World have been better off without development assistance?” See, e.g., 
Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 7.
405 Id.
406
 Of course, it is international capital that has decided that Western workers no longer will do certain 
types of work.  Chantel Thomas, Globalization and the Production of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1451 (2000) (discussing when corporations relocate to the Third World in search of cheap labor, less 
governmental regulation and the like). 
407 See, e.g., Narman & Simon, supra note 362, at 1–2.
408 See Illich, supra note 42, at 88 (discussing the evolution of needs in development discourse, as it 
evolved from food, clothing, materials for housing and mechanical power into a measurable standard such 
as Gross National Product and then into notions of absolute poverty and minimum levels of human 
decency).
409 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 377, 379.  The pre-development world was also 
the colonized world and colonialism was a destructive force that disrupted communities, changed cultures 
and had complex effects across very complex cultures.  Thus developers did not confront pristine societies 
untouched by the West.  See Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528 (1999).
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410 Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 12, at 930–35.
411 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text on poverty. 
412 Illich, supra note 42, at 88, 96 (Noting in “traditional poverty, people could rely on finding a cultural 
hemlock,” but development is a process which “lifts people out of their traditional cultural commons,”
dissolving such cultural bonds.  Many are sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of worsening poverty 
from which they will never be able to rise and meet their new needs.).
413 For a discussion of the modern-traditional dichotomy, see ESCOBAR, supra note 19, at 75–80; Escobar, 
Planning, supra note 157, at 135–36.
414
 Cultures change, but development viewed tradition and Third World cultures as impediments to 
modernization and thus to be eradicated in favor of development.  Indeed development can be visualized as 
a process by which people are lifted out of their cultural commons.  In this transition, cultural bonds are 
dissolved, even though culture can continue to tinge development in superficial ways – one need only 
observe rural people recently transplanted to the megacities of the Third World. ESCOBAR, supra note 19, 
at 75–80; Escobar, Planning, supra note 157, at 135–36.
415 McGee, Participating in Development, in DEVELOPMENT THEORY at 93, 95–96.  (Noting early 
orthodoxy when the “development agency conceived, designed, funded, managed, implemented and 
evaluated the project from somewhere outside its boundaries”; and there were the project beneficiaries –
undifferentiated, passive recipients of goods and services provided through project channels.  People –
whether in the agency or in the beneficiary population – were scarcely acknowledged to be there.”  
Beginning the 1980s higher levels of “participation” came into vogue, but even these interventions were 
problematic.).
416 See Doug J. Porter, Scenes from Childhood the Homesickness of Development Discourses, in POWER OF 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 17, at 63 (noting that discourse analysis at minimum might make development 
workers aware of their practices).
417 This analysis does not take account of situations involving war or similar conflicts.  The responsibilities 
of the international community in any such situation necessarily differ from that in times of peace, 
regardless of where a particular nation stands on the modernization scale. 
418 Racial difference on the international stage cannot be equated with notions of race in the United States. 
But it is equally clear that a racial discourse partly inspired colonial discourse and is not irrelevant in 
foreign policy.  It certainly colors perceptions of the developing world, which is inevitably seen as the 
colored world.  Gordon, Critical Race Theory, supra note 331.  It is also acknowledged that development 
practitioners come from all over the world and thus may be people of color.  This does not mean race is 
irrelevant, but that it may be that its effect is more complex and difficult to sort out.   
419
 Tucker, supra note 64, at 3.
420 Sardar, supra note 55, at 44.  The West defines freedom, progress, law, tradition, community science, 
what is real and what it means to be human.  Non-Western societies must accept these definitions or cease 
to exist.  Id.
421 Participation attempts to incorporate the voice of development’s target in the process of development.  
For a discussion of the evolution of “participation,” see McGee, supra note 114, at 93.  See also Rahnema, 
Participation, supra note 155, at 116; Minogue & Kothari, Conclusion, supra note 391, at 185–86.
422 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 377, 379.  See also Richard Douthwaite, Is it 
Possible to Build a Sustainable World, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY, supra note 4, at 158–60 
(detailing why the current global economic system is unsustainable).
423 See, e.g., Eduardo Galeano, To Be Like Them, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 
214.
424
 Often when these questions are raised, the immediate response is that everyone wants what the West
offers and the person raising the question is queried about whether he or she would give up their Western 
life-style.  Third World scholars are similarly interrogated, and if they reside in the West, are presented as 
proof that all peoples desire life in the West.  For those born and raised in Western countries, this is truly an 
unfair question, for few are willing to change their entire way of life, especially when that life has always 
been posited as superior and the alternative posited as inferior.  The Western brain drain is certainly a 
reality, as Western educated elites seek jobs in the North.  And while it is true that many elites have 
embraced development wholeheartedly, not all Third World elites have migrated to the West.  Moreover, it 
may be difficult to straddle the morass left in the wake of development, which has left many with few 
viable economic options besides re-settling in the West.  Leaving may be the only reasonable course, and 
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thus many leave even as they make their life work helping those left behind.  Finally it is not argued that 
the West is inferior and undesirable and no one would choose it.  Indeed many have and many undoubtedly 
will.  What is posed is how to give people the choice to direct the change, or lack thereof, that will govern 
their lives.
425
 This would include, if not prioritize, the waste and environmental degradation wrought by the 
industrialized world.
426 While the demonstrations and other actions against globalizations are more or less ridiculed in the 
United States by the American media, this resistance has continued and is perhaps expanding.
427
 Escobar, Imagining a Post Development Era, supra note 388, at 211, 217. 
428
 Escobar notes that these new social movements are often compared with the old, meaning 
“modernization or dependency; politics centered around traditional actors like parties, vanguards, and the 
working class who struggle for the control of the state; and to a view of society as composed of more or 
less immutable structures an class relations that only great changes (i.e. massive development schemes or 
revolutionary upheavals) can alter in a significant way.” Id.  He suggests that there may be significant 
continuities between the two regimes, including ways in which “for instance, old styles of politics are 
pervasive among the new movements – are overlooked.” Id.  Equally important the past is endowed with 
features that are not completely accurate (for instance the claim that all styles of politics in the past were 
clientilistic and non-participatory).  Id.
429 Most of these social movements have been in Latin America. Id.
430
 This insight is found in Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, From Global Thinking to Local 
Thinking, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997) at 277.  
This quite brilliant essay begins with the bumper stickers that urge its reader to “think globally, act locally,” 
noting that it reflects the desire to act in solidarity with those on the periphery of globalization.  But they 
propose that perhaps the best course is to think locally and act locally, given that all even MNCs must sell 
and make their products locally.  Indeed, to this extent, all global projects, including the development 
project, is local.  It may be impossible to challenge such entities globally because most localities are unable 
to act effectively at the global level, which can be seen in some of the difficulties faced by the anti-
globalization movements.  But there may be more possibilities to mount such challenges on the local level.
431 See Esteva, From Global Thinking to Local Thinking, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 
11, at 286–88 (suggesting this role). By supporting local communities as they attempt to take on global 
capital and international institutions, there is a space for intervention by Western communities that want to 
assist.
432 See supra notes 6, 164–65, 168 and accompanying text.  For an excellent anysis of the debt problem in
Africa, see Chris N. Okeke, The Debt burden:An African Perspective, 35 INT’L LAW 1489 (2001); Susan 
George, How the Poor Develop the Rich, in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, supra note 11, at 207
(detailing how the debt drains funds from the Third World and enriches the industrialized world).
433 See, e.g., Ruth Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 43 (1996).
434 Rahnema, Towards Post-Development, supra note 11, at 384. Industrialization might be rejected by 
some, welcomed by others or it might be restructured to meet local needs; other alternatives would be on 
the table. Health care and other basic social services might be embraced, or perhaps reshaped and then 
supported.
